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HISTORY 


HANNIBAL  THE  CARTHAGINIAN 


BY   JACOB   ABBOTT. 


S®ft|)  23ngrabfnfls 


NEW    YORK: 
HARPER    &    BROTHERS,    PUBLISHERS. 

1872. 


< 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  fort}-- nine,  by 

Harper  &  Brothers, 

to  the  Clerk's  Office  cf  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District 
of  New  York. 


PREFACE. 


The  author  of  this  series  has  made  it  his  spe- 
cial object  to  confine  himself  very  strictly,  even 
in  the  most  minute  details  which  he  records,  to 
historic  truth.  The  narratives  are  not  tales 
founded  upon  history,  but  history  itself,  without 
any  embellishment  or  any  deviations  from  the 
strict  truth,  so  far  as  it  can  now  be  discovered 
by  an  attentive  examination  of  the  annals  writ- 
ten, at  the  time  when  the  events  themselves  oc- 
curred. In  writing  the  narratives,  the  author 
has  endeavored  to  avail  himself  of  the  best 
sources  of  information  which  this  country  af- 
fords ;  and  though,  of  course,  there  must  be  in 
these  volumes,  as  in  all  historical  narratives, 
more  or  less  of  imperfection  and  error,  there  is 
no  intentional  embellishment.  Nothing  is  stat- 
ed, not  even  the  most  minute  and  apparently 


viii  Preface. 

imaginary  details,  without  what  was  deemed 
good  historical  authority.  The  readers,  there- 
fore, may  rely  upon  the  record  as  the  truth,  an  I 
nothing  but  the  truth,  so  far  as  an  honest  pur 
pose  and  a  careful  examination  has  bi  en  effect- 
ual  in  ascertaining  it. 


CONTENTS. 


Chapter  Pag« 

I.  THE    FIRST    PUNIC    WAR 13 

II.  HANNIBAL  AT    SAGUNTUM 33 

III.  OPENING    OF    THE    SECOND    PUNIC    WAR 52 

IV.  THE    PASSAGE    OF    THE    RHONE 69 

V.  HANNIBAL    CROSSES    THE  ALPS 90 

VI.  HANNIBAL    IN    THE    NORTH    OF    ITALY 126 

VII.  THE   APENNINES 144 

fill.  THE    DICTATOR    FABIUS 163 

IX.  THE    BATTLE    OF   CANN.E 185 

X.  SCIPIO 205 

XI.  HANNIBAL    A    FUGITIVE    AND    AN    EXILE 235 

XII.  THE    DESTRUCTION    OF    CARTHAGE 262 


ENGRAVINGS. 


.   .Page 

map Frontispiece. 

THE    BATTLE   IN    THE   RIVER 42 

THE    ELEPHANTS    CROSSING   THE   RHONE 87 

HANNIBAL   ON    THE    ALPS Ill 

crossing  the  marshes. 161 

hasdrubal's  head 227 

the  burning  of  the  carthaginian  fleet 242 


illuminated  Title-page,  from  a  design  by  Gwilt  Mapleson.  The 
colors,  red  and  blue,  as  seen  in  this  design,  were  those  always  used 
by  the  Carthaginians.  In  the  border  are  representations  of  the  shields, 
lances,  bows,  and  quivers,  which  they  employed,  and  at  the  foot  of  the 
page  is  a  Carthaginian  ship. 


\ 


HANNIBAL. 

Chapter   I. 
The  First  Punic  War. 


Hannibal.  Rome  and  Carthaga 

TXANNIBAL  was  a  Carthaginian  general 
■",  *  He  acquired  his  great  distinction  as  a  war  • 
rior  by  his  desperate  contests  with  the  Romans, 
Rome  and  Carthage  grew  up  together  on  oppo- 
site sides  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  For  about 
a  hundred  years  they  waged  against  each  other 
most  dreadful  wars.  There  were  three  of  these 
wars.  Rome  was  successful  in  the  end,  and 
Carthage  was  entirely  destroyed. 

There  was  no  real  cause  for  any  disagreement 
between  these  two  nations.  Their  hostility  to 
each  other  was  mere  rivalry  and  spontaneous 
hate.  They  spoke  a  different  language ;  they 
had  a  different  origin ;  and  they  lived  on  oppo- 
site sides  of  the  same  sea.  So  they  hated  and 
devoured  each  other. 

Those  who  have  read  the  history  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  in  this  series,  will  recollect  the  diffi- 


14  Hannibal.  [B.C.  280 

Tyre.  Founding  of  Carthage.  Its  commercial  spirit 

culty  he  experienced  in  besieging  and  subduing 
Tyre,  a  great  maritime  city,  situated  about  two 
miles  from  the  shore,  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea.  Carthage  was  originally 
founded  by  a  colony  from  this  city  of  Tyre,  and 
it  soon  became  a  great  commercial  and  mari- 
time power  like  its  mother.  The  Carthaginians 
built  ships,  and  with  them  explored  all  parts  of 
the  Mediterranean  Sea.  They  visited  all  the 
nations  on  these  coasts,  purchased  the  commod- 
ities they  had  to  sell,  carried  them  to  other  na- 
tions, and  sold  them  at  great  advances.  They 
soon  began  to  grow  rich  and  powerful.  They 
hired  soldiers  to  fight  their  battles,  and  began 
to  take  possession  of  the  islands  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and,  in  some  instances,  of  points  on  the 
main  land.  For  example,  in  Spain:  some  of 
their  ships,  going  there,  found  that  the  natives 
had  silver  and  gold,  which  they  obtained  from 
veins  of  ore  near  the  surface  of  the  ground.  At 
first  the  Carthaginians  obtained  this  gold  and 
silver  by  selling  the  natives  commodities  of  va- 
rious kinds,  which  they  had  procured  in  other 
countries ;  paying,  of  course,  to  the  producers 
only  a  very  small  price  compared  with  what 
they  required  the  Spaniards  to  pay  them.  Fi- 
nally, they  took  possession  of  that  part  of  Spain 


B.C.280.)    First  Punic    War.  15 

Gold  and  silver  mines.  New  Carthage.  Ships  and  army 

where  the  mines  were  situated,  and  worked  the 
mines  themselves.  They  dug  deeper ;  they  em- 
ployed skillful  engineers  to  make  pumps  to  raise 
the  water,  which  always  accumulates  in  mines, 
and  prevents  their  being  worked  to  any  great 
depth  unless  the  miners  have  a  considerable  de- 
gree of  scientific  and  mechanical  skill.  Thej 
founded  a  city  here,  which  they  called  New  Car- 
thage— Nova  Carthago.  They  fortified  and 
garrisoned  this  city,  and  made  it  the  center  of 
their  operations  in  Spain.  This  city  is  called 
Carthagena  to  this  day. 

Thus  the  Carthaginians  did  every  thing  by 
power  of  money.  They  extended  their  opera- 
tions in  every  direction,  each  new  extension 
bringing  in  new  treasures,  and  increasing  their 
means  of  extending  them  more.  They  had,  be- 
sides the  merchant  vessels  which  belonged  to 
private  individuals,  great  ships  of  war  belong 
ing  to  the  .state.  These  vessels  were  called 
galleys,  and  were  rowed  by  oarsmen,  tier  above 
tier,  there  being  sometimes  four  and  five  banks 
of  oars.  They  had  armies,  too,  drawn  from  dif- 
ferent countries,  in  various  troops,  according  as 
different  nations  excelled  in  the  different  modes 
of  warfare.  For  instance,  the  Numidians,  whose 
country  extended  in  the  neighborhood  of  Car- 


16  Hannibal.  [B.C.  ^Ot 

Numidia.  Balearic  Isles.  The  sling 

thage,  on  the  African  coast,  were  famous  for 
their  horsemen.  There  were  great  plains  in 
Numidia,  and  good  grazing,  and  it  was,  conse- 
quently, one  of  those  countries  in  which  horses 
and  horsemen  naturally  thrive.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  natives  of  the  Balearic  Isles,  now  call- 
ed Majorca,  Minorca,  and  Ivica,  were  famous 
for  their  skill  as  slingers.  So  the  Carthagini- 
ans, in  making  up  their  forces,  would  hire  bod- 
ies of  cavalry  in  Numidia,  and  of  slingers  in  the 
Balearic  Isles ;  and,  for  reasons  analogous,  they 
got  excellent  infantry  in  Spain. 

The  tendency  of  the  various  nations  to  adopt 
and  cultivate  different  modes  of  warfare  was 
far  greater,  in  those  ancient  times,  than  now. 
The  Balearic  Isles,  in  fact,  received  their  name 
from  the  Greek  word  ballein,  which  means  to 
throw  with  a  sling.  The  youth  there  were 
trained  to  perfection  in  the  use  of  this  weapon 
from  a  very  early  age.  It  is  said  that  mothers 
used  to  practice  the  plan  of  putting  the  bread 
for  their  boys'  breakfast  on  the  branches  of  trees, 
high  above  their  heads,  and  not  allow  them  to 
have  their  food  to  eat  until  they  could  bring  it 
down  with  a  stone  thrown  from  a  sling. 

Thus  the  Carthaginian  power  became  great- 
ly extended.    The  whole  government,  however 


B.C.280.]    First  Punic  War.  17 

The  government  of  Carthage.  The  aristocracy 

was  exercised  by  a  small  body  of  wealthy  and 
aristocratic  families  at  home.  It  was  very  much 
such  a  government  as  that  of  England  is  at  the 
present  day,  only  the  aristocracy  of  England  is 
based  on  ancient  birth  and  landed  property, 
whereas  in  Carthage  it  depended  on  commer- 
cial greatness,  combined,  it  is  true,  with  hered- 
itary family  distinction.  The  aristocracy  of 
Carthage  controlled  and  governed  every  thing. 
None  but  its  own  sons  could  ordinarily  obtain 
office  or  power.  The  great  mass  of  inhabitants 
were  kept  in  a  state  of  servitude  and  vassalage. 
This  state  of  things  operated  then,  as  it  does 
now  in  England,  very  unjustly  and  hardly  for 
those  who  were  thus  debased;  but  the  result 
was — and  in  this  respect  the  analogy  with  En- 
gland still  holds  good — that  a  very  efficient  and 
energetic  government  was  created.  The  gov- 
ernment of  an  oligarchy  makes  sometimes  a 
very  rich  and  powerful  state,  but  a  discontent- 
ed and  unhappy  people. 

Let  the  reader  now  turn  to  the  map  and  find 
the  place  of  Carthage  upon  it.  Let  him  imag- 
ine a  great  and  rich  city  there,  with  piers,  and 
docks,  arid  extensive  warehouses  for  the  com- 
merce, and  temples,  and  public  edifices  of  splen- 
did architecture,  for  the  religious  and  civil  serv- 
B 


18  Hannibal.  [B.C.  280. 

Geographical  relations  of  the  Carthaginian  empire. 

ice  of  the  state,  and  elegant  mansions  and  pal- 
aces for  the  wealthy  aristocracy,  and  walls  and 
towers  for  the  defense  of  the  whole.  Let  him 
then  imagine  a  back  country,  extending  for 
some  hundred  miles  into  the  interior  of  Africa, 
fertile  and  highly  cultivated,  producing  great 
stores  of  corn,  and  wine,  and  rich  fruits  of  every 
description.  Let  him  then  look  at  the  islands 
of  Sicily,  of  Corsica,  and  Sardinia,  and  the  Ba- 
leares,  and  conceive  of  them  as  rich  and  prosper- 
ous countries,  and  all  under- the  Carthaginian 
rule.  Look,  also,  at  the  coast  of  Spain  ;  see,  in 
imagination,  the"  city  of  Carthagena,  with  its 
fortifications,  and  its  army,  and  the  gold  and 
silver  mines,  with  thousands  and  thousands  of 
slaves  toiling  in  them.  Imagine  fleets  of  ships 
going  continually  along  the  shores  of  the  Med- 
iterranean, from  country  to  country,  cruising 
back  and  forth  to  Tyre,  to  Cyprus,  to  Egypt, 
to  Sicily,  to  Spain,  carrying  corn,  and  flax,  and 
purple  dyes,  and  spices,  and  perfumes,  and  pre^ 
cious  stones,  and  ropes  and  sails  for  ships,  and 
gold  and  silver,  and  then  periodically  returning 
to  Carthage,  to  add  the  profits  they  had  made  to 
the  vast  treasures  of  wealth  already  accumula- 
ted there.  Let  the  reader  imagine  all  this  with 
the  map  before  him,  so  as  to  have  a  distinct 


B.C. 280.]    First  Punic   War.  19 

Rome  and  the  Romans.  Their  character 

conception  of  the  geographical  relations  of  the 
localities,  and  he  will  have  a  pretty  correct  idea 
of  the  Carthaginian  power  at  the  time  it  com- 
menced its  dreadful  conflicts  with  Rome. 

Rome  itself  was  very  differently  situated. 
Rome  had  been  built  by  some  wanderers  from 
Troy,  and  it  grew,  for  a  long  time,  silently  and 
slowly,  by  a  sort  of  internal  principle  of  life  and 
energy.  One  region  after  another  of  the  Italian 
peninsula  was  merged  in  the  Roman  state. 
They  formed  a  population  which  was,  in  the 
main,  stationary  and  agricultural.  They  tilled 
the  fields ;  they  hunted  the  wild  beasts  ;  they 
raised  great  flocks  and  herds.  They  seem  tc 
have  been  a  race — a  sort  of  variety  of  the  human 
species — possessed  of  a  very  refined  and  superior 
Organization,  which,  in  its  development,  gave 
rise  to  a  character  of  firmness,  energy,  and  force, 
both  of  body  and  mind,  which  has  justly  excited 
the  admiration  of  mankind.  The  Carthaginians 
had  sagacity — the  Romans  called  it  cunning — 
and  activity,  enterprise  and  wealth.  Their  ri- 
vals, on  the  other  hand,  were  characterized  by 
genius,  courage,  and  strength,  giving  rise  to  a 
certain  calm  and  indomitable  resolution  and  en- 
ergy, which  has  since,  in  every  age,  been  strong- 
ly associated,  in  the  minds  of  men,  with  the  very 
word  Roman. 


20  Hannibal.  [B.C.  280. 

Progress  of  Carthage  and  Rome  Origin  of  the  first  Punic  war 

The  progress  of  nations  was  much  more  slow 
in  ancient  days  than  now,  and  these  two  rival 
empires  continued  their  gradual  growth  and  ex- 
tension, each  on  its  own  side  of  the  great  sea 
which  divided  them,  fox  five  hundred  years,  be- 
fore they  came  into  collision.  At  last,  however, 
the  collision  came.  It  originated  in  the  follow- 
ing way : 

By  looking  at  the  map,  the  reader  will  see 
that  the  island  of  Sicily  is  separated  from  the 
main  land  by  a  narrow  strait  called  the  Strait 
of  Messina.  This  strait  derives  its  name  from 
the  town  of  Messina,  which  is  situated  upon  it, 
on  the  Sicilian  side.  Opposite  Messina,  on  the 
Italian  side,  there  was  a  town  named  Rhegium. 
Now  it  happened  that  both  these  towns  had 
been  taken  possession  of  by  lawless  bodies  of 
soldiery.  The  Romans  came  and  delivered  Rbe- 
gium,  and  punished  the  soldiers  who  had  seized 
it  very  severely.  The  Sicilian  authorities  ad- 
vanced to  the  deliverance  of  Messina.  The 
troops  there,  finding  themselves  thus  threaten- 
ed, sent  to  the  Romans  to  say  that  if  they,  the 
Romans,  would  come  and  protect  them,  they 
would  deliver  Messina  into  their  hands. 

The  question,  what  answer  to  give  to  this  ap- 
plication, was  brought  before  the  Roman  sen* 


B.C.  280.]    First   Punic  War.  2J 

Rhegium  and  Messina.  A  perplexing  question 

ate,  and  caused  them  great  perplexity.  It  seem- 
ed very  inconsistent  to  take  sides  with  the  reb- 
els of  Messina,  when  they  had  punished  so  se- 
verely those  of  Rhegium.  Still  the  Romans  had 
been,  for  a  long  time,  becoming  very  jealous  of 
the  growth  and  extension  of  the  Carthaginian 
power.  Here  was  an  opportunity  of  meeting 
and  resisting  it.  The  Sicilian  authorities  were 
about  calling  for  direct  aid  from  Carthage  to 
recover  the  city,  and  the  affair  would  probably 
result  in  establishing  a  large  body  of  Carthagin- 
ian troops  within'  sight  of  the  Italian  shore, 
and  at  a  point  where  it  would  be  easy  for  them 
to  make  hostile  incursions  into  the  Roman  ter- 
ritories. In  a  word,  it  was  a  case  of  what  is 
called  political  necessity ;  that  is  to  say,  a  case 
in  which  the  interests  of  one  of  the  parties  in  a 
contest  were  so  strong  that  all  considerations  of 
justice,  consistency,  and  honor  are  to  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  promotion  of  them.  Instances  of 
this  kind  of  political  necessity  occur  very  fre- 
quently in  the  management  of  public  affairs  in 
all  ages  of  the  world. 

The  contest  for  Messina  was,  after  all,  how- 
ever, considered  by  the  Romans  merely  as  a  pre- 
text, or  rather  as  an  occasion,  for  commencing 
the  struggle  which  they  had  long  been  desirous 


22  Hannibal.  [B.C.  280. 

The  Romans  determine  to  build  a  Heet.  Preparations. 

of  entering  upon.  They  evinGed  their  charac- 
teristic energy  and  greatness  in  the  plan  which 
they  adopted  at  the  outset.  They  knew  very 
well  that  the  power  of  Carthage  rested  mainly 
on  her  command  of  the  seas,  and  that  they  could 
not  hope  successfully  to  cope  with  her  till  they 
could  meet  and  conquer  her  on  her  own  element. 
Tn  the  mean  time,  however,  they  had  not  a  sin- 
gle ship  and  not  a  single  sailor,  while  the  Med 
iterranean  was  covered  with  Carthaginian  ships 
and  seamen.  Not  at  all  daunted  by  this  pro- 
digious inequality,  the  Romans  resolved  to  be- 
gin at  once  the  work  of  creating  for  themselves 
a  naval  power.  \[ 

The  preparations  consumed  some  time ;  foi 
the  Romans  had  not  only  to  build  the  ships, 
they  had  first  to  learn  how  to  build  them.  They 
took  their  first  lesson  from  a  Carthaginian  gal- 
ley which  was  cast  away  in  a  storm  upon  the 
coast  of  Italy.  They  seized  .this  galley,  collect- 
ed their  carpenters  to  examine  it,  and  set  wood- 
men at  work  to  fell  tress  and  collect  materials 
for  imitating  it.  The  carpenters  studied  their 
model  very  carefully,  measured  the  dimensions 
of  every  part,  and  observed  the  manner  in  which 
the  various  parts  were  connected  and  secured 
together.     The  heavy  shocks  which  vessels  are 


B.C.  259.]    First   Punic    War.  23 

Training  the  oarsmen.  The  Roman' fleet  puts  to  sea. 

exposed  to  from  the  waves  makes  it  necessary 
to  secure  great  strength  in  the  construction  of 
them ;  and,  though  the  ships  of  the  ancients 
were  very  small  and  imperfect  compared  with 
the  men-of-war  of  the  present  day,  still  it  is  sur- 
prising that  the  Romans  could  succeed  at  all  in 
such  a  sudden  and  hasty  attempt  at  building 
them. 

They  did,  however,  succeed.  While  the  ships 
were  building,  officers  appointed  for  the  purpose 
were  training  men,  on  shore,  to  the  art  of  row- 
ing them.  Benches,  like  the  seats  which  the 
oarsman  would  occupy  in  the  ships,  were  ar- 
ranged on  the  ground,  and  the  intended  seamen 
were  drilled  every  day  in  the  movements  and 
action  of  rowers.  The  result  was,  that  in  a 
few  months  after  the  building  of  the  ships  was 
commenced,  the  Romans  had  a  fleet  of  one  hun- 
dred galleys  of  five  banks  of  oars  ready.  They 
remained  in  harbor  with  them  foe  some  time,  to 
give  the  oarsmen  the  opportunity  to  see  wheth- 
er they  could  row  on  the  water  as  well  as  on  the 
land,  and  then  boldly  put  to  sea  to  meet  the 
Carthaginians. 

There  was  one  part  of  the  arrangements  made 
by  the  Romans  in  preparing  their  fleets  which 
was  strikingly  characteristic  of  the  determined 


24  Hannibal.  [B.C.  259 

Grappling  irons.  Courage  and  resolution  of  the  Romans. 

resolution  which  marked  all  their  conduct 
They  constructed  machines  containing  grap- 
pling irons,  which  they  mounted  on  the  prows 
of  their  vessels.  These  engines  were  so  con- 
trived, that  the  moment  one  of  the  ships  con- 
taining them  should  encounter  a  vessel  of  the 
onemy,  the  grappling  irons  would  fall  upon  the 
deck  of  the  latter,  and  hold  the  two  firmly  to- 
gether, so  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  either 
escaping  from  the  other.  The  idea  that  they 
themselves  should  have  any  wish  to  withdraw 
from  the  encounter  seemed  entirely  out  of  the 
question.  Their  only  fear  was  that  the  Cartha- 
ginian seamen  would  employ  their  superior  skill 
and  experience  in  naval  maneuvers  in  making 
their  escape.  Mankind  have  always  regarded 
the  action  of  the  Romans,  in  this  case,  as  one 
of  the  most  striking  examples  of  military  cour- 
age and  resolution  which  the  history  of  war  has 
ever  recorded,  An  army  of  landsmen  come 
down  to  the  sea-shore,  and,  without  scarcely 
having  ever  seen  a  ship,  undertake  to  build  a 
fleet,  and  go  out  to  attack  a  power  whose  na- 
vies covered  the  sea,  and  made  her  the  sole  and 
acknowledged  mistress  of  it.  They  seize  a 
wrecked  galley  of  their  enemies  for  their  model; 
they  build  a  hundred  vessels  like  it :  they  prao 


B.C.254.]    First  Punic   War.  25 

Success  of  the  Romans.  The  rostral  column. 

tice  maneuvers  for  a  short  time  in  port;  and 
then  go  forth  to  meet  the  fleets  of  their  power- 
ful enemy,  with  grappling  machines  to  hold 
ihem,  fearing  nothing  but  the  possibility  of 
their  escape. 

The  result  was  as  might  have  been  expected 
The  Romans  cap? sired,  sunk,  destroyed,  or  dis- 
persed the  Carthaginian  fleet  which  was  brought 
to  oppose  them.  They  took  the  prows  of  the 
ships  which  they  captured  and  conveyed  them 
to  Rome,  and  built  what  is  called  a  rostral  pil- 
lar of  them.  A  rostral  pillar  is  a  column  orna- 
mented with  such  beaks  or  prows,  which  were, 
in  the  Roman  language,  called  rostra.  This  col- 
umn was  nearly  destroyed  by  lightning  about 
fifty  years  afterward,  but  it  was  repaired  and 
rebuilt  again,  and  it  stood  then  for  many  cen- 
turies, a  very  striking  and  appropriate  monu- 
ment of  this  extraordinary  naval  victory.  The 
Roman  commander  in  this  case  was  the  consul 
Dnilius.  The  rostral  column  was  erected  in 
honor  of  him.  In  digging  among  the  ruins  of 
Rome,  there  was  found  what  was  supposed  to  be 
the  remains  of  this  column,  about  three  hun- 
dred years  ago. 

The  Romans  now  prepared  to  carry  the  war 
into  Africa  itself.     Of  course  it  was  easy,  after 


2fi  Hannibal.  |B.C.  254 

Government  of  Rome.  The  consuls. 

their  victory  over  the  Carthaginian  fleet,  to  trans- 
port troops  across  the  sea  to  the  Carthaginian 
shore.  The  Roman  commonwealth  was  govern- 
ed at  this  time  by  a  senate,  who  made  the  laws, 
and  by  two  supreme  executive  officers,  called 
consuls.  They  thought  it  was  safer  to  have 
two  chief  magistrates  than  one,  as  each  of  the 
two  would  naturally  be  a  check  upon  the  other. 
The  result  was,  however,  that  mutual  jealousy 
involved  them  often  in  disputes  and  quarrels.  It 
is  thought  better,  in  modern  times,  to  have  but 
one  chief  magistrate  in  the  state,  and  to  provide 
ofher  modes  to  put  a  check  upon  any  disposition 
he  might  evince  to  abuse  his  powers. 

The  Roman  consuls,  in  time  of  war,  took  com- 
mand of  the  armies.  The  name  of  the  consul 
upon  whom  it  devolved  to  carry  on  the  war  with 
the  Carthaginians,  after  this  first  great  victory, 
was  Regulus,  and  his  name  has  been  celebrated 
in  every  age,  on  account  of  his  extraordinary 
adventures  in  this  campaign,  and  his  untimely 
fate.  .  How  far  the  story  is  strictly  true  it  is 
now  impossible  to  ascertain,  but  the  following 
is  the  story,  as  the  Roman  historians  relate  it : 

At  the  time  when  Regulus  was  elected  con- 
sul he  was  a  plain  man,  living  simply  on  his 
farm,  maintaining  himself  by  his  own  industry, 


B.C.254.J    First  Punic  War.  27 

Story  of  Regulus.  He  is  made  consul 

and  evincing  no  ambition  or  pride.  His  fellow- 
citizens,  however,  observed  those  qualities  of 
mind  in  him  which  they  were  accustomed  to  ad- 
mire, and  made  him  consul.  He  left  the  city 
and  took  command  of  the  army.  He  enlarged 
the  fleet  to  more  than  three  hundred  vessels. 
He  put  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men  on 
board,  and  sailed  for  Africa.  One  or  two  years 
had  been  spent  in  making  these  preparations, 
which  time  the, Carthaginians  had  improved  in 
building  new  ships ;  so  that,  when  the  Romans 
set  sail,  and  were  moving  along  the  coast  of 
Sicily,  they  soon  came  in  sight  of  a  larger  Car- 
thaginian fleet  assembled  to  oppose  them.  Reg- 
ulus  advanced  to  the  contest.  The  Carthagin- 
ian fleet  was  beaten  as  before.  The  ships  which 
were  not  captured  or  destroyed  made  their  es- 
cape in  all  directions,  and  Regulus  went  on, 
without  farther  opposition,  and  landed  his  forces 
on  the  Carthaginian  shore.  He  encamped  as 
soon  as  he  landed,  and  sent  back  word  to  the 
Roman  senate  asking  what  was  next  to  be  done. 
The  senate,  considering  that  the  great  diffi- 
culty and  danger,  viz.,  that  of  repulsing  the 
Carthaginian  fleet,  was  now  past,  ordered  Reg- 
ulus to  send  home  nearly  all  the  ships  and  a 
very  large  part  of  the  army*,  and  with  the  rest 


28  Hannibal.  [B.C.  254 

Regulus  marches  against  Carthage  His  difficulties. 

to  commence  his  march  toward  Carthage.    Reg 
ulus  obeyed  ;  he  sent  home  'the  troops  which 
had  been  ordered  home,  and  with  the  rest  began 
to  advance  upon  the  city. 

Just  at  this  time,  howevor,  news  came  out 
to  him  that  the  farmer  who  had  had  the  care  of 
his  land  at  home  had  died,  and  that  his  little 
farm,  on  which  rested  his  sole  reliance  for  the 
support  of  his  family,  was  going  to  ruin.  Reg- 
ulus accordingly  sent  to  the  senate,  asking 
them  to  place  some  one  else  in  command  of  the 
army,  and  to  allow  him  to  resign  his  office,  that 
he  might  go  home  and  take  care  of  his  wife  and 
children.  The  senate  sent  back  orders  that  he 
should  go  on  with  his  campaign,  and  promised 
to  provide  support  for  his  family,  and  to  see  that 
some  one  was  appointed  to  take  care  of  his  land. 
This  story  is  thought  to  illustrate  the  extreme 
simplicity  and  plainness  of  all  the  habits  of  life 
among  the  Romans  in  those  days.  It  certainly 
does  so,  if  it  is  true.  It  is,  however,  very  ex- 
traordinary, that  a  man  who  was  intrusted,  by 
such  a  commonwealth,  with  the  command  of  a 
fleet  of  a  hundred  and  thirty  vessels,  and  an 
army  of  a  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men* 
should  have  a  family  at  home  dependent  for  sub- 
sistence on  the  hired  cultivation  of  seven  acres 
"*"  land.     Still,  «n«h  is  th  •  *i;nry, 


B.C.  254.]    First  Punic   War.  29 

Successes  of  Regulus.      Arrival  of  Greeks.      The  Romans  put  to  flight 

Regulus  advanced  toward  Carthage,  conquer- 
ing as  he  came.  The  Carthaginians  were  beat- 
en in  one  field  after  another,  and  were  reduced, 
in  fact,  to  the  last  extremity,  when  an  occur- 
rence took  place  which  turned  the  scale.  This 
occurrence  was  the  arrival  of  a  large  body  of 
troops  from  Greece,  with  a  Grecian  general  at 
their  head.  These  were  troops  which  the  Car- 
thaginians had  hired  to  fight  for  them,  as  was 
the  case  with  the  rest  of  their  army.  But  these 
were  Greeks,  and  the  Greeks  were  of  the  same 
race,  and  possessed  the  same  qualities,  as  the 
Romans.  The  newly-arrived  Grecian  general 
evinced  at  once  such  military  superiority,  that 
the  Carthaginians  gave  him  the  supreme  com- 
mand. He  marshaled  the  army,  accordingly, 
for  battle.  He  had  a  hundred  elephants  in  the 
van.  They  were  trained  to  rush  forward  and 
trample  down  the  enemy.  He  had  the  Greek 
phalanx  in  the  center,  which  was  a  close,  com- 
pact body  of  many  thousand  troops,  bristling 
with  long,  iron-pointed  spears,  with  which  the 
men  pressed  forward,  bearing  every  thing  before 
them,  Regulus  was,  in  a  word,  ready  to  meet 
Carthaginians,  but  he  was  not  prepared  to  en- 
counter Greek's.  His  army  was  put  to.  flight, 
and  he  was  taken  prisoner.     Nothing  could  ex- 


30  Hannibal.  [B.C.  254 

Regulus  a  prisoner.  He  is  sent  to  Rome 

ceed  the  excitement  and  exultation  in  the  city 
when  they  saw  Regulus,  and  five  hundred  oth- 
er Roman  soldiers,  brought  captive  in.  A  few 
days  before,  they  had  been  in  consternation  at 
the  imminent  danger  of  his  coming  in  as  a  ruth- 
less and  vindictive  conqueror. 

The  Roman  senate  were  not  discouraged  by 
this  disaster.  They  fitted  out  new  armies,  and 
the  war  went  on,  Regulus  being  kept  all  the 
time  at  Carthage  as  a  close  prisoner.  At  last 
the  Carthaginians  authorized  him  to  go  to  Rome 
as  a  sort  of  commissioner,  to  propose  to  the  Ro- 
mans to  exchange  prisoners  and  to  make  peace. 
They  exacted  from  him  a  solemn  promise  that 
if  he  was  unsuccessful  he  would  return.  The 
Romans  had  taken  many  of  the  Carthaginians 
prisoners  in  their  naval  combats,  and  held  them 
captive  at  Rome.  It  is  customary,  in  such  ca- 
ses, for  the  belligerent  nations  to  make  an  ex- 
change, and  restore  the  captives  on  both  sides 
to  their  friends  and  home.  It  was  such  an  ex- 
change of  prisoners  as  this  which  Regulus  was 
to  propose. 

When  Regulus  reached  Rome  he  refused  to 
enter  the  chy,  but  he  appeared  before  the  sen- 
ate without  the  walls,  in  a  very  humble  garb 
and  with  the  most  subdued  and  unassuming  de- 


B.C.  249.] 

F] 

[RST 

Pun 

[ic 

W^ 

LR. 

31 

Regulus  before  the  Roman  senate. 

Res  alt  of  his 

mission. 

meanor.  He  was  no  longer,  he  said,  a  Roman 
officer,  or  even  citizen,  but  a  Carthaginian  pris- 
oner, and  he  disavowed  all  right  to  direct,  01 
even  to  counsel,  the  Roman  authorities  in  re- 
spect to  the  proper  course  to  be  pursued.  His 
opinion  was,  however,  he  said,  that  the  Romans 
ought  not  to  make  peace  or  to  exchange  prison- 
ers. He  himself  and  the  other  Roman  prison- 
ers were  old  and  infirm,  and  not  worth  the  ex- 
change ;  and,  moreover,  they  had  no  claim 
whatever  on  their  country,  as  they  could  only 
have  been  made  prisoners  in  consequence  of 
want  of  courage  or  patriotism  to  die  in  their 
country's  cause.  He  said  that  the  Carthagin- 
ians were  -tired  of  the  war,  and  that  their  re- 
sources were  exhausted,  and  that  the  Roman? 
ought  to  press  forward  in  it  with  renewed  vigor, 
and  leave  himself  and  the  other  prisoners  to 
their  fate. 

The  senate  came  very  slowly  and  reluctantly 
to  the  conclusion  to  follow  this  advice.  They, 
however,  all  earnestly  joined  in  attempting  tc 
persuade  Regulus  that  he  was  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  return  to  Carthage.  His  promise,  they 
said,  was  extorted  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  and  was  not  binding.  Regulus,  however, 
insisted  on  keeping  his  faith  with  his  enemies 


32  Hannibal.  [B.C.  249 


Death  of  Regulus.  Conclusion  of  the  war 

He  sternly  refused  to  see  his  family,  and,  bid- 
ding the  senate  farewell,  he  returned  to  Car- 
thage. The  Carthaginians,  exasperated  at  his 
having  himself  interposed  to  prevent  the  suc- 
cess of  his  mission,  tortured  him  for  some  time 
in  the  most  cruel  manner,  and  finally  put  him 
to  death.  One  would  think  that  he  ought  to 
have  counseled  peace  and  an  exchange  of  pris- 
oners, and  he  ought  not  to  have  refused  to  see  his 
unhappy  wife  and  children ;  but  it  was  certainly 
very  noble  in  him  to  refuse  to  break  his  word. 
The  war  continued  for  some  time  after  this, 
until,  at  length,  both  nations  became  weary  of 
the  contest,  and  peace  was  made.  The  follow- 
ing is  the  treaty  which  was  signed.  It  shows 
that  the  advantage,  on  the  whole,  in  this  first 
Punic  war,  was  on  the  part  of  the  Romans : 

"  There  shall  be  peace  between  Rome  and 
Carthage.  The  Carthaginians  shall  evacuate 
all  Sicily.  They  shall  not  make  war  upon  any 
allies  of  the  Romans.  They  shall  restore  to  the 
Romans,  without  ransom,  all  the  prisoners  which 
they  have  taken  from  them,  and  pay  them  with- 
in ten  years  three  thousand  two  hundred  talents 
of  silver." 

The  war  had  continued  twenty-four  years. 


B.C.234]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       33 

Parentage  of  Hannibal.  Character  of  Hamilcar. 


Chapter  II. 
Hannibal  at  Saguntum. 

THE  name  of  Hannibal's  father  was  Hamil- 
car. He  was  one  of  the  leading  Cartha- 
ginian generals.  He  occupied  a  very  prominent 
position,  both  on  account  of  his  rank,  and  wealth, 
and  high  family  connections  at  Carthage,  and 
also  on  account  of  the  great  military  energy 
which  he  displayed  in  the  command  of  the  ar- 
mies abroad.  He  carried  on  the  wars  which 
the  Carthaginians  waged  in  Africa  and  in  Spain 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  the  Romans, 
and  he  longed  to  commence  hostilities  with  the 
Romans  again. 

At  one  time,  when  Hannibal  was  about  nine 
years  of  age,  Hamilcar  was  preparing  to  set  off 
on  an  expedition  into  Spain,  and,  as  was  usual 
in  those  days,  he  was  celebrating  the  occasion 
with  games,  and  spectacles,  and  various  religious 
ceremonies.  It  has  been  the  custom  in  all  ages 
of  the  world,  when  nations  go  to  war  with  each 
other,  for  each  side  to  take  measures  for  propi- 
tiating the  favor  of  Heaven.  Christian  nations 
at  the  present  day  do  it  by  prayers  offered  in 
C 


34  Hannibal.  [B.C.  234. 

Religious  ceremonies.  Hannibal's  famous  oath  of  enmity  to  Rome 

each  country  for  the  success  of  their  own  arms. 
Heathen  nations  do  it  by  sacrifices,  libations, 
and  offerings.  Hamilcar  had  made  arrange- 
ments for  such  sacrifices,  and  the  priests  were 
offering  them  in  the  presence  of  the  whole  as- 
sembled army. 

Young  Hannibal,  then  about  nine  years  of 
age,  was  present.  He  was  a  boy  of  great  spirit 
and  energy,  and  he  entered  with  much  enthu- 
siasm into  the  scene.  He  wanted  to  go  to  Spain 
himself  with  the  army,  and  he  came  to  his  fa- 
ther and  began  to  urge  his  request.  His  father 
could  not  consent  to  this.  He  was  too  young 
to  endure  the  privations  and  fatigues  of  such  an 
enterprise.  However,  his  father  brought  him 
to  one  of  the  altars,  in  the  presence  of  the  other 
officers  of  the  army,  and  made  him  lay  his  hand 
upon  the  consecrated  victim,  and  swear  that,  as 
soon  as  he  was  old  enough,  and  had  it  in  his 
power,  he  would  make  war  upon  the  Romans. 
This  was  done,  no  doubt,  in  part  to  amuse  young 
Hannibal's  mind,  and  to  relieve  his  disappoint- 
ment in  not  being  able  to  go  to  war  at  that 
time,  by  promising  him  a  great  and  mighty  en 
emy  to  fight  at  some  future  day.  Hannibal  re- 
membered it,  and  longed  for  the  time  to  come 
*rhen  he  could  go  to  war  against  the  Romans 


B.C. 234.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum        35 

Hamilcar  in  Spain.  .  Hasdrubal.  Death  of  Hamilcar. 

Hamiloar  bade  his  son  farewell  and  embarked 
for  Spain.  He  was  at  liberty  to  extend  his  con- 
quests there  in  all  directions  west  of  the  River 
Iberus,  a  river  which  the  reader  will  find  upon 
the  map,  flowing  southeast  into  the  Mediterra- 
nean Sea.  Its  name,  Iberus,  has  been  gradu- 
ally changed,  in  modern  times,  to  Ebro.  By 
the  treaty  with  the  Romans  the  Carthaginians 
were  not  to  cross  the  Iberus.  They  were  also 
bound  by  the  treaty  not  to  molest  the  people  of 
Saguntum,  a  city  lying  between  the  Iberus  and 
the  Carthaginian  dominions.  Saguntum  was 
in  alliance  with  the  Romans  and  under  their 
protection. 

Hamilcar  was,  however,  very  restless  and  un* 
easy  at  being  obliged  thus  to  refrain  from  hos 
tilities  with  the  Roman  power.     He  began,  im- 
mediately after   his  arrival  in  Spain,  to  forn 
plans  for  renewing  the  war.     He  had  unde* 
him,  as  his  principal  lieutenant,  a  young  man 
who  had  married  his  daughter.     His  name  was 
Hasdrubal.     With  Hasdrubal's  aid,  he  went  on 
extending  his  conquests  in  Spain,  and  strength- 
ening his  position  there,  and  gradually  matur- 
ing his  plans  for  renewing  war  with  the  Ro- 
mans, when  at  length  he  died.     Hasdrubal  sue 
ceeded  him. ,  Hannibal  was  now,  probably,  about 


3(3  Hannibal.  [B.C.  221 

Hannibal  sent  for  to  Spain.  Opposition  of  Hanno, 

twenty-one  or  two  years  old,  and  still  in  Car- 
thage. Hasdrubal  sent  to  the  Carthaginian  gov 
ernment  a  request  that  Hannibal  might  receive 
an  appointment  in  the  army,  and  be  sent  out  to 
join  him  in  Spain. 

On  the  subject  of  complying  with  this  re- 
quest there  was  a  great  debate  in  the  Cartha- 
ginian senate.  In  all  cases  where  questions  of 
government  are  controlled  by  votes,  it  has  been 
found,  in  every  age,  that  parties  will  always  be 
formed,  of  which  the  two  most  prominent  will 
usually  be  nearly  balanced  one  against  the  oth- 
er. Thus,  at  this  time,  though  the  Hamilcar 
family  were  in  power,  there  w~as  a  very  strong 
party  in  Carthage  in  opposition  to  them.  The 
leader  of  this  party  in  the  senate,  whose  name 
was  Hanno,  made  a  very  earnest  speech  against 
sending  Hannibal.  He  was  too  young,  he  said, 
to  be  of  any  service.  He  would  only  learn  the 
vices  and  follies  of  the  camp,  and  thus  become 
corrupted  and  ruined.  "  Besides,"  said  Hanno, 
"  at  this  rate,  the  command  of  our  armies  in 
Spain  is  getting  to  be  a  sort  of  hereditary  right. 
Hamilcar  was  not  a  king,  that  his  authority 
should  thus  descend  first  to  his  son-in-law  and 
then  to  his  son ;  for  this  plan  of  making  Han- 
nibal," he  said,  "  while  yet  scarcely  arrived  at 


B.C.221.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       3? 

Hannibal  sets  out  for  Spain.  Favorable  impression  on  the  army. 

manhood,  a  high  officer  in  the  army,  is  only  a 
stepping-stone  to  the  putting  of  the  forces  wholly 
under  his  orders,  whenever,  for  any  reason,  Has 
drubal  shall  cease  to  command  them." 

The  Roman  historian,  through  whose  narra- 
tive we  get  our  only  account  of  this  debate, 
says  that,  though  these  were  good  reasons,  yet 
sfrength  prevailed,  as  usual,  over  wisdom,  in 
the  decision  of  the  question.  They  voted  to 
send  Hannibal,  and  he  set  out  to  cross  the  sea  to 
Spain  with  a  heart  full  of  enthusiasm  and  joy. 

A  great  deal  of  curiosity  and  interest  was  felt 
throughout  the  army  to  see  him  on  his  arrival. 
The  soldiers  had  been  devotedly  attached  to  his 
father,  and  they,  were  all  ready  to  transfer  this 
attachment  at  once  to  the  son,  if  he  should  prove 
worthy  of  it.  It  was  very  evident,  soon  after 
he  reached  the  camp,  that  he  was  going  to  prove 
himself  thus  worthy.  He  entered  at  once  into 
the  duties  of  his  position  with  a  degree  of  ener- 
gy, patience,  and  self-denial  which  attracted 
universal  attention,  and  made  him  a  universal 
favorite.  He  dressed  plainly;  he  assumed  no 
airs ;  he  sought  for  no  pleasures  or  indulgences, 
nor  demanded  any  exemption  from  the  dangers 
and  privations  which  the  common  soldiers  had 
to  endure.     He  ate  plain  food,  and  slept,  often, 


38  Hannibal.  [B.C.  221. 

Character  of  Hannibal.  He  is  elevated  to  the  supreme  command. 

in  his  military  cloak,  on  the  ground,  in  the 
midst  of  the  soldiers  on  guard ;  and  in  battle  he 
was  always  foremost  to  press  forward  into  the 
contest,  and  the  last»to  leave  the  ground  when 
the  time  came  for  repose.  The  Romans  say 
that,  in  addition  to  these  qualities,  he  was  in- 
human and  merciless  when  in  open  warfare 
with  his  foes,  and  cunning  and  treacherous  m 
every  other  mode  of  dealing  with  them.  It  is 
very  probable  that  he  was  so.  Such  traits  of 
character  were  considered  by  soldiers  in  those 
days,  as  they  are  now,  virtues  in  themselves, 
though  vices  in  their  enemies. 

However  this  may  be,  Hannibal  became  a 
great  and  universal  favorite  in  the  army.  He 
went  on  for  several  years  increasing  his  military 
knowledge,  and  widening  and  extending  his  in- 
fluence, when  at  length,  one  day,  Hasdrubal 
was  suddenly  killed  by  a  ferocious  native  of  the 
country  whom  he  had  by  some  means  offended. 
As  soon  as  the  first  shock  of  this  occurrence 
was  over,  the  leaders  of  the  army  went  in  pur- 
suit of  Hannibal,  whom  they  brought  in  tri- 
umph to  the  tent  of  Hasdrubal,  and  instatepl 
him  at  once  in  the  supreme  command,  with  one 
consent  and  in  the  midst  of  universal  acclama- 
tions.    As  soon  as  news  of  this  event  reached 


B.C.221.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       39 

The  River  Iberus.  Hannibal  seeks  a  war  with  the  Romans. 

Carthage,  the  government  there  confirmed  the 
act  of  the  army,  and  Hannibal  thus  found  him- 
self suddenly  but  securely  invested  with  a  very 
high  military  command.  9\^  &Jj<~ 

His  eager  and  restless  desire  to  try  his  strength 
with  the  Romans  received  a  new  impulse  by  his 
rinding  that  the  power  was  now  in  his  hands. 
Still  the  two  countries  were  at  peace.  They 
were  bound  by  solemn  treaties  to  continue  so. 
The  River  Iberus  was  the  boundary  which  sep- 
arated the  dominions  of  the  two  nations  from 
each  other  in  Spain,  the  territory  east  of  that 
boundary  being  under  the  Roman  power,  and 
that  on  the  west  under  that  of  the  Carthagin- 
ians ;  except  that  Saguntum,  which  was  on  the 
western  side,  was  an  ally  of  the  Romans,  and 
the  Carthaginians  were  bound  by  the  treaty  to 
leave  it  independent  and  free. 

Hannibal  could  not,  therefore,  cross  the  Ibe- 
rus or  attack  Saguntum  without  an  open  in- 
fraction of  the  treaty.  He,  however,  immedi- 
ately began  to  move  toward  Saguntum,  and  to 
attack  the  nations  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
it.  If  he  wished  to  get  into  a  war  with  the  Ro- 
mans, this  was  the  proper  way  to  promote  it ; 
for,  by  advancing  thus  into  the  immediate  vi- 
cinity of  the  capital  of  their  allies,  there  was 


40  Hannibal.  [B.C.  219 

Stratagem  of  Hannibal.  Fording  the  river. 

great  probability  that  disputes  would  arise  which 
would  sooner  or  later  end  in  war. 

The  Romans  say  that  Hannibal  was  cunning 
and  treacherous,  and  he  certainly  did  display, 
on  some  occasions,  a  great  degree  of  adroitness 
in  his  stratagems.  In  one  instance  in  these  pre- 
liminary wars  he  gained  a  victory  over  an  im- 
mensely superior  force  in  a  very  remarkable 
manner.  He  was  returning  from  an  inroad 
upon  some  of  the  northern  provinces,  laden  and 
encumbered  with  spoil,  when  he  learned  that 
an  immense  army,  consisting,  it  was  said,  of  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  were  coming  down  upon 
his  rear.  There  was  a  river  at  a  short  distance 
before  him.  Hannibal  pressed  on  and  crossed 
the  river  by  a  ford,  the  water  being,  perhaps, 
about  three  feet  deep.  He  secreted  a  large  body 
of  cavalry  near  the  bank  of  the  stream,  and  push- 
ed on  with  the  main  body  of  the  army  to  some 
little  distance  from  the  river,  so  as  to  produce 
the  impression  upon  his  pursuers  that  he  was 
pressing  forward  to  make  his  escape. 

The  enemy,  thinking  that  they  had  no  time 
to  lose,  poured  down  in  great  numbers  into  the 
stream  from  various  points  along  the  banks  ; 
and,  as  soon  as  they  had  reached  the  middle  of 
the  current,  and  were  wading  laboriously,  half 


B.C.  219.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       4-i 

Great  battle  in  the  River  Tagus.  Victory  of  Hannibal 

submerged,  with  their  weapons  held  above  their 
heads,  so  as  to  present  as  little  resistance  as  pos- 
sible to  the  water,  the  horsemen  of  Hannibal 
rushed  in  to  meet  and  attack  them.  The  horse- 
men had,  of  course,  greatly  the  advantage ;  for, 
though  their  horses  were  in  the  water,  they  were 
themselves  raised  above  it,  and  their  limbs  were 
free,  while  their  enemies  were  half  submerged, 
and,  being  encumbered  by  their  arms  and  by 
one  another,  were  nearly  helpless.  They  were 
immediately  thrown  into  complete  confusion, 
and  were  overwhelmed  and  carried  down  by  the 
current  in  great  numbers.  Some  of  them  suc- 
ceeded in  landing  below,  on  Hannibal's  side ; 
but,  in  the  mean  time,  the  main  body  of  his 
army  had  returned,  and  was  ready  to  receive 
them,  and  they  were  trampled  under  foot  by 
the  elephants,  which  it  was  the  custom  to  em- 
ploy, in  those  days,  as  a  military  force.  As 
soon  as  the  river  was  cleared,  Hannibal  march- 
ed his  own  army  across  it,  and  attacked  what 
remained  of  the  enemy  on  their  own  side.  He 
gained  a  complete  victory,  which  was  so  great 
and  decisive  that  he  secured  by  it  possession  of 
the  whole  country  west  of  the  Iberus,  except 
Saguntum,  and  Saguntum  itself  began  to  be 
seriously  alarmed. 


44  Hannibal.  [B.C.  218. 

Saguntum.  Hannibal  attacks  it 

The  Saguntines  sent  embassadors  to  Rome 
to  ask  the  Romans  to  interpose  and  protect  them 
from  the  dangers  which  threatened  them.  These 
embassadors  made  diligent  efforts  to  reach  Rome 
as  soon  as  possible,  but  they  were  too  late.  On 
some  pretext  or  other,  Hannibal  contrived  to 
raise  a  dispute  between  the  city  and  one  of  the 
neighboring  tribes,  and  then,  taking  sides  with 
the  tribe,  he  advanced  to  attack  the  city.  The 
Saguntines  prepared  for  their  defense,  hoping 
soon  to  receive  succors  from  Rome.  They 
strengthened  and  fortified  their  walls,  while 
Hannibal  began  to  move  forward  great  military 
engines  for  battering  them  down. 

Hannibal  knew  very  well  that  by  his  hostili- 
ties against  this  city  he  was  commencing  a  con- 
test with  Rome  itself,  as  Rome  must  necessa- 
rily take  part  with  her  ally.  In  fact,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  his  design  was  to  bring  on  a  gen- 
eral war  between  the  two  great  nations.  He 
began  with  Saguntum  for  two  reasons:  first, 
it  would  not  be  safe  for  him  to  cross  the  Iberus, 
and  advance  into  the  Roman  territory,  leaving 
so  wealthy  and  powerful  a  city  in  his  rear ;  and 
then,  in  the  second  place,  it  was  easier  for  him 
to  find  pretexts  for  getting  indirectly  into  a 
quarrel  with  Saguntum,  and  throwing  the  odi- 


B.C. 218.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       45 

Progress  of  the  siege.  Hannibal  wounded. 

um  of  a  declaration  of  war  on  Rome,  than  to 
persuade  the  Carthaginian  state  to  renounce 
the  peace  and  themselves  commence  hostilities. 
There  was,  as  has  been  already  stated,  a  very 
strong  party  at  Carthage  opposed  to  Hannibal, 
who  would,  of  course,  resist  any  measures  tend- 
ing to  a  war  with  Rome,  for  they  would  con- 
sider such  a  war  as  opening  a  vast  field  for  grat- 
ifying Hannibal's  ambition.  The  only  way, 
therefore,  was  to  provoke  a  war  by  aggressions 
on  the  Roman  allies,  to  be  justified  by  the  best 
pretexts  he  could  find. 

Saguntum  was  a  very  wealthy  and  powerful 
city.  It  was  situated  about  a  mile  from  the 
sea.  The  attack  upon  the  place,  and  the  de 
fense  of  it  by  the  inhabitants,  went  on  for  some 
time  with  great  vigor.  In  these  operations, 
Hannibal  exposed  himself  to  great  danger.  He 
approached,  at  one  time,  so  near  the  wall,  in 
superintending  the  arrangements  of  his  soldiers 
and  the  planting  of  his  engines,  that  a  heavy 
javelin,  thrown  from  the  parapet,  struck  him  on 
the  thigh.  It  pierced  the  flesh,  and  inflicted  so 
severe  a  wound  that  he  fell  immediately,  and 
was  borne  away  by  the  soldiers.  It  was  sever- 
al days  before  he  was  free  from  the  danger  in- 
curred by  the  loss  of  blood  and  the  fever  which 


46  Hannibal.  [B.C.  218 

Hannibal  recovers.  The  falarica 

follows  such  a  wound.  During  all  this  time  his 
army  were  in  a  great  state  of  excitement  and 
anxiety,  and  suspended  their  active  operations. 
As  soon,  however,  as  Hannibal  was  found  to 
be  decidedly  convalescent,  they  resumed  them 
again,  and  urged  them  onward  with  greater  en- 
ergy than  before. 

The  weapons  of  warfare  in  those  ancient  days 
were  entirely  different  from  those  which  are  now 
employed,  and  there  was  one,  described  by  an 
ancient  historian  as  used  by  the  Saguntines  at 
this  siege,  which  might  almost  come  under  the 
modern  denomination  of  tire-arms.  It  was  call- 
ed the  falarica.  It  was  a  sort  of  javelin,  con- 
sisting of  a  shaft  of  wood,  with  a  long  point  of 
iron.  This  point  was  said  to  be  three  feet  long. 
This  javelin  was  to  be  thrown  at  the  enemy 
cither  from  the  hand  of  the  soldier  or  by  an  en- 
gine. The  leading  peculiarity  of  it  was,  how- 
ever, that,  near  to  the  pointed  end,  there  were 
wound  around  the  wooden  shaft  long  bands  of 
tow,  which  were  saturated  with  pitch  and  other 
combustibles,  and  this  inflammable  band  was 
set  on  fire  just  before  the  javelin  was  thrown 
A.s  the  missile  flew  on  its  way,  the  wind  fanned 
the  flames,  and  made  them  burn  so  fiercely,  that 
when  the  javelin  struck  the  shield  of  the  soldier 


B.C. 218.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       47 

Arrival  of  the  Roman  embassadors.  Hannibal's  policy 

opposing  it,  it  could  not  be  pulled  out,  and  the 
shield  itself  had  to  be  thrown  down  and  aban- 
doned. 

While  the  inhabitants  of  Saguntum  were 
vainly  endeavoring  to  defend  themselves  against 
their  terrible  enemy  by  these  and  similar  means, 
their  embassadors,  not  knowing  that  the  city 
had  been  attacked,  had  reached  Rome,  and  had 
laid  before  the  Roman  senate  their  fears,  that 
the  city  would  be  attacked,  unless  they  adopted 
vigorous  and  immediate  measures  to  prevent  it. 
The  Romans  resolved  to  send  embassadors  to 
Hannibal  to  demand  of  him  what  his  intentions 
were,  and  to  warn  him  against  any  acts  of  hos- 
tility against  Saguntum.  When  these  Roman 
embassadors  arrived  on  the  coast,  near  to  Sa- 
guntum, they  found  that  hostilities  had  com- 
menced, and  that  the  city  was  hotly  besieged 
They  were  at  a  loss  to  know  what  to  do. 

It  is  better  for  a  rebel  not  to  hear  an  order 
which  he  is  determined  beforehand  not  to  obey. 
Hannibal,  with  an  adroitness  which  the  Cartha- 
ginians called  sagacity,  and  the  Romans  treach- 
ery and  cunning,  determined  not  to  see  these 
messengers.  He  sent  word  to  them,  at  the  shore, 
that  they  must  not  attempt  to  come  to  his  camp, 
for  the  country  was  in  such  a  disturbed  condi- 


48  Hannibal.  [B.C.  218 

Hannibal  sends  embassadors  to  Cartbage.         Tbe  Roman  embassadors. 

tion  that  it  would  not  be  safe  for  them  to  land ; 
and  besides,  he  could  not  receive  or  attend  to 
them,  for  he  was  too  much  pressed  with  the  ur- 
gency of  his  military  works  to  have  any  time  to 
spare  for  debates  and  negotiations. 

Hannibal  knew  that  the  embassadors,  being 
thus  repulsed,  and  having  found,  too,  that  the 
war  had  broken  out,  and  that  Saguntum  was 
actually  beset  and  besieged  by  Hannibal's  ar- 
mies, would  proceed  immediately  to  Carthage 
to  demand  satisfaction  there.  He  knew,  also, 
that  Hanno  and  his  party  would  very  probably 
espouse  the  cause  of  the  Romans,  and  endeavor 
to  arrest  his  designs.  He  accordingly  sent  his 
own  embassadors  to  Carthage,  to  exert  an  influ- 
ence in  his  favor  in  the  Carthaginian  senate,  and 
endeavor  to  urge  them  to  reject  the  claims  of 
the  Romans,  and  allow  the  war  between  Rome 
and  Carthage  to  break  out  again. 

The  Roman  embassadors  appeared  at  Car- 
thage, and  were  admitted  to  an  audience  before 
the  senate.  They  stated  their  case,  represent- 
ing that  Hannibal  had  made  war  upon  Sagun- 
tum in  violation  of  the  treaty,  and  had  refused 
even  to  receive  the  communication  which  had 
been  sent  him  by  the  Roman  senate  through 
them.     They  demanded  that  the  Carthaginian 


B.C.  218.]  Hannibal  at  Saguntum.       49 

Parties  in  the  Carthaginian  senate.  Speech  of  Hanno. 

government  should  disavow  his  acts,  and  delivei 
him  up  to  them,  in  order  that  he  might  receive 
the  punishment  which  his  violation  of  the  treaty , 
and  his  aggressions  upon  an  ally  of  the  Romans, 
so  justly  deserved. 

The  party  of  Hannibal  in  the  Carthaginian 
senate  were,  of  course,  earnest  to  have  these  pro- 
posals rejected  with  scorn.  The  other  side,  with 
Hanno  at  their  head,  maintained  that  they  were 
reasonable  demands.  Hanno,  in  a  very  ener- 
getic and  powerful  speech,  told*  the  senate  that 
he  had  warned  them  not  to  send  Hannibal  into 
Spain.  He  had  foreseen  that  such  a  hot  and 
turbulent  spirit  as  his  would  involve  them  in 
inextricable  difficulties  with  the  Roman  power. 
Hannibal  had,  he  said,  plainly  violated  the  treaty. 
He  had  invested  and  besieged  Saguntum,  which 
they  were  solemnly  bound  not  to  molest,  and 
they  had  nothing  to  expect  in  return  but  that 
the  Roman  legions  would  soon  be  investing  and 
besieging  their  own  city.  In  the  mean  timej 
the  Romans,  he  added,  had  been  moderate  and 
forbearing.  They  had  brought  nothing  to  the 
charge  of  the  Carthaginians.  They  accused  no- 
body but  Hanniba],  who,  thus  far,  alone  was 
guilty.  The  Carthaginians,  by  disavowing  his 
acts,  could  save  themselves  from  the  responsi- 
D 


50  Hannibal.  [B.C.  218 

H&nno  proposes  to  give  up  Hannibal.         Defense  of  Hannibal's  friends. 

bility  of  them.  He  urged,  therefore,  that  an 
embassage  of  apology  should  be  sent  to  Rome, 
that  Hannibal  should  be  deposed  and  delivered 
up  to  the  Romans,  and  that  ample  restitution 
should  be  made  to  the  Saguntines  for  the  inju- 
ries they  had  received. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  friends  of  Hannibal 
urged  in  the  Carthaginian  senate  their  defense 
of  the  general.  They  reviewed  the  history  of 
the  transactions  in  which  the  war*  had  origina- 
ted, and  showed,  or  attempted  to  show,  that  the 
Saguntines  themselves  commenced  hostilities, 
and  that  consequently  they,  and  not  Hannibal, 
were  responsible  for  all  that  followed ;  that,  un- 
der those  circumstances,  the  Romans  ought  not 
to  take  their  part,  and  if  they  did  so,  it  proved 
that  they  preferred  the  friendship  of  Saguntum 
to  that  of  Carthage ;  and  that  it  would  be  cow- 
ardly and  dishonorable  in  the  extreme  for  them 
to  deliver  the  general  whom  they  had  placed  in 
power,  and  who  had  shown  himself  so  worthy 
of  their  choice  by  his  courage  and  energy,  into 
the  hands  of  their  ancient  and  implacable  foes. 

Thus  Hannibal  was  waging  at  the  same  time 
two  Wars,  one  in  the  Carthaginian  senate,  where 
the  weapons  were  arguments  and  eloquence,  and 
the  other  under  the  walls  of  Saguntum,  which 


B.C.  218.]  Hannibal  at  S/vguntum.       51 

Hannibal  triumphant  Saguntum  falls, 

was  fought  with  battering  rams  and  fiery  jave- 
lins. He  conquered  in  both.  The  senate  de- 
cided to  send  the  Roman  embassadors  home 
without  acceding  to  their  demands,  and  the 
walls  of  Saguntum  were  battered  down  by  Han- 
nibal's engines.  The  inhabitants  refused  all 
terms  of  compromise,  and  resisted  to  the  last, 
so  that,  when  the  victorious  soldiery  broke  over 
the  prostrate  walls,  and  poured  into  the  city,  it 
was  given  up  to  them  to  plunder,  and  they  killed 
and  destroyed  all  that  came  in  their  way.  The 
disappointed  embassadors  returned  to  Rome 
with  the  news  that  Saguntum  had  been  taken 
and  destroyed  by  Hannibal,  and  that  the  Car- 
thaginians, far  from  offering  any  satisfaction  for 
the  wrong,  assumed  the  responsibility  of  it  them- 
selves, and  were  preparing  for  war. 

Thus  Hanniba]  accomplished  his  purpose  of 
opening  the  way  for  waging  war  against  the 
Roman  power.  He  prepared  to  enter  into  the 
contest  with  the  utmost  energy  and  zeal.  The 
conflict  that  ensued  lasted  seventeen  years,  and 
is  known  in  history  as  the  second  Punic  war. 
It  was  one  of  the  most  dreadful  struggles  be- 
tween rival  and  hostile  nations  which  the  gloomy 
history  of  mankind  exhibits  to  view.  The  events 
that  occurred  will  be  described  in  the  subse- 
quent chapters. 


52  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Fall  of  Hanno's  party.  Power  of  Hannibal 


Chapter  III. 

Opening  of  the  Second  Punic  War. 

"¥T7"HEN  the  tide  once  turns  in  any  nation 
"  in  favor  of  war,  it  generally  rushes  on 
with  great  impetuosity  and  force,  and  bears  all 
before  it.  It  was  so  in  Carthage  in  this  in- 
stance. The  party  of  Hanno  were  thrown  en- 
tirely into  the  minority  and  silenced,  and  the 
friends  and  partisans  of  Hannibal  carried  not 
only  the  government,  but  the  whole  community 
with  them,  and  every  body  was  eager  for  war. 
This  was  owing,  in  part,  to  the  natural  conta- 
giousness of  the  martial  spirit,  which,  when  felt 
by  one,  qatches  easily,  by  sympathy,  in  the  heart 
of  another.  It  is  a  fire  which,  when  once  it  be- 
gins to  burn,  spreads  in  every  direction,  and  con- 
sumes all  that  comes  in  its  way. 

Besides,  when  Hannibal  gained  possession  of 
Saguntum,  he  found  immense  treasures  there, 
which  he  employed,  not  to  increase  his  own 
private  fortune,  but  to  strengthen  and  confirm 
his  civil  and  military  power.  The  Saguntines 
did  every  thing  they  could  to  'prevent  these 


B.C.217.]  Second  Punic  War.  53 

Desperate  valor  of  the  Saguntmes.     Hannibal's  disposition  of  the  spoils 

treasures  from  falling  into  his  hands.  They 
fought  desperately  to  the  last,  refused  all  terms 
of  surrender,  and  they  became  so  insanely  des- 
perate in  the  end,  that,  according  to  the  narra- 
tive of  Livy,  when  they  found  that  the  walls 
and  towers  of  the  city  were  falling  in,  and  that 
all  hope  of  further  defense  was  gone,  they  built 
an  enormous  fire  in  the  public  streets,  and  heap- 
ed upon  it  ail  the  treasures  which  they  had  time 
to  collect  that  fire  could  destroy,  and  then  that 
many  of  the  principal  inhabitants  leaped  into 
the  flames  themselves,  in  order  that  their  hatecr 
conquerors  might  lose  their  prisoners  as  well  as 
their  spoils. 

Notwithstanding  this,  however,  Hannibal  ob- 
tained a  vast  aufcmt  of  gold  and  silver,  both  in 
the  form  of  money  and  of  plate,  and  also  much 
valuable  merchandise,  which  the  Saguntine  mer- 
chants had  accumulated  in  their  palaces  and 
warehouses.  He  used  all  this  property  to 
strengthen  his  own  political  and  military  posi- 
tion. He  paid  his  soldiers  all  the  arrears  due 
to  them  in  full.  He  divided  among  them  a 
large  additional  amount  as  their  share  of  the 
spoil.  He  sent  rich  trophies  home  to  Carthage, 
and  presents,  consisting  of  sums  of  money,  and 
jewelry,  and  gems;  to  his  friends  there,  and  to 


54  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal  chosen  one  of  the  suffetes.  Nature  of  the  office 

those  whom  he  wished  to  make  "his  friends.  The 
result  of  this  munificence,  and  of  the  renown 
which  his  victories  in  Spain  had  procured  for 
aim,  was  to  raise  him  to  the  highest  pinnacle 
)f  influence  and  honor.  The  Carthaginians 
chose  him  one  of  the  suffetes. 

The  suffetes  were  the  supreme  executive  offi- 
cers of  the  Carthaginian  commonwealth.  The 
government  was,  as  has  been  remarked  before, 
a  sort  of  aristocratic  republic,  and  republics  are 
always  very  cautious  about  intrusting  power, 
even  executive  power,  to  any  one  man.  As 
Rome  had  two  consuls,  reigning  jointly,  and 
France,  after  her  first  revolution,  a  Directory 
of  five,  so  the  Carthaginians  chose  annually  two 
suffetes,  as  they  were  called  at  Carthage,  though 
the  Roman  writers  call  them  indiscriminately 
suffetes,  consuls,  and  kings.  Hannibal  was  now 
advanced  to  this  dignity;  so  that,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  his  colleague,  he  held  the  supreme 
civil  authority  at  Carthage,  besides  being  in- 
vested with  the  command  of  the  vast  and  vie- 
torious  army  in  Spain. 

When  news  of  these  events — the  siege  and 
destruction  of  Saguntum,  the  rejection  of  the 
demands  of  the  Roman  embassadors,  and  the 
vigorous  preparations  making  by  the  Cartha- 


B.C.  217.]     Second   Punic    War.  55 

Great  excitement  at  Rome.  Fearful  anticipations. 

ginians  for  war — reached  Rome,  the  whole  city 
was  thrown  into  consternation.  The  senate 
and  the  people  held  tumultuous  and  disorderly 
assemblies,  in  which  the  events  which  had  oc- 
curred, and  the  course  of  proceeding  which  it 
was  incumbent  on  the  Romans  to  take,  were 
discussed  with  much  excitement  and  clamor 
The  Romans  were,  in  fact,  afraid  of  the  Car- 
thaginians. The  campaigns  of  Hannibal  in 
Spain  had  impressed  the  people  with  a  strong 
sense  of  the  remorseless  and  terrible  energy  of 
his  character ;  they  at  once  concluded  that  his 
plans  would  be  formed  for  marching  into  Italy, 
and  they  even  anticipated  the  danger  of  his 
bringing  the  war  up  to  the  very  gates  of  the 
city,  so  as  to  threaten  them  with  the  destruc- 
tion which  he  had  brought  upon  Saguntum. 
The  event  showed  how  justly  they  appreciated 
his  character. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  first  Punic  war, 
there  had  been  peace  between  the  Romans  and 
Carthaginians  for  about  a  quarter  of  a  century. 
During  all  this  time  both  nations  had  been  ad- 
vancing in  wealth  and  power,  but  the  Cartha- 
ginians had  made  much  more  rapid  progress 
than  the  Romans.  The  Romans  had,  indeed, 
been  very  successful  at  the  onset  in  the  formei 


56  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

New  embassy  to  Carthage.  Warm  debates 

war,  but  in  the  end  the  Carthaginians  had 
proved  themselves  their  equal.  They  seemed, 
therefore,  to  dread  now  a  fresh  encounter  with 
these  powerful  foes,  led  on,  as  they  were  now  to 
be,  by  such  a  commander  as  Hannibal. 

They  determined,  therefore,  to  send  a  second 
embassy  to  Carthage,  with  a  view  of  making 
one  more  effort  to  preserve  peace  before  actual- 
ly commencing  hostilities.  They  accordingly 
selected  five  men  from  among  the  most  influ- 
ential citizens  of  the  state — men  of  venerable 
age  and  of  great  public  consideration — and 
commissioned  them  to  proceed  to  Carthage  and 
ask  once  more  whether  it  was  the  deliberate 
and  final  decision  of  the  Carthaginian  senate 
to  avow  and  sustain  the  action  of  Hannibal 
This  solemn  embassage  set  sail.  They  arrived 
at  Carthage.  They  appeared  before  the  senate. 
They  argued  their  cause,  but  it  was,  of  course, 
to  deaf  and  unwilling  ears.  The  Carthaginian 
orators  replied  to  them,  each  side  attempting  to 
throw  the  blame  of  the  violation  of  the  treaty 
on  the  other.  It  was  a  solemn  hour,  for  the 
peace  of  the  world,  the  lives  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men,  and  the  continued  happiness 
or  the  desolation  and  ruin  of  vast  regions  oi 
country,  depended  on  the  issue  of  the  debate 


B.C.217.]     Second   Punic   War.  57 

* 

Fruitless  negotiations.  The  embassadors  return. 

Unhappily,  the  breach  was  only  widened  by  the 
discussion.  "Very  well,"  said  the  Roman 
commissioners,  at  last,  "  we  offer  you  peace  or 
war,  which  do  you  choose  ?"  "  Whichever  you 
please,"  replied  the  Carthaginians;  "  decide  for 
yourselves."  "  War,  then,"  said  the  Romans, 
"since  it  must  be  so."  The  conference  was 
broken  up,  and  the  embassadors  returned  to 
Rome. 

They  returned,  however,  by  the  way  of 
Spain.  Their  object  in  doing  this  was  to  ne- 
gotiate with  the  various  kingdoms  and  tribes  in 
Spain  and  in  France,  through  which  Hannibal 
would  have  to  march  in  invading  Italy,  and  en- 
deavor to  induce  them  to  take  sides  with-  the 
Romans.  They  were  too  late,  however,  for 
Hannibal  had  contrived  to  extend  and  establish 
his  influence  in  all  that  region  too  strongly  to 
be  shaken ;  so  that,  on  one  pretext  or  another, 
the  Roman  proposals  were  all  rejected.  There 
was  one  powerful  tribe,  for  example,  called  the 
Volscians.  The  embassadors,  in  the  presence 
of  the  great  council  of  the  Volscians,  made 
Known  to  them  the  probability  of  war,  and  in- 
vited them  to  ally  themselves  with  the  Romans. 
The  Volscians  rejected  the  proposition  with  a 
sort  of  scorn.     "  We  see,"  said  they,  "  from  thft 


58  Hannibal  [B.C.  217. 


Reply  of  the  Volscians.  Council  of  Gauls. 

fate  of  Saguntum,  what  is  to  be  expected  to  re- 
sult from  an  alliance  with  the  Romans.  After 
leaving  that  city  defenseless  and  alone  in  its 
struggle  against  such  terrible  danger,  it  is  in 
vain  to  ask  other  nations  to  trust  to  your  pro- 
tection. If  you  wish  for  new  allies,  it  will  be 
best  for  you  to  go  where  the  story  of  Saguntum 
is  not  known."  This  answer  of  the  Volscians 
was  applauded  by  the  other  nations  of  Spain,  as 
far  as  it  was  known,  and  the  Roman  embassa- 
dors, despairing  of  success  in  that  country,  went 
on  into  Gaul,  which  is  the  name  by  which  the 
country  now  called  France  is  known  in  ancient 
history. 

On  reaching  a  certain  place  which  was  a  cen- 
tral point  of  influence  and  power  in  Gaul,  the 
Roman  commissioners  convened  a  great  martial 
council  there.  The  spectacle  presented  by  this 
assembly  was  very  imposing,  for  the  warlike 
counselors  came  to  the  meeting  armed  complete- 
ly and  in  the  most  formidable  manner,  as  if 
they  were  coming  to  a  battle  instead  of  a  con- 
sultation and  debate.  The  venerable  embassa- 
dors laid  the  subject  before  them.  They  des- 
canted largely  on  the  power  and  greatness  of 
the  Romans,  and  on  the  certainty  that  they 
should  conquer  in  the  approaching  contest,  and 


B.C.217.]  Second  Punic  War.  59 

Tumultuous  scene.  Repulse  of  the  embassadors 

they  invited  the  Gauls  to  espouse  their  cause, 
and  to  rise  in  arms  and  intercept  Hannibal's 
passage  through  their  country,  if  he  should  at- 
tempt to  effect  one. 

The  assembly  could  hardly  be  induced  to  hear 
the  embassadors  through ;  and,  as  soon  as  they 
had  finished  their  address,  the  whole  council 
broke  forth  into  cries  of  dissent  and  displeasure, 
and  even  into  shouts  of  derision.  Order  was  at 
length  restored,  and  the  officers,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  express  the  sentiments  of  the  assembly, 
gave  for  their  reply  that  the  Gauls  had  never 
received  any  thing  but  violence  and  injuries 
from  Rome,  or  any  thing  but  kindness  and  good- 
will from  Carthage ;  and  that  they  had  no  idea 
of  being  guilty  of  the  folly  of  bringing  the  im- 
pending storm  of  llannibaFs  hostility  upon  their 
own  heads,  merely  for  the  sake  of  averting  it 
from  their  ancient  and  implacable  foes.  Thus 
the  embassadors  were  every  where  repulsed. 
They  found  no  friendly  disposition  toward  the 
Roman  power  tilt  they  had  crossed  the  Rhone. 

Hannibal  began  now  to  form  his  plans,  in  a 
very  deliberate  and  cautious  manner,  for  a  march 
into  Italy.  He  knew  well  that  this  was  an  ex- 
pedition of  such  magnitude  and  duration  as  to  re- 
quire beforehand  the  most  careful  and  well-con 


W  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal's  kindness  to  his  soldiers.  He  matures  his  designs 

sidered  arrangements,  both  for  the  forces  which 
were  to  go,  and  for  the  states  and  communities 
which  were  to  remain.  The  .winter  was  com- 
ing on.  His  first  measure  was  to  dismiss  a 
large  portion  of  his  forces,  that  they  might  visit 
their  homes.  He  told  them  that  he  was  intend- 
ing some  great  designs  for  the  ensuing  spring, 
which  might  take  them  to  a  great  distance,  and 
keep  them  for  a  long  time  absent  from  Spain, 
and  he  would,  accordingly,  give  them  the  inter- 
vening time  to  visit  their  families  and  their 
homes,  and  to  arrange  their  affairs.  This  act 
of  kind  consideration  and  confidence  renewed 
the  attachment  of  the  soldiers  to  their  command- 
er, and  they  returned  to  his  camp  in  the  spring 
not  only  with  new  .strength  and  vigor,  but  with 
redoubled  attachment  to  the  "service  in  which 
they  were  engaged. 

Hannibal,  after  sending  home  his  soldiers,  re- 
tired himself  to  New  Carthage,  which,  as  will 
be  seen  by  the  map,  is  further  west  than  Sa- 
guntum,  where  he  went  into  winter  quarters, 
and  devoted  himself  to  the  maturing  of  his  de- 
signs. Besides  the  necessary  preparations  for 
his  own  march,  he  had  to  provide  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  countries  that  he  should  leave. 
He  devised  various  and  ingenious  plans  to  pre 


B.C.  2.17.]  Second   Punic   War.  61 

Hannibal's  plan  for  the  government  of  Spain  in  his  absence. 

vent  the  danger  of  insurrections  and  rebellions 
while  he  was  gone.  One  was,  to  organize  an 
army  for  Spain  out  of  soldiers  drawn  from  Af- 
rica, while  the  troops  which  were  to  be  em* 
ployed  to  garrison  Carthage,  and  to  sustain  the 
government  there,  were  taken  from  Spain.  By 
thus  changing  the  troops  of  the  two  countries, 
each  country  was  controlled  by  a  foreign  sol- 
diery, who  were  more  likely  to  be  faithful  in 
their  obedience  to  their  commanders,  and  less 
in  danger  of  sympathizing  with  the  populations 
which  they  were  respectively  employed  to  con- 
trol, than  if  each  had  been  retained  in  its  own 
native  land. 

Hannibal  knew  very  well  that  the  various 
states  and  provinces  of  Spain,  which  had  refused 
to  ally  themselves  with  the  Romans  and  aban- 
don him,  had  been  led  to  do  this  through  the 
influence  of  his  presents  or  the  fear  of  his  pow- 
er, and  that  if,  after  he  had  penetrated  into  It- 
aly, he  should  meet  with  reverses,  so  as  to  di- 
minish very  much  their  hope  of  deriving  bene- 
fit from  his  favor  or  their  fear  of  his  power,  there 
would  be  great  danger  of  defections  and  revolts 
As  an  additional  security  against  this,  he  adopt- 
ed the  following  ingenious  plan.  He  enlisted  a 
body  of  troops  from  among  all  the  nation*  of 


62  Hanncbal  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal's  brother  HasdrubaL  He  is  left  in  charge  of  Spain. 

Spain  that  were  in  alliance  with  him,  selecting 
the  young  men  who  were  enlisted  as  much  as 
possible  from  families  of  consideration  and  influ- 
ence, and  this  body  of  troops,  when  organized 
and  officered,  he  sent  into  Carthage,  giving  the 
nations  and  tribes  from  which  they  were  drawn 
to  understand  that  he  considered  them  not  only 
as  soldiers  serving  in  his  armies,  but  as  hosta- 
ges, which  he  should  hold  as  security  for  the 
fidelity  and  obedience  of  the  countries  from 
which  they  had  come.  The  number  of  these 
soldiers  was  four  thousand. 

Hannibal  had  a  brother,  whose  name,  as  it 
happened,  was  the  same  as  that  of  his  brother- 
in-law,  Hasdrubal.  It  was  to  him  that  he  com- 
mitted the  government  of  Spain  during  his  ab- 
sence. The  soldiers  provided  for  him  were,  as 
has  been  already  stated,  mainly  drawn  from 
Africa.  In  addition  to  the  foot  soldiers,  he  pro- 
vided him  with  a  small  body  of  horse.  He  left 
with  him,  also,  fourteen  elephants.  And  as  he 
thought  it  not  improbable  that  the  Romans 
might,  in  some  contingency  during  his  absence, 
make  a  descent  upon  the  Spanish  coast  from 
the  sea,  he  built  and  equipped  for  him  a  small 
fleet  of  about  sixty  vessels,  fifty  of  which  were 
of  the  first  class.     In  modern  times,  the  mag- 


B.C.217.]  Second   Punic    War.  63 

Preparations  of  the  Romans.  Their  plan  for  the  war 

nitude  and  efficiency  of  a  ship  is  estimated  by 
the  number  of  guns  she  will  carry;  then,  il 
was  the  number  of  banks  of  oars.  Fifty  of 
Hasdrubal's  ships  were  quinquer ernes,  as  they 
were  called,  that  is,  they  had  five  banks  of  oars 

The  Romans,  on  the  other  hand,  did  not  neg- 
lect their  own  preparations.  Though  reluct- 
ant  to  enter  upon  the  war,  they  still  prepared 
to  engage  in  it  with  their  characteristic  energy 
and  ardor,  when  they  found  that  it  could  not 
be  averted.  They  resolved  on  raising  two  pow- 
erful armies,  one  for  each  of  the  consuls.  The 
plan  was,  with  one  of  these  to  advance  to  meet 
Hannibal,  and  with  the  other  to  proceed  to  Sic- 
ily, and  from  Sicily  to  the  African  coast,  with 
a  view  of  threatening  the  Carthaginian  capital. 
This  plan,  if  successful,  would  compel  the  Car- 
thaginians to  recall  a  part  or  the  whole  of  Han- 
nibal's army  from  the  intended  invasion  of  It- 
aly to  defend  their  own  African  homes. 

The  force  raised  by  the  Romans  amounted  to 
about  seventy  thousand  men.  About  a  third  of 
these  were  Roman  soldiers,  and  the  remainder 
were  drawn  from  various  nations  dwelling  in 
Italy  and  in  the  islands  of  the  Mediterranean 
Sea  which  were  in  alliance  with  the  Romans, 
Of  these  troops  six  thousand  were  cavalry      Of 


64  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

The  Roman  fleet.  Drawing  lota 

course,  as  the  Romans  intended  to  cross  into 
Africa,  they  needed  a  fleet.  They  built  and 
equipped  one,  which  consisted  of  two  hundred 
and  twenty  ships  of  the  largest  class,  that 
is,  quinqueremes,  besides  a  number  of  smaller 
and  lighter  vessels  for  services  requiring  speed. 
There  were  vessels  in  use  in  those  times  larger 
than  the  quinqueremes.  Mention  is  occasion- 
ally made  of  those  which  had  six  and  even  sev- 
en banks  of  oars.  But  these  were  only  employ- 
ed as  the  flag-ships  of  commanders,  and  for 
other  purposes  of  ceremony  and  parade,  as  they 
were  too  unwieldy  for  efficient  service  in  action. 
Lots  were  then  drawn  in  a  very  solemn  man- 
ner, according  to  the  Roman  custom  on  such 
occasions,  to  decide  on  the  assignment  of  these 
two  armies  to  the  respective  consuls.  The  one 
destined  to  meet  Hannibal  on  his  way  from 
Spain,  fell  to  a  consul  named  Cornelius  Scipio. 
The  name  of  the  other  was  Sempronius.  It 
devolved  on  him,  consequently,  to  take  charge 
of  the  expedition  destined  to  Sicily  and  Africa. 
When  all  the  arrangements  were  thus  made, 
the  question  was  finally  put,  in  a  very  solemn 
and  formal  manner,  to  the  Roman  people  for 
their  final  vote  and  decision.  "  Do  the  Roman 
people  decide  and  decree  that  war  shall  be  de 


B.C. 217.]    Second 

Funic   War.              t>5 

Religious  ceremonies. 

Hannibal's  march. 

clared  against  the  Carthaginians?"  The  de- 
cision was  in  the  affirmative.  The  war  was 
then  proclaimed  with  the  usual  imposing  cere- 
monies. Sacrifices  and  religious  celebrations 
followed,  to  propitiate  the  favor  of  the  gods,  and 
to  inspire  the  soldiers  with  that  kind  of  cour- 
age and  confidence  which  the  superstitious, 
however  wicked,  feel  when  they  can  imagine 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  heaven. 
These  shows  and  spectacles  being  over,  all 
things  were  ready. 

In  the  mean  time  Hannibal  was  moving  on, 
as  the  spring  advanced,  toward  the  banks  of  the 
Iberus,  that  frontier  stream,  the  crossing  of 
which  made  him  an  invader  of  what  was,  in 
some  sense,  Roman  territory.  He  boldly  passed 
the  stream,  and  moved  forward  along  the  coast 
of  the  Mediterranean,  gradually  approaching  the 
Pyrenees,  which  form  the  boundary  between 
France  and  Spain.  His  soldiers  hitherto  did 
not  know  what  his  plans  were.  It  is  very  lit- 
tle the  custom  noiu  for  military  and  naval  com- 
manders to  communicate  to  their  men  much  in- 
formation about  their  designs,  and  it  was  still 
less  the  custom  then ;  and  besides,  in  those  days, 
the  common  soldiers  had  no  access  to  fhose 
means  of  information  by  which  news  of  every 
E 


66  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

The  Fyrenees.  Discontent  in  Hannibal's  army. 

sort  is  now  so  universally  diffused.  Thus, 
though  all  the  officers  of  the  army,  and  well- 
informed  citizens,  both  in  Rome  and  Carthage, 
anticipated  and  understood  Hannibal's  designs, 
his  own  soldiers,  ignorant  and  degraded,  knew 
nothing  except  that  they  were  to  go  on  some 
distant  and  dangerous  service.  They,  very  like- 
ly, had  no  idea  whatever  of  Italy  or  of  Rome, 
or  of  the  magnitude  of  the  possessions,  or  of  the 
power  held  by  the  vast  empire  which  they  were 
going  to  invade. 

When,  however,  after  traveling  day  after  day, 
they  came  to  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  found 
that  they  were  really  going  to  pass  that  mighty 
chain  of  mountains,  and  for  this  purpose  were 
actually  entering  its  wild  and  gloomy  denies, 
the  courage  of  some  of  them  failed,  and  they  be- 
gan to  murmur.  The  discontent  and  alarm 
were,  in  fact,  so  great,  that  one  corps,  consist- 
ing of  about  three  thousand  men,  left  the  camp 
in  a  body,  and  moved  back  toward  their  homes 
On  mquiry,  Hannibal  found  that  there  were  ter 
thousand  more  who  were  in  a  similar  state  of 
feeling.  His  whole  force  consisted  of  over  ont 
hundred  thousand.  And  now  what  does  the 
reader  imagine  that  Hannibal  would  do  in  such 
an  emergency?     Would  he  return  in  pursuit 


B.C.217.J  Second  Punic  War.  67 

Hannibal's  address.  The  discontented  sent  home. 

of  these  deserters,  to  recapture  and  destroy  them 
as  a  terror  to  the  rest?  or  would  he  let  them 
go,  and  attempt  by  words  of  conciliation  and  en- 
couragement to  confirm  and  save  those  that  yet 
remained  ?  He  did  neither.  He  called  togeth- 
er the  ten  thousand  discontented  troops  that 
were  still  in  his  camp,  and  told  them  that,  since 
they  were  afraid  to  accompany  his  army,  or  un- 
willing to  do  so,  they  might  return.  He  want- 
ed none  in  his  service  who  had  not  the  couragG 
and  the  fortitude  to  go  on  wherever  he  might 
lead.  He  would  not  have  the  faint-hearted  and 
the  timid  in  his  army.  They  would  only  be  a 
burden  to  load  down  and  impede  the  courage 
and  energy  of  the  rest.  So  saying,  he  gave  or- 
ders for  them  to  return,  and  with  the  rest  of  the 
army,  whose  resolution  and  ardor  were  redoubled 
by  this  occurrence,  he  moved  on  through  the 
passes  of  the  mountains. 

This  act  of  Hannibal,  in  permitting  his  dis- 
contented soldiers  to  return,  had  all  the  effect 
of  a  deed  of  generosity  in  its  influence  upon  the 
minds  of  the  soldiers  who  went  on.  We  must 
not,  however,  imagine  that  it  was  prompted  by 
a  spirit  of  generosity  at  all.  It  was  policy.  A 
seeming  generosity  was,  in  this  case,  exactly 
what  was  wanted  to  answer  his  ends.     Hanni- 


68  Hannibal.  [B.C.217 

Hannibal's  sagacity.  The  Pyrenees  passed 

bal  was  mercilessly  cruel  in  all  cases  where  he 
imagined  that  severity  was  demanded.  It  re- 
quires great  sagacity  sometimes  in  a  command- 
er to  know  when  he  must  punish,  and  when  it 
is  wisest  to  overlook  and  forgive.  Hannibal, 
like  Alexander  and  Napoleon,  possessed  this  sa- 
gacity in  a  very  high  degree ;  and  it  was,  doubt- 
less, the  exercise  of  that  principle  alone  which 
prompted  his  action  on  this  occasion. 

Thus  Hannibal  passed  the  Pyrenees.  The 
next  difficulty  that  he  anticipated  was  in  cross- 
ing the  River  Rhone. 


B.C.  217.]  Passage  or  the  Rhone.       69 

Difficulties  anticipated.  •  Reconnoitering  party. 


Chapter   IV. 

The   Passage   of  the   Rhone. 

TTANNIBAL,  after  he  had  passed  the  Pyr- 
-*--*■  enees,  did  not  anticipate  any  new  diffi- 
culty till  he  should  arrive  at  the  Rhone.  He 
knew  very  well  that  that  was  a  broad  and  rap- 
id river,  and  that  he  must  cross  it  near  its 
mouth,  where  the  water  was  deep  and  the  banks 
low;  and,  besides,  it  was  not  impossible  that 
the  Romans  who  were  coming  to  meet  him, 
under  Cornelius  Scipio,  might  have  reached 
the  Rhone  before  he  should  arrive  there,  and  be 
ready  upon  the  banks  to  dispute  his  passage 
He  had  sent  forward,  therefore,  a  small  detach- 
ment in  advance,  to  reconnoiter  the  country  and 
select  a  route  to  the  Rhone,  and  if  they  met 
with  no  difficulties  to  arrest  them  there,  they 
were  to  go  on  till  they  reached  the  Alps,  and 
explore  the  passages  and  defiles  through  which 
his  army  could  best  cross  those  snow-covered 
mountains. 

It  seems  that  before  he  reached  the  Pyrenees 
— that  is,  while  he  was  upon  the  Spanish  side  of 


70  •       Hannibal.  [B.C.217 

Som*>  tribes  reduced.*  Alarm  of  the  Gauls 

them,  some  of  the  tribes  through  whose  territo- 
ries he  had  to  pass  undertook  to  resist  him, 
and  he,  consequently,  had  to  attack  them  and 
reduce  them  by  force ;  and  then,  when  he  was 
ready  to  move  on,  he  left  a  guard  in  the  terri- 
tories thus  conquered  to  keep  them  in  subjec- 
tion. Rumors  of  this  reached  Gaul.  The 
Gauls  were  alarmed  for  their  own  safety.  They 
had  not  intended  to  oppose  Hannibal  so  long  as 
they  supposed  that  he  only  wished  for  a  safe 
passage  through  their  country  on  his  way  to 
Ttaly ;  but  now,  when  they  found,  from  what 
had  occurred  in  Spain,  that  he  was  going  to 
conquer  the  countries  he  traversed  as  he  passed 
along,  they  became  alarmed.  They  seized  their 
arms,  and  assembled  in  haste  at  Ruscino,  and 
began  to  devise  measures  of  defense.  Ruscino 
was  the  same  place  as  that  in  which  the  Ro- 
man embassadors  met  the  great  council  of  tho 
Gauls  on  their  return  to  Italy  from  Carthage. 

While  this  great  council;  or,  rather,  assembly 
of  armies,  was  gathering  at  Ruscino,  full  of 
threats  and  anger,  Hannibal  was  at  Illiberis,  a 
town  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenean  Mountains 
He  seems  to  have  had  no  fear  that  any  opposi 
tion  which,  the  Gauls  could  bring  to  bear  against 
him  would  be  successful,  but  he  dreaded  the 


B.C.  217. 1  Passage   of   the   Rhone.      71 

The  Alps.  Difficulty  of  their  passage^ 

delay.  He  was  extremely  unwilling  to  spend 
the  precious  months  of  the  early  summer  in 
contending  with  such  foes  as  they,  when  the 
road  to  Italy  was  before  him.  Besides,  the  pass- 
es of  the  Alps,  which  are  difficult  and  laborious 
at  any  time,  are  utterly  impracticable  except 
in  the  months  of  July  and  August.  At  all 
other  seasons  they  are,  or  were  in  those  days, 
blocked  up  with  impassable  snows.  In  modern 
times  roads  have  been  made,  with  galleries  cut- 
through  the  rock,  and  with  the  exposed  places 
protected  by  sloping  roofs  projecting  from  above, 
Dver.  which  storms  sweep  and  avalanches  slide 
without  injury ;  so  that  now  the  intercourse 
of  ordinary  travel  between  France  and  Italy, 
across  the  Alps,  is  kept  up,  in  some  measure, 
all  the  year.  In  Hannibal's  time,  however,  the 
mountains  could  not  be  traversed  except  in  the 
summer  months,  and  if  it  had  not  been  that  the 
result  justified  the  undertaking,  it  would  have 
been  considered  an  act  of  inexcusable  rashness 
and  folly  to  attempt  to  cross  with  an  army  at 
all. 

Hannibal  had  therefore  no  time  to  lose,  and 
that  circumstance  made  this  case  one  of  those 
in  which  forbearance  and  a  show  of  generosity 
were  called  for,  instead  of  defiance  and  force. 


i  e~H. 


72  Hannibal.  [B.C.217 


Hannibal's  message  to  the  Gauls.  Success  of  his  policy 

He  accordingly  sent  messengers  to  the  council 
at  Ruscino  to  say,  in  a  very  complaisant  and 
affable  manner,  that  he  wished  to  see  and  con- 
fer with  their  princes  in  person,  and  that,  if 
they  pleased,  he  would  advance  for  this  pur- 
pose toward  Ruscino;  or  they  might,  if  they 
preferred,  come  on  toward  him  at  Illiberis, 
where  he  would  await  their  arrival.  He  in- 
vited them  to  come  freely  into  his  camp,  and 
said  that  he  was  ready,  if  they  were  willing  to 
receive  him,  to  go  into  theirs,  for  he  had  come 
to  Gaul  as  a  friend  and  an  ally,  and  wanted 
nothing  but  a  free  passage  through  their  terri- 
tory.. He  had  made  a  resolution,  he  said,  if 
the  Gauls  would  but  allow  him  to  keep  it,  that 
there  should  not  be  a  single  sword  drawn  in  his 
army  till  he  got  into  Italy. 

The  alarm  and  the  feelings  of  hostility  which 
prevailed  among  the  Gauls  were  greatly  allay- 
ed by  this  message.  They  put  their  camp  in 
motion,  and  went  on  to  Illiberis.  The  princes 
and  high  officers  of  their  armies  went  to  Han- 
nibal's camp,  and  were  received  with  the  high- 
est marks  of  distinction  and  honor.  They  were 
loaded  with  presents,  and  went  away  charmed 
with  the  affability,  the  wealth,  and  the  generos- 
ity of  their*  visitor.      Instead  of  opposing  his 


B.C.217.]   Passage   of   the   Rhone.       73 

Cornelius  Scipio.  He  embarks  his  army 

progress,  they  became  the  conductors  and  guides 
of  his  army.  They  took  them  first  to  Ruscino, 
which  was,  as  it  were,  their  capital,  and  thence, 
after  a  short  delay,  the  army  moved  on  without 
any  further  molestation  toward  the  Rhone. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Roman  consul  Scipio, 
having  embarked  the  troops  destined  to  meet 
Hannibal  in  sixty  ships  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Tiber,  set  sail  for  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone. 
The  men  were  crowded  together  in  the  ships, 
as  armies  necessarily  must  be  when  transport- 
ed by  sea.  They  could  not  go  far  out  to  sea, 
for,  as  they  had  no  compass  in  those  days, 
there  were  no  means  of  directing  the  course  of 
navigation,  in  case  of  storms  or  cloudy  skies, 
except  by  the  land.  The  ships  accordingly 
made  their  way  slowly  along  the  shore,  some- 
times by  means  of  sails  and  sometimes  by 
oars,  and,  after  suffering  for  some  time  the 
hardships  and  privations  incident  to  such  a  voy- 
age— the  sea-sickness  and  the  confinement  of* 
such  swarming  numbers  in  so  narrow  a  space 
bringing  every  species  of  discomfort  in  their 
train- — the  fleet  entered  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone. 
The  officers  had  no  idea  that  Hannibal  was 
near.  They  had  only  heard  of  his  having  cross- 
ed the  Iberus.     They  imagined  that  he  was 


74  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Both  armies  on  the  Rhons.  Exploring  party 

still  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pyrenees.  They 
entered  the  Rhone  by  the  first  branch  they 
came  to — for  the  Rhone,  like  the  Nile,  divides 
near  its  mouth,  and  flows  into  the  sea  by  sev- 
eral separate  channels — and  sailed  without  con- 
cern up  to  Marseilles,  imagining  that  their  en- 
emy was  still  hundreds  of  miles  away,  entangled, 
perhaps,  among  the  defiles  of  the  Pyrenees.  In- 
stead of  that,  he  was  safely  encamped  upon  the 
banks  of  the  Rhone,  a  short  distance  above  them, 
quietly  and  coolly  making  his  arrangements  for 
crossing  it. 

When  Cornelius  got  his  men  upon  the  land, 
they  were  too  much  exhausted  by  the  sickness 
and  misery  they  had  endured  upon  the  voyage 
to  move  on  to  meet  Hannibal  without  some 
days  for  rest  and  refreshment.  Cornelius,  how- 
ever, selected  three  hundred  horsemen  who  were 
able  to  move,  and  sent  them  up  the  river  on  an 
exploring  expedition,  to  learn  the  facts  in  re- 
spect to  Hannibal,  and  to  report  them  to  him. 
Dispatching  them  accordingly,  he  remained  him- 
self in  his  camp,  reorganizing  and  recruiting 
his  army,  and  awaiting  the  return  of  the  party 
that  he  had  sent  to  explore. 

Although  Hannibal  had  thus  far  met  with  no 
serious  opposition  in  his  progress  through  Gaul, 


B.C.  217.]  Passage  of  the  Rhone.         75 

Feelings  of  the  Gauls  in  respect  to  Hannibal. 

it  must  not,  on  that  account,  be  supposed  that 
the  people,  through  whose  territories  he  was 
passing,  were  really  friendly  to  his  cause,  or 
pleased  with  his  presence  among  them.  An 
army  is  always  a  burden  and  a  curse  to  any 
country  that  it  enters,  even  when  its  only  ob- 
ject is  to  pass  peacefully  through.  The  Gauls 
assumed  a  friendly  attitude  toward  this  dreaded 
invader  and  his  horde  only  because  they  thought 
that  by  so  doing  he  would  the  sooner  pass  and 
be  gone.  They  were  too  weak,  and  had  too  few 
means  of  resistance  to  attempt  to  stop  him ;  and, 
as  the  next  best  thing  that  they  could  do,  re- 
solved to  render  him  every  possible  aid  to  hast- 
en him  on.  This  continued  to  be  the  policy  of 
the  various  tribes  until  he  reached  the  river 
The  people  on  the  further  side  of  the  river,  how- 
ever, thought  it  was  best  for  them  to  resist. 
They  were  nearer  to  the  Roman  territories,  and, 
consequently,  somewhat  more  under  Roman  in- 
fluence. They  feared  the  resentment  of  the  Ro- 
mans if  they  should,  even  passively,  render  any 
co-operation  to  Hannibal  in  his  designs  ;  and,  as 
they  had  the  broad  and  rapid  river  between  them 
and  their  enemy,  they  thought  there  was  a  rea- 
sonable prospect  that,  with  its  aid,  they  could 
exclude  him  from  their  territories  altogether. 


76  Hannibal.  |B.C.217 

The  Gauls  beyond  the  river  oppose  Hannibal's  passage. 

Thus  it  happened  that,  when  Hannibal  came 
to  the  stream,  the  people  on  one  side  were  all 
eager  to  promote,  while  those  on  the  other  were 
determined  to  prevent  his  passage,  both  parties 
being  animated  by  the  same  desire  to  free  their 
country  from  such  a  pest  as  the  presence  of  an 
army  of  ninety  thousand  men ;  so  that  Hanni- 
bal stood  at  last  upon  the  banks  of  the  river, 
with  the  people  on  his  side  of  the  stream  wait- 
ing and  ready  to  furnish  all  the  boats  and  ves- 
sels that  they  could  command,  and  to  render 
every  aid  in  their  power  in  the  embarkation, 
while  those  on  the  other  were  drawn  up  in  bat- 
tle array,  rank  behind  rank,  glittering  with 
weapons,  marshaled  so  as  to  guard  every  place 
of  landing,  and  lining  with  pikes  the  whole  extent 
of  the  shore,  while  the  peaks  of  their  tents,  in 
vast  numbers,  with  banners  among  them  float- 
ing in  the  air,  were  to  be  seen  in  the  distance 
behind  them.  All  this  time,  the  three  hundred 
horsemen  which  Cornelius  had  dispatched  were 
slowly  and  cautiously  making  their  way  up  the 
river  from  the  Roman  encampment  below. 

After  contemplating  the  scene  presented  to 
his  view  at  the  river  for  some  time  in  silence, 
Hannibal  commenced  his  preparations  for  cross- 
ing the  stream.     He  collected  first  all  the  boats 


B.C. 217.]  Passage  of  the  Rhone.         77 

Preparations  for  crossing  the  river.  Boat  building. 

of  every  kind  which  could  be  obtained  among 
the  Gauls  who  lived  along  the  bank  of  the  riv- 
er. These,  however,  only  served  for  a  begin- 
ning, and  so  he  next  got  together  all  the  work- 
men and  all  the  tools  which  the  country  could 
furnish,  for  several  miles  around,  and  went  to 
work  constructing  more.  The  Gauls  of  that  re- 
gion had  a  custom  of  making  boats  of  the  trunks 
of  large  trees.  The  tree,  being  felled  and  cut 
to  the  proper  length,  was  hollowed  out  with 
hatchets  and  adzes,  and  then,  being  turned  bot- 
tom upward,  the  outside  was  shaped  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  make  it  glide  easily  through  the 
water.  So  convenient  is  this  mode  of  making 
boats,  that  it  is  practiced,  in  cases  where  suffi- 
ciently large  trees  are  found,  to  the  present  day 
Such  boats  are  now  called  canoes. 

There  were  plenty  of  large  trees  on  the  banks 
of  the  Rhone.  Hannibal's  soldiers  watched  the 
Gauls  at  their  work,  in  making  boats  of  them, 
until  they  learned  the  art  themselves.  Some 
first  assisted  their  new  allies  in  the  easier  por- 
tions of  the  operation,  and  then  began  to  feli 
large  trees  and  make  the  boats  themselves. 
Others,  who  had  less  skill  or  more  impetuosity 
chose  not  to  wait  for  the  slow  process  of  hoi 
lowing  the  wood,  and  they,  accordingly,  would 


78  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Rafts.  The  enemy  look  on  in  silence 

fell  the  trees  upon  the  shore,  cut  the  trunks  of 
equal  lengths,  place  them  side  by  side  in  the  wa- 
ter, and  bolt  or  bind  them  together  so  as  to  form 
a  raft.  The  form  and  fashion  of  their  craft  was 
of  no  consequence,  they  said,  as  it  was  for  one 
passage  only.  Any  thing  would  answer,  if  it 
would  only  float  and  bear  its  burden  over. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  enemy  upon  the  oppo- 
site  shore  looked  on,  but  they  could  do  nothing 
to  impede  these  operations.  If  they  had  had  ar- 
tillery, such  as  is  in  use  at  the  present  day,  they 
could  have  fired  across  the  river,  and  have  blown 
the  boats  and  rafts  to  pieces  with  balls  and  shells 
as  fast  as  the  Gauls  and  Carthaginians  could 
build  them.  In  fact,  the  workmen  could  not 
have  built  them  under  such  a  cannonading ; 
but  the  enemy,  in  this  case,  had  nothing  but 
spears,  and  arrows,  and  stones,  to  be  thrown 
either  by  the  hand,  or  by  engines  far  too  weak 
to  send  them  with  any  effect  across  such  a 
stream.  They  had  to  look  on  quietly,  there- 
fore, and  allow  these  great  and  formidable  prep- 
arations for  an  attack  upon  them  to  go  on  with- 
out interruption.  Their  only  hope  was  to  over- 
whelm the  army  with  their  missiles,  and  prevent 
their  landing,  when  they  should  reach  the  bank 
at  last  in  their  attempt  to  cross  the  stream. 


B.C.217.]  Passage  of  the  Rhone  7^ 

Difficulties  df  crossing  a  river.  Hannibal's  tactics 

If  an  army  is  crossing  a  river  without  any 
enemy  to  oppose  them,  a  moderate  number  of 
boats  will  serve,  as  a  part  of  the  army  can  be 
transported  at  a  time,  and  the  whole  gradually 
transferred  from  one  bank  to  the  other  by  re 
peated  trips  of  the  same  conveyances.  But 
when  there  is  an  enemy  to  encounter  at  the 
landing,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  the  means  of 
carrying  over  a  very  large  force  at  a  time  ;  foi 
if  a  small  division  were  to  go  over  first  alone, 
it  would  only  throw  itself,  weak  and  defense- 
less, into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Hannibal, 
therefore,  waited  until  he  had  boats,  rafts,  and 
floats  enough  constructed  to  carry  over  a  force 
all  together  sufficiently  numerous  and  powerful 
to  attack  the  enemy  with  a  prospect  of  success 

The  Romans,  as  we  have  already  remarked, 
say  that  Hannibal  was  cunning.  He  certainly 
was  not  disposed,  like  Alexander,  to  trust  in 
his  battles  to  simple  superiority  of  bravery  and 
force,  but  was  always  contriving  some  strata- 
gem to  increase  the  chances  of  victory.  He 
did  so  in  this  case.  He  kept  up  for  many  days 
a  prodigious  parade  and  bustle  of  building  boats 
and  rafts  in  sight  of  his  enemy,  as  if  his  sole 
reliance  was  on  the  multitude  of  men  that  he 
could  pour  across  the  river  at  a  single  transpor- 


ftO  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Hannibal's  stratagem.  Detachment  under  Hanno. 

tation,  and  he  thus  kept  their  attention  closely 
riveted  upon  these  preparations.  All  this  time, 
however,  he  had  another  plan  in  course  of  exe- 
cution. He  had  sent  a  strong  body  of  troops 
secretly  up  the  river,  with  orders  to  make  their 
way  stealthily  through  the  forests,  and  cross 
the  stream  some  few  miles  above.  This  force 
was  intended  to  move  back  from  the  river,  as 
soon  as  it  should  cross  the  stream,  and  come 
down  upon  the  enemy  in  the  rear,  so  as  to  at- 
tack and  harass  them  there  at  the  same  time 
that  Hannibal  was  crossing  with  the  main  body 
of  the  army.  If  they  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
river  safely,  they  were  to  build  a  fire  in  the 
woods,  on  the  other  side,  in  order  that  the  col- 
umn of  smoke  which  should  ascend  from  it 
might  serve  as  a  signal  of  their  success  to  Han- 
nibal. 

This  detachment  was  commanded  by  an  offi- 
cer named  Hanno — of  course,  a  very  difFerent 
man  from  Hannibal's  great  enemy  of  that  name 
in  Carthage.  Hanno  set  out  in  the  night,  mov- 
ing back  from  the  river,  in  commencing  his 
march,  so  as  to  be  entirely  out  of  sight  from 
the  Gauls  on  the  other  side.  He  had  some 
guides,  belonging  to  the  country,  who  promised 
to  show  him  a  convenient  place  for  crossing. 


B.C. 217.]  Passage   of   the 

Rhone.       81 

Success  of  Hanno. 

The  signal 

The  party  went  up  the  river  about  twenty-five 
miles.  Here  they  found  a  place  where  the  wa- 
ter spread  to  a  greater  width,  and  where  the 
current  was  less  rapid,  and  the  water  not  so 
deep.  They  got  to  this  place  in  silence  and  se- 
crecy, their  enemies  below  not  having  suspect- 
ed any  such  design.  As  they  had,  therefore, 
nobody  to  oppose  them,  they  could  cross  much 
more  easily  than  the  main  army  below.  They 
made  some  rafts  for  carrying  over  those  of  the 
men  that  could  not  swim,  and  such  munitions 
of  war  as  would  be  injured  by  the  wet.  The 
rest  of  the  men  waded  till  they  reached  the 
channel,'  and  then  swam,  supporting  themselves 
in  part  by  their  bucklers,  which  they  placed 
beneath  their  bodies  in  the  water.  Thus  they 
all  crossed  in  safety.  They  paused  a  day,  to 
dry  their  clothes  and  to  rest,  and  then  moved 
cautiously  down  the  river  until  they  were  near 
enough  to  Hannibal's  position -to  allow  their  sig 
nal  to  be  seen.  The  fire  was  then  built,  and 
they  gazed  with  exultation  upon  the  column  of 
*moke  which  ascended  from  it  high  into  the  air. 
Hannibal  saw  the  signal,  and  now  immedi- 
ately prepared  to  cross  with  his  army.  The 
horsemen  embarked  in  boats,  holding  their 
horses  by  lines,  with  a  view  of  leading  them 
F 


82  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Passage  of  the  river.  Scene  of  confusion 

into  the  water  so  that  they  might  swim  in  com- 
pany with  the  boats.  Other  horses,  bridled  and 
pccoutered,  were  put  into  large  flat-bottomed 
boats,  to  be  taken  across  dry,  in  order  that  they 
might  be  all  ready  for  service  at  the  instant  of 
landing.  The  most  vigorous  and  efficient  por- 
tion of  the  army  were,  of  course,  selected  for 
the  first  passage,  while  all  those  who,  for  any 
cause,  were  weak  or  disabled,  remained  behind, 
with  the  stores  and  munitions  of  war,  to  be 
transported  afterward,  when  the  first  passage 
should  have  been  effected.  All  this  time  the 
enemy,  on  the  opposite  shore,  were  getting  their 
ranks  in  array,  and  making  every  thing  ready 
for  a  furious  assault  upon  the  invaders  the  mo 
ment  they  should  approach  the  land. 

There  was  something  like  silence  and  order 
during  the  period  while  the  men  were  embarking 
and  pushing  out*  from  the  land,  but  as  they  ad- 
vanced into  the  current,  the  loud  commands,  and 
shouts,  and  outcries  increased  more  and  more, 
and  the  rapidity  of  the  current  and  of  the  eddies 
by  which  the  boats  and  rafts  were  hurried  down 
the  stream,  or  whirled  against  each  other,  soon 
produced  a  terrific  scene  of  tumult  and  confu- 
sion. As  soon  as  the  first  boats  approached  the 
land,  the  Gauls  assembled  to  oppose  them  rush- 


B.C. 217.]  Passage  of. the  Rhone.         83 

Attack  of  Hanno.  Flight  of  the  Gauls 

ed  down  upon  them  with  showers  of  missiles, 
and  with  those  unearthly  yells  which  barbarous 
warriors  always  raise  in  going  into  battle,  as  a 
means  both  of  exciting  themselves  and  of  terri- 
fying their  enemy.  Hannibal's  officers  urged 
the  boats  on,  and  endeavored,  with  as  much 
coolness  and  deliberation  as  possible,  to  effect  a 
landing.  It  is  perhaps  doubtful  how  the  con- 
test would  have  ended,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
detachment  under  Hanno,  which  now  came 
suddenly  into  action.  While  the  Gauls  were 
in  the  height  of  their  excitement,  in  attempting 
to  drive  back  the  Carthaginians  from  the  bank, 
they  were  thunderstruck  at  hearing  the  shouts 
and  cries  of  an  enemy  behind  them,  and,  on 
looking  around,  they  saw  the  troops  of  Hanno 
pourjng  down  upon  them  from  the  thickets 
with  terrible  impetuosity  and  force.  It  is  very 
difficult  for  an  army  to  fight  both  in  front  and 
in  the  rear  at  the  same  time.  The  Gauls,  after 
a  brief  struggle,  abandoned  the  attempt  any 
longer  to  oppose  Hannibal's  landing.  They  fled 
down  the  river  and  back  into  the  interior,  leav- 
ing Hanno  in  secure  possession  of  the  bank, 
while  Hannibal  and  his  forces  came  up  at  their 
leisure  out  of  the  water,  finding  friends  instead 
of  enemies  "to  receive  them. 


84  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Transportation  of  the  elephants.  Manner  of  doing  it 

The  remainder  of  the  army,  together  with 
the  stores  and  munitions  of  war,  were  next  to 
be  transported,  and  this  was  accomplished  with 
little  difficulty  now  that  there  was  no  enemy  to 
disturb  their  operations.  There  was  one  part 
of  the  force,  however,  which  occasioned  some 
trouble  and  delay.  It  was  a  body  of  elephants 
which  formed  a  part  of  the  army.  How  to  get 
these  unwieldy  animals  across  so  broad  and  rap- 
id a  river  was  a  question  of  no  little  difficulty. 
There  are  various  accounts  of  the  manner  in 
which  Hannibal  accomplished  the  object,  from 
which  it  would  seem  that  different  methods 
were  employed.  One  mode  was  as  follows: 
the  keeper  of  the  elephants  selected  one  more 
spirited  and  passionate  in  disposition  than  the 
rest,  and  contrived  to  teaze  and  torment  him  so 
as  to  make  him  angry.  The  elephant  advanced 
toward  his  keeper  with  his  trunk  raised  to  take 
vengeance.  The  keeper  fled  ;  the  elephant  pur- 
sued him,  the  other  elephants  of  the  herd  fol- 
lowing, as  is  the  habit  of  the  animal  on  such 
occasions.  The  keeper  ran  into  the  water  as 
if  to  elude  his  pursuer,  while  the  elephant  and 
a  large  part  of  the  herd  pressed  on  after  him. 
The  man  swam  into  the  channel,  and  the  ele- 
phants,  before   they  could    check  themselves, 


B.C.  217.]  Passage  of  the  Rhone.        85 

A.  new  plan.  Huge  rafts. 

found  that  they  were  beyond  their  depth.  Some 
swam  on  after  the  keeper,  and  crossed  the  river, 
where  they  were  easily  secured.  Others,  terri- 
fied, abandoned  themselves  to  the  current,  and 
were  floated  down,  struggling  helplessly  as  they 
went,  until  at  last  they  grounded  upon  shallows 
or  points  of  land,  whence  they  gained  the  shore 
again,  some  on  one  side  of  the  stream  and  some 
on  the  other. 

This  plan  was  thus  only  partially  successful, 
and  Hannibal  devised  a  more  effectual  method 
for  the  remainder  of  the  troop.  He  built  an 
immensely  large  raft,  floated  it  up  to  the  shore, 
fastened  it  there  securely,  and  covered  it  with 
earth,  turf,  and  bushes,  so  as  to  make  it  resem- 
ble a  projection  of  the  land.  He  then  caused  a 
second  raft  to  be  constructed  of  the  same  size, 
and  this  he  brought  up  to  the  outer  edge  of  the 
other,  fastened  it  there  by  a  temporary  connec- 
tion, and  covered  and  concealed  it  as  he  had 
done  the  first.  The  first  of  these  rafts  extend- 
ed two  hundred  feet  from  the  shore,  and  was 
fifty  feet  broad.  The  other,  that  is,  the  outer 
one,  was  only  a  little  smaller.  The  soldiers 
then  contrived  to  allure  and  drive  the  elephants 
over  these  rafts  to  the  outer  one,  the  animals 
imagining  that  they  had  not  left  the  land.    The 


86  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

The  elephants  got  safely  over.  The  reconnoitering  parties 


two  rafts  were  then  disconnected  from  each 
other,  and  the  outer  one  began  to  move  with  its 
bulky  passengers  over  the  water,  towed  by  a 
number  of  boats  which  had  previously  been  at* 
tached  to  its  outer  edge. 

As  soon  as  the  elephants  perceived  the  mo. 
tion,  they  were  alarmed,  and  began  immediate- 
ly to  look  anxiously  this  way  and  that,  and  to 
crowd  toward  the  edges  of  the  raft  which  was 
conveying  them  away.  They  found  themselves 
hemmed  in  by  water  on  every  side,  and  were 
terrified  and  thrown  into  confusion.  Some 
were  crowded  off  into  the  river,  and  were  drift- 
ed down  till  they  landed  below.  The  rest  soon 
became  calm,  and  allowed  themselves  to  be 
quietly  ferried  across  the  stream,  when  they 
found  that  all  hope  of  escape  and  resistance 
were  equally  vain. 

In  the  mean  time,  while  these  events  were 
occurring,  the  troop  of  three  hundred,  which 
Scipio  had  sent  up  the  river  to  see  what  tidings 
he  could  learn  of  the  Carthaginians^  were  slow- 
ly making  their  way  toward  the  point  where 
Hannibal  was  crossing;  and  it  happened  that 
Hannibal  had  sent  down  a  troop  of  Jive  hundred, 
when  he  first  reached  the  river,  to  see  if  they 
could  learn  any  tidings  of  the  Romans.     Nei- 


B.C. 217.]  Passage  of  the  Rhone.        89 

The  detachments  meet.  A  battle  ensues. 

ther  of  the"  armies  had  any  idea  how  near  they 
were  to  the  other.  The  two  detachments  met 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  on  the  way.  They 
were  sent  to  explore,  and  not  to  fight ;  but  as 
they  were  nearly  equally  matched,  each  was 
ambitious  of  the  glory  of  capturing  the  others 
and  carrying  them  prisoners  to  their  camp. 
They  fought  a  long  and  bloody  battle.  A  great 
number  were  killed,  and  in  about  the  same 
proportion  on  either  side.  The  Romans  say 
they  conquered.  We  do  not  know  what  the 
Carthaginians  saidr  but  as  both  parties  retreat- 
ed from  the  field  and  went  back  to  their  respect- 
ive camps,  it  is  safe  to  infer  that  neither  could 
boast  of  a  very  decisive  victory. 


90  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 


The  Alps.  Their  sublimity  and  grandeur 


I 


Chapter   V. 
Hannibal   crosses  the   Alps. 

T  is  difficult  for  any  one  who  has  not  actual- 
ly seen  such  mountain  scenery  as  is  present- 
ed by  the  Alps,  to  form  any  clear  conception 
of  its  magnificence  and  grandeur.  Hannibal 
had  never  seen  the  Alps,  but  the  world  was 
filled  then,  as  now,  with  their  fame. 

Some  of  the  leading  features  of  sublimity  and 
grandettr  which  these  mountains  exhibit,  result 
mainly  from  the  perpetual  cold  which  reigns 
upon  their  summits.  This  is  owing  simply  to 
their  elevation.  In  every  part  of  the  earth,  as 
we  ascend  from  the  surface  of  the  ground  into 
the  atmosphere,  it  becomes,  for  some  mysteri- 
ous reason  or  other,  more  and  more  cold  as  we 
rise,  so  that  over  our  heads,  wherever  we  are, 
there  reigns,  at  a  distance  of  two  or  three  miles 
above  us,  an  intense  and  perpetual  cold.  This 
is  true  not  only  in  cool  and  temperate  latitudes, 
but  also  in  the  most  torrid  regions  of  the  globe 
If  we  were  to  ascend  in  a  balloon  at  Borneo  at 
midday,  when  the  burning  sun  of  the  tropics 


B.C.217.]   Crossing  the  Alps.  91 

Perpetual  cold  in  the  upper  regions  of  the  atmosphere. 

was  directly  over  our  heads,  to  an  elevation  of 
five  or  six  miles,  we  should  find  that  although 
we  had  been  moving  nearer  to  the  sun  all  the 
time,  its  rays  would  have  lost,  gradually,  all 
their  power.  They  would  fall  upon  us  as  bright- 
ly as  ever,  but  their  heat  would  be  gone.  The\ 
would  feel  like  moonbeams,  and  we  should  be 
surrounded  with  an  atmosphere  as  frosty  as  that 
of  the  icebergs  of  the  frigid  zone. 

It  is  from  this  region  of  perpetual  cold  that 
hail-stones  descend  upon  us  in  the  midst  of  sum- 
mer, and  snow  is  continually  forming  and  falling 
there ;  but  the  light  and  fleecy  flakes  melt  be- 
fore they  reach  the  earth,  so  that,  while  the  hail 
has  such  solidity  and  momentum  that  it  forces 
its  way  through,  the  snow  dissolves,  and  falls 
upon  us. as  a  cool  and  refreshing  rain.  Rain 
cools  the  air  around  us  and  the  ground,  because 
it  comes  from  cooler  regions  of  the  air  above. 

Now  it  happens  that  not  only  the  summits, 
but  extensive  portions  of  the  upper  declivities  of 
the  Alps,  rise  into  the  region  of  perpetual  win- 
ter. Of  course,  ice  congeals  continually  there, 
and  the  snow  which  forms  falls  to  the  ground 
as  snow,  and  accumulates  in  vast  and  perma- 
nent stores.  The  summit  of  Mount  Blanc  is 
covered  with  a  bed  of  snow  of  enormous  thick- 


92  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Avalanches.  Their  terrible  force. 

ness,  which  is  almost  as  much  a  permanent  ge- 
ological stratum  of  the  mountain  as  the  granite 
which  lies  beneath  it. 

Of  course,  during  the  winter  months,  the 
whole  country  of  the  Alps,  valley  as  well  as 
hill,  is  covered  with  snow.  In  the  spring  the 
snow  melts  in  the  valleys  and  plains,  and  high- 
er up  it  becomes  damp  and  heavy  with  partial 
melting,  and  slides  down  the  declivities  in  vast 
avalanches,  which  sometimes  are  of  such  enor- 
mous magnitude,  and  descend  with  such  resist- 
less force,  as  to  bring  down  earth,  rocks,  and 
even  the  trees  of  the  forest  in  their  train.  On 
the  higher  declivities,  however,  and  over  all  the 
rounded  summits,  the  snow  still  clings  to  its 
place,  yielding  but  very  little  to  the  feeble  beams 
of  the  sun,  even  in  July. 

There  are  vast  ravines  and  valleys  among  the 
higher  Alps  where  the  snow  accumulates,  being 
driven  into  them  by  winds  and  storms  in  the 
winter,  and  sliding  into  them,  in  great  avalanch- 
es, in  the  spring.  These  vast  depositories  of 
snow  become  changed  into  ice  below  the  sur- 
face ;  for  at  the  surface  there  is  a  continual 
melting,  and  the  water,  flowing  down  through 
the  mass,  freezes  below.  Thus  there  are  val- 
leys, or  rather  ravines,  some  of  them  two  or 


B.C. 217.]    Crossing  the   Alps.  93 

The  glaciers.  Motion  of  the  ice. 

three  miles  wide  and  ten  or  fifteen  miles  long, 
filled  with  ice,  transparent,  solid,  and  blue,  hun- 
dreds of  feet  in  depth.  They  are  called  glaciers. 
And  what  is  most  astonishing  in  respect  to  these 
icy  accumulations  is  that,  though  the  ice  is  per- 
fectly compact  and  solid,  the  whole  mass  is  found 
to  be  continually  in  a  state  of  slow  motion  down 
the  valley  in  which  it  lies,  at  the  rate  of  about 
a  foot  in  twenty-four  hours.  By  standing  upon 
the  surface  and  listening  attentively,  we  hear, 
from  time  to  time,  a  grinding  sound.  The  rocks 
which  lie  along  the  sides  are  pulverized,  and  are 
continually  moving  against  each  other  and  fall- 
ing ;  and  then,  besides,  which  is  a  more  direct  and 
positive  proof  still  of  the  motion  of  the  mass,  a 
mark  may  be  set  up  upon  the  ice,  as  has  been 
often  done,  and  marks  corresponding  to  it  made 
upon  the  solid  rocks  on  each  side  of  the  valley, 
and  by  this  means  the  fact  of  the  motion,  and 
the  exact  rate  of  it,  may  be  fully  ascertained. 

Thus  these  valleys  are  really  and  literally 
rivers  of  ice,  rising  among  the  summits  of  the 
mountains,  and  flowing,  slowly  it  is  true,  but 
with  a  continuous  and  certain  current,  to  a  sort 
of  mouth  in  some  great  and  open  valley  below. 
Here  the  streams  which  have  flowed  over  the 
surface    above,  and   descended   into  the  mass 


94  Hannibal.  [B.C.217 

Crevices  and  chasms.  Situation  of  the  Alps 

through  countless  crevices  and  chasms,  into 
which  the  traveler  looks  down  with  terror,  con- 
centrate and  issue  from  under  the  ice  in  a  tur- 
bid torrent,  which  comes  out  from  a  vast  arch- 
way made  by  the  falling  in  of  masses  which  the 
water  has  undermined.  This  lower  end  of  the 
glacier  sometimes  presents  a  perpendicular  wall 
hundreds  of  feet  in  height ;  sometimes  it  crowds 
down  into  the  fertile  valley,  advancing  in  some 
unusually  cold  summer  into  the  cultivated  coun- 
try, where,  as  it  slowly  moves  on,  it  plows  up 
the  ground,  carries  away  the  orchards  and  fields, 
and  even  drives  the  inhabitants  from  the  villa- 
ges which  it  threatens.  If  the  next  summer 
proves  warm,  the  terrible  monster  slowly  draws 
back  its  frigid  head,  and  the  inhabitants  return 
to  the  ground  it  reluctantly  evacuates,  and  at- 
tempt to  repair  the  damage  it  has  done. 

The  Alps  lie  between  France  and  Italy,  and 
the  great  valleys  and  the  ranges  of  mountain 
land  lie  in  such  a  direction  that  they  must  be 
crossed  in  order  to  pass  from  one  country  to  tho 
other.  These  ranges  are,  however,  not  regular 
They  are  traversed  by  innumerable  chasms, 
fissures,  and  ravines;  in  some  places  they  rise 
in  vast  rounded  summits  and  swells,  covered 
with  fields  of  spotless  snow;    in  others  they 


B.C. 217.]  Crossing  the   Ai.es.  95 

Roads  over  the  Alps.  Sublime  scenery 

tower  in  lofty,  needle-like  peaks,  which  even 
the  chamois  can  not  scale,  and  where  scarcely 
a  flake  of  snow  can  find  a  place  of  rest.  Around 
and  among  these  peaks  and  summits,  and 
through  these  frightful  defiles  and  chasms,  the 
roads  twist  and  turn,  in  a  zigzag  and  constant- 
ly ascending  course,  creeping  along  the  most 
frightful  precipices,  sometimes  beneath  them 
and  sometimes  on  the  brink,  penetrating  the 
darkest  and  gloomiest  defiles,  skirting  the  most 
impetuous  and  foaming  torrents,  and  at  last, 
perhaps,  emerging  upon  the  surface  of  a  glacier, 
to  be  lost  in  interminable  fields  of  ice  and  snow, 
where  countless  brooks  run  in  glassy  channels, 
and  crevasses  yawn,  ready  to  take  advantage 
of  any  slip  which  may  enable  them  to  take  down 
the  traveler  into  their  bottomless  abysses. 

And  yet,  notwithstanding  the  awful  desola- 
tion which  reigns  in  the  upper  regions  of  the 
Alps,  the  lower  valleys,  through  which  the 
streams  finally  meander  out  into  the  open  plains, 
and  by  which  the  traveler  gains  access  to  the 
sublimer  scenns  of  the  upper  mountains,  are  in- 
expressibly verdant  and  beautiful.  They  are 
fertilized  by  the  deposits  of  continual  inunda- 
tions in  the  early  spring,  and  the  sun  beats 
down  into  them  with  a  genial  warmth  in  sum- 


96  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Beauty  of  the  Alpine  scenery.  Picturesque  scenery 

mer,  which  brings  out  millions  of  flowers,  of  the 
most  beautiful  forms  and  colors,  and  ripens  rap- 
idly the  broadest  and  richest  fields  of  grain 
Cottages,  of  every  picturesque  and  beautiful 
form,  tenanted  by  the  cultivators,  the  shepherds 
and  the  herdsmen,  crown  every  little  swell  in 
the  bottom  of  the  valley,  and  cling  to  the  decliv- 
ities of  the  mountains  which  rise  on  either  hand. 
Above  them  eternal  forests  of  firs  and  pines 
wave,  feathering  over  the  steepest  and  most 
rocky  slopes  with  their  somber  foliage.  Still 
higher,  gray  precipices  rise,  and  spires  and  pin- 
nacles, far  grander  and  more  picturesque,  if  not 
so  symmetrically  formed,  than  those  construct- 
ed by  man.  Between  these  there  is  seen,  here 
and  there,  in  the  background,  vast  towering 
masses  of  white  and  dazzling  snow,  which  crown 
the  summits  of  the  loftier  mountains  beyond. 

Hannibal's  determination  to  carry  an  army 
into  Italy  by  way  of  the  Alps,  instead  of  trans- 
porting them  by  galleys  over  the  sea,  has  al- 
ways been  regarded  as  one  of  the  greatest  un- 
dertakings of  ancient  times.  He  hesitated  for 
some  time  whether  he  should  go  down  the 
Rhone,  and  meet  and  give  battle  to  Scipio,  or 
whether  he  should  leave  the  Roman  army  to  its 
course,  and  proceed  himself  directly  toward  the 


B.C.217.]  Crossing  the  Alps.  97 

Hannibal  determines  to  cross  the  Alps.  His  army  follows. 

Alps  and  Italy.  The  officers  and  soldiers  of 
the  army,  who  had  now  learned  something  of 
their  destination  and  of  their  leader's  plans, 
wanted  to  go  and  meet  the  Romans.  They 
dreaded  the  Alps.  They  were  willing  to  en- 
counter a  military  foe,  however  formidable,  for 
this  was  a  danger  that  they  were  accustomed 
to  and  could  understand ;  but  their  imagina- 
tions were  appalled  at  the  novel  and  awful  im- 
ages they  formed  of  falling  down  precipices  of 
ragged  rocks,  or  of  gradually  freezing,  and  be- 
ing buried  half  alive,  during  the  process,  in  eter 
nal  snows. 

Hannibal,  when  he  found  that  his  soldiers 
were  afraid  to  proceed,  called  the  leading  por- 
tions of  his  army  together,  and  made  them  an 
address.  He  remonstrated  with  them  for  yield- 
ing now  to  unworthy  fears,  after  having  suc- 
cessfully met  and  triumphed  over  such  dangers 
as  they  had  already  incurred.  "  You  have  sur- 
mounted the  Pyrenees,"  said  he,  "you  have 
crossed  the  Rhone.  You  are  now  actually  in 
sight  of  the. Alps,  which  are  the  very  gates  of 
access  to  the  country  of  the  enemy.  What  do 
you  conceive  the  Alps  to  be  ?  They  are  noth- 
ing but  high  mountains,  after  all.  Suppose 
they  are  higher  than  the  Pyrenees,  they  do  not 
G 


98  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal's  speech  to  his  army.  Its  effects. 

reach  to  the  skies ;  and,  since  they  do  not,  they 
can  not  be  insurmountable.  They  are  sur- 
mounted, in  fact,  every  day ;  they  are  even  in- 
habited and  cultivated,  and  travelers  continual- 
ly pass  over  them  to  and  fro.  And  what  a  sin- 
gle man  can  do,  an  army  can  do,  for  an  army 
is  only  a  large  number  of  single  men.  In  fact, 
to  a  soldier,  who  has  nothing  to  carry  with  him 
but  the  implements  of  war,  no  way  can  be  too 
difficult  to  be  surmounted  by  courage  and  en- 
ergy." 

After  finishing  his  speech,  Hannibal,  finding 
his  men  reanimated  and  encouraged  by  what 
he  had  said,  ordered  them  to  go  to  their  tents 
and  refresh  themselves,  and  prepare  to  march  on 
the  following  day.  They  made  no  further  op- 
position to  going  on.  Hannibal  did  not,  how- 
ever, proceed  at  once  directly  toward  the  Alps. 
He  did  not  know  what  the  plans  of  Scipio  might 
be,  who,  it  will  be  recollected,  was  below  him, 
on  the  Rhone,  with  the  Roman  army.  He  did 
not  wish  to  waste  his  time  and  his  strength  in 
a  contest  with  Scipio  in  Gaul,  but  to  press  on 
and  get  across  the  Alps  into  Italy  as  soon  as 
possible.  And  so,  fearing  lest  Soipio  should 
strike  across  the  country,  and  intercept  him  if 
he  should  attempt  to  go  by  the  most  direct 


B.C. 217.]  Crossing   the  Alps.  90 

Scipio  moves  after  Hannibal.  Sad  vestiges. 

route,  he  determined  to  move  northwardly,  up 
the  River  Rhone,  till  he  should  get  well  into 
the  interior,  with  a  view  of  reaching  the  Alps 
ultimately  by  a  more  circuitous  journey. 

It  was,  in  fact,  the  plan  of  Scipio  to  come  up 
with  Hannibal  and  attack  him  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble ;  and,  accordingly,  as  soon  as  his  horsemen,  or, 
rather,  those  who  were  left  alive  after  the  battle 
had  returned  and  informed  him  that  Hannibal 
and  his  army  were  near,  he  put  his  camp  in  mo- 
tion and  moved  rapidly  up  the  river.  He  arrived 
at  the  place  where  the  Carthaginians  had  crossed 
a  few  days  after  they  had  gone.  The  spot  was 
in  a  terrible  state  of  ruin  and  confusion.  The 
grass  and  herbage  were  trampled  down  for  the 
circuit  of  a  mile,  and  all  over  the  space  were 
spots  of  black  and  smouldering  remains,  where 
the  camp-fires  had  been  kindled.  The  tops  and 
branches  of  trees  lay  every  where  around,  their 
leaves  withering  in  the  sun,  and  the  groves  and 
forests  were  encumbered  with  limbs,  and  reject- 
ed trunks,  and  trees  felled  and  left  where  the} 
lay.  The -shore  was  lined  far  down  the  stream 
with  ruins  of  boats  and  rafts,  with  weapons 
which  had  been  lost  or  abandoned,  and  with  the 
bodies  of  those  who  had  been  drowned  in  the 
passage,  or  killed  in  the  contest  on  the  shore 


100  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Perplexity  of  Scipio.  He  sails  back  to  Italy. 

These  and  numerous  other  vestiges  remained, 
but  the  army  was  gone. 

There  were,  however,  upon  the  ground 
groups  of  natives  and  other  visitors,  who  had 
come  to  look  at  the  spot  now  destined  to  become 
so  memorable  in  history.  From  these  men 
Scipio  learned  when  and  where  Hannibal  had 
gone.  He  decided  that  it  was  useless  to  at- 
tempt to  pursue  him.  He  was  greatly  perplex- 
ed to  know  what  to  do.  In  the  casting  of  lots, 
Spain  had  fallen  to  him,  but  now  that  the  great 
enemy  whom  he  had  come  forth  to  meet  had 
left  Spain  altogether,  his  only  hope  of  intercept- 
ing his  progress  was  to  sail  back  into  Italy,  and 
meet  him  as  he  came  down  from  the  Alps  into 
the  great  valley  of  the  Po.  Still,  as  Spain  had 
been  assigned  to  him  as  his  province,  he  could 
not  well  entirely  abandon  it.  He  accordingly 
sent  forward  the  largest  part  of  his  army  intc 
Spain,  4;o  attack  the  forces  that  Hannibal  had 
left  there,  while  he  himself,  with  a  smaller 
force,  went  down  to  the  sea-shore  and  sailed 
back  to  Italy  again.  He  expected  to  find  Ro- 
man forces  in  the  valley  of  the  Po,  with  which 
he  hoped  to  be  strong  enough  to  meet  Hanni. 
bal  as  he  descended  from  the  mountains,  if  he 
should  succeed  in  effecting  a  passage  over  them. 


B.C.217.]  Crossing   the    Alps.  10J 

Hannibal  approaches  the  Alps.  A  dangerous  defile. 

In  the  mean  time  Hannibal  went  en,  draw- 
ing nearer  and  nearer  to  the  ranges  of  snowy 
summits  which  his  soldiers  had  seen  for  many 
days  in  their  eastern  horizon.  These  ranges 
were  very  resplendent  and  grand  when  the  sun 
went  down  in  the  west,  for  then  it  shone  di- 
rectly upon  them.  As  the  army  approached 
nearer  and  nearer  to  them,  they  gradually  with- 
drew from  sight  and  disappeared,  being  con- 
cealed by  intervening  summits  less  lofty,  but 
nearer.  As  the  soldiers  went  on,  however,  and 
began  to  penetrate  the  valleys,  and  draw  near 
to  the  awful  chasms  and  precipices  among  the 
mountains,  and  saw  the  turbid  torrents  descend- 
ing from  them,  their  fears  revived.  It  was,  how- 
ever, now  too  late  to  retreat.  They  pressed  for- 
ward, ascending  continually,  till  their  road  grew 
extremely  precipitous  and  insecure,  threading 
its  way  through  almost  impassable  defiles,  with 
rugged  cliffs  overhanging  them,  and  snowy  sum- 
mits towering  all  around. 

At  last  they  came  to  a  narrow  defile  through 
which  they  must  necessarily  pass,  but  which 
was  guarded  by  large  bodies  of  armed  men  as- 
sembled on  the  rocks  and  precipices  above,  ready 
to  hurl  stones  and  weapons  of  every  kind  upon 
them  if  they  should  attempt  to  pass  through. 


102  Hannibal.  [B.C.  21? 

The  army  encamps.  The  mountaineer* 

. . ^ 

The  army  halted.  Hannibal  ordered  them  to 
encamp  where  they  were,  until  he  could  consid- 
er what  to  do.  In  the  course  of  the  day  he 
learned  that  the  mountaineers  did  not  remain 
at  their  elevated  posts  during  the  night,  on  ac- 
count of  the  intense  cold  and  exposure,  know- 
ing, too,  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  an  army 
to  traverse  such  a  pass  as  they  were  attempt- 
ing to  guard  without  daylight  to  guide  them , 
for  the  road,  or  rather  pathway,  which  passes 
through  these  defiles,  follows  generally  the  course 
of  a  mountain  torrent,  which  flows  through  a 
succession  of  frightful  ravines  and  chasms,  and 
often  passes  along  on  a  shelf  or  projection  of  the 
rock,  hundreds  and  sometimes  thousands  of  feet 
from  the  bed  of  the  stream,  which  foams  and 
roars  far  below.  There  could,  of  course,  be  no 
hope  of  passing  safely  by  such  a  route  without 
the  light  of  day. 

The  mountaineers,  therefore,  knowing  that  it 
was  not  necessary  to  guard  the  pass  at  night — 
its  own  terrible  danger  being  then  a  sufficient  pro- 
tection— were  accustomed  to  disperse  in  the  even- 
ing, and  descend  to  regions  where  they  could  find 
shelter  and  repose,  and  to  return  and  renew  their 
watch  in  the  morning.  When  Hannibal  learned 
this,  he  determined  to  anticipate  them  in  getting 


B.C.217.]  Crossing   the    Alps.  103 

Hannibal's  stratagem.  Its  success. 


up  upon  the  rocks  the  next  day,  and,  in  order  tc 
prevent  their  entertaining  any  suspicion  of  his 
design,  he  pretended  to  be  making  all  the  ar- 
rangements for  encamping  for  the  night  on  the 
ground  he  had  taken.  He  accordingly  pitched 
more  tents,  and  built,  toward  evening,  a  great 
many  fires,  and  he  began  some  preparations  in- 
dicating that  it  was  his  intention  the  next  day 
to  force  his  way  through  the  pass.  He  moved 
forward  a  strong  detachment  up  to  a  point  near 
the  entrance  to  the  pass,  and  put  them  in  a  for- 
tified position  there,  as  if  to  have  them  all  ready 
to  advance  when  the  proper  time  should  arrive 
on  the  following  day. 

The  mountaineers,  seeing  all  these  prepara- 
tions going  on,  looked  forward  to  a  conflict  on 
the  morrow,  and,  during  the  night,  left  their 
positions  as  usual,  to  descend  to  places  of  shel- 
ter. The  next  morning,  however,  when  they 
began,  at  an  early  hour,  to  ascend  to  them  again, 
they  were  astonished  to  find  all  the  lofty  rocks, 
and  cliffs,  and  shelving  projections  which  over- 
hung the  pass,  covered  with  Carthaginians. 
Hannibal  had  aroused  a  strong  body  of  his  men 
at  the  earliest  dawn,  and  led  them  up,  by  steep 
climbing,  to  the  places  which  the  mountaineers 
nad  left,  so  as  to  be  there  before  them.     Tho 


104  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217, 

Astonishment  of  the  mountaineers.  Terrible  conflict  in  the  defile 

mountaineers  paused,  astonished,  at  this  spec- 
tacle, and  their  disappointment  and  rage  were 
much  increased  on  looking  down  into  the  val- 
ley below,  and  seeing  there  the  remainder  of 
the  Carthaginian  army  quietly  moving  through 
the  pass  in  a  long  train,  safe  apparently  from 
any  molestation,  since  friends,  and  not  enemies, 
were  now  in  possession  of  the  cliffs  above. 

The  mountaineers  could  not  restrain  their 
feelings  of  vexation  and  anger,  but  immediately 
rushed  down  the  declivities  which  they  had  in 
part  ascended,  and  attacked  the  army  in  the  de- 
file. An  awful  scene  of  struggle  and  confusion 
ensued.  Some  were  killed  by  weapons  or  by 
rocks  rolled  down  upon  them.  Others,  contend- 
ing together,  and  struggli  g  desperately  in  pla- 
ces of  very  narrow  foothold,  tumbled  headlong 
down  the  rugged  rocks  into  the  torrent  below ; . 
and  horses,  laden  with  baggage  and  stores,  be- 
came frightened  and  unmanageable,  and  crowd- 
ed each  other  over  the  most  frightful  precipices. 
Hannibal,  who  was  above,  on  the  higher  rocks, 
looked  down  upon  this  scene  for  a  time  with , 
the  greatest  anxiety  and  terror.  He  did  not 
dare  to  descend  himself  and  mingle  in  the  affray, 
for  fear  of  increasing  the  confusion.  He  soon 
found,  however,  that  it  was  absolutely  necessa 


B.C.  217.]  Crossing   the    Alps.  105 

Attack  of  Hannibal.  The  mountaineers  defeated. 

ry  for  him  to  interpose,  and  he  came  down  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  his  detachment  with  him. 
They  descended  by  oblique  and  zigzag  paths, 
wherever  they  could  get  footing  among  the  rocks, 
and  attacked  the  mountaineers  with  great  fury 
The  result  was,  as  he  had  feared,  a  great  in- 
crease at  first  of  the  confusion  and  the  slaugh- 
ter. The  horses  were  more  and  more  terrified 
by  the  fresh  energy  of  the  combat,  and  by  the 
resounding  of  louder  shouts  and  cries,  which 
were  made  doubly  terrific  by  the  echoes  and 
reverberations  of  the  mountains.  They  crowd- 
ed against  each  other,  and  fell,  horses  and  men 
together,  in  masses,  over  the  cliffs  to  the  rugged 
rocks  below,  where  they  lay  in  confusion,  some 
dead,  and  others  dying,  writhing  helplessly  in 
agony,  or  vainly  endeavoring  to  crawl  away. 

The  mountaineers  were,  however,  conquered 
and  driven  away  at  last,  and  the  pass  was  left 
clear.  The  Carthaginian  column  was  restored 
to  order.  The  horses  that  had  not  fallen  were 
calmed  and  quieted.  The  baggage  which  had 
been  thrown  down  was  gathered  up,  and  the 
Wounded  men  were  placed  on  litters,  rudely  con- 
structed on  the  spot,  that  they  might  be  borne 
on  to  a  place  of  safety.  In  a  short  time  all  were 
ready  to  move  on,  and  the  march  was  accord- 


106  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

The  army  pauses  to  refresh.  .  Scarcity  of  food. 

ingly  recommenced.  There  was  no  further  dif- 
ficulty. The  column  advanced  in  a  quiet  and 
orderly  manner  until  they  had  passed  the  defile. 
At  the  extremity  of  it  they  came  to  a  spacious 
fort  belonging  to  the  natives.  Hannibal  took 
possession  of  this  fort,  and  paused  for  a  little 
time  there  to  rest  and  refresh  his  men. 

One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  encountered 
by  a  general  in  conducting  an  army  through 
difficult  and  dangerous  roads,  is  that  of  provid- 
ing food  for  them.  An  army  can  transport  its 
own  food  only  a  very  little  way.  Men  travel- 
ing over  smooth  roads  can  only  carry  provisions 
for  a  few  days,  and  where  the  roads  are  as  dif- 
ficult and  dangerous  as  the  passes  of  the  Alps, 
they  can  scarcely  carry  any.  The  commander 
must,  accordingly,  find  subsistence  in  the  coun- 
try through  which  he  is  marching.  Hannibal 
had,  therefore,  now  not  only  to  look  out  for  the 
safety  of  his  men,  but  their  food  was  exhausted, 
and  he  must  take  immediate  measures  to  secure 
a  supoly. 

The  lower  slopes  of  lofty  mountains  afford 
usually  abundant  sustenance  for  flocks  and 
herds.  The  showers  which  are  continually  fall- 
ing there,  and  the  moisture  which  comes  down 
the  sides  of  the  mountains  through  the  ground, 


JB.C.217.]  Crossing   the  Alps.  107 

Herds  and  flocks  upon  the  mountains.  Foraging  parties. 

keep  the  turf  perpetually  green,  and  sheep  and 
cattle  love  to  pasture  upon  it ;  they  climb  to 
great  heights,  finding  the  herbage  finer  and 
sweeter  the  higher  they  go.  Thus  the  inhab- 
itants of  mountain  ranges  are  almost  always 
shepherds  and  herdsmen.  Grain  can  be  raised 
in  the  valleys  below,  but  the  slopes  of  the  mount- 
ains, though  they  produce  grass  to  perfection, 
are  too  steep  to  be  tilled. 

As  soon  as  Hannibal  had  got  established  in 
the  fort,  he  sent  around  small  bodies  of  men  to 
seize  and  drive  in  all  the  cattle  and  sheep  that 
they  could  find.  These  men  were,  of  course, 
armed,  in  order  that  they  might  be  prepared  to 
meet  any  resistance  which  they  might  encoun- 
ter. The  mountaineers,  however,  did  not  at- 
tempt to  resist  them.  They  felt  that  they  were 
conquered,  and  they  were  accordingly  disheart 
encd  and  discouraged.  The  only  mode  of  saving 
their  cattle  which  was  left  to  them,  was  to  drive 
them  as  fast  as  they  could  into  concealed  and 
inaccessible  places.  They  attempted  to  do  this, 
and  while  Hannibal's  parties  were  ranging  up 
the  valleys  all  around  them,  examining  every 
field,  and  barn,  and  sheepfold  that  they  could 
find,  the  wretched  and  despairing  inhabitants 
were  flying  in  all  directions,  driving  the  cows 


1U8  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Collecting  cattle.  Progress  of  the  army 

and  sheep,  on  which  their  whole  hope  of  sub- 
sistence depended,  into  the  fastnesses  of  the 
mountains.  They  urged  them  into  wild  thick 
ets,  and  dark  ravines  and  chasms,  and  over  dan 
gerous  glaciers,  and  up  the  steepest  ascents, 
wherever  there  was  the  readiest  prospect  of  get- 
ting them  out  of  the  plunderer's  way. 

These  attempts,  however,  to  save  their  little 
property  were  but  very  partially  successful. 
Hannibal's  marauding  parties  kept  coming 
home,  one  after  another,  with  droves  of  sheep 
and  cattle  before  them,  some  larger  and  some 
smaller,  but  making  up  a  vast  amount  in  all. 
Hannibal  subsisted  his  men  three  days  on  the 
food  thus  procured  for  them.  It  requires  an 
enormous  store  to  feed  ninety  or  a  hundred 
thousand  men,  even  for  three  days ;  besides,  in 
all  such  cases  as  this,  an  army  always  waste 
and  destroy  far  more  than  they  really  consume. 

During  these  three  days  the  army  was  not 
stationary,  but  was  moving  slowly  on.  The 
way,  though  still  difficult  and  dangerous,  was 
at  least  open  before  them,  as  there  was  now  no 
enemy  to  dispute  their  passage.  So  they  went 
on,  rioting  upon  the  abundant  supplies  they  had 
obtained,  and  rejoicing  in  the  double  victory 
they  were  gaining,  over  the  hostility  of  the  peo- 


B.C.217.]  Crossing  the  Alps.  109 

Cantons.  An  embassage 

pie  and  the  physical  dangers  and  difficulties  of 
the  way.  The  poor  mountaineers  returned  to 
their  cabins  ruined  and  desolate,  for  mountain- 
eers who  have  lost  their  cows  and  their  sheep 
have  lost  their  all. 

The  Alps  are  not  all  in  Switzerland.  Some 
of  the  most  celebrated  peaks  and  ranges  are  in 
a  neighboring  state  called  Savoy.  The  whole 
country  is,  in  fact,  divided  into  small  states, 
called  cantons  at  the  present  day,  and  similar 
political  divisions  seem  to  have  existed  in  the 
time  of  the  Romans.  In  his  march  onward 
from  the  pass  which  has  been  already  described, 
Hannibal,  accordingly,  soon  approached  the 
confines  of  another  canton.  As  he  was  advanc- 
ing slowly  into  it,  with  the  long  train  of  his 
army  winding  up  with  him  through  the  valleys, 
he  was  met  at  the  borders  of  this  new  state  b^ 
an  embassage  sent  from  the  government  of  it. 
They  brought  with  them  fresh  stores  of  provis- 
ions, and  a  number  of  guides.  They  said  that 
they  had  heard  of  the  terrible  destruction  which 
had  come  upon  the  other  canton  in  consequence 
of  their  effort  to  oppose  his  progress,  and  that 
they  had  no  intention  of  renewing  so  vain  an  at- 
tempt. They  came,  therefore,  they  said,  to  of- 
fer Hannibal  their  friendship    and  their   aid. 


110  Hannibal  [B.C.  217. 


Hostages.  Hannibal's  suspiciond 

They  had  brought  guides  to  show  the  army  the 
best  way  over  the  mountains,  and  a  present  of 
provisions ;  and  to  prove  the  sincerity  of  their 
professions  they  offered  Hannibal  hostages. 
These  hostages  were  young  men  and  boys,  the 
sons  of  the  principal  inhabitants,  whom  they 
offered  to  deliver  into  Hannibal's  power,  to  be 
kept  by  him  until  he  should  see  that  they  were 
faithful  and  true  in  doing  what  they  offered. 

Hannibal  was  so  accustomed  to  stratagem 
and  treachery  himself,  that  he  was  at  first  very 
much  at  a  loss  to  decide  whether  these  offers 
and  professions  were  honest  and  sincere,  or 
whether  they  were  only  made  to  put  him  off  his 
guard.  He  thought  it  possible  that  it  was  their 
design  to  induce  him  to  place  himself  under  their 
direction,  so  that  they  might  lead  him  into  some 
dangerous  defile  or  labyrinth  of  rocks,  from  which 
he  could  not  extricate  himself,  and  where  they 
could  attack  and  destroy  him.  He,  however,  de- 
cided to  return  them  a  favorable  answer,  but  to 
watch  them  very  carefully,  and  to  proceed  un- 
der their  guidance  with  the  utmost  caution  and 
care.  He  accepted  of  the  provisions  they  of- 
fered, and  took  the  hostages.  These  last  he  de- 
livered into  the  custody  of  a  body  of  his  soldiers, 
and  they  marched  on  with  the  rest  of  the  army. 


B.C. 217.]  Crossing   lie  Alps.  113 

Treachery  of  the  mountaineers.  They  attack  Hannibal. 

Then,  directing  the  new  guides  to  lead  the  way, 
the  army  moved  on  after  them.  The  elephants 
went  first,  with  a  moderate  force  for  their  protec- 
tion preceding  and  accompanying  them.  Then 
came  long  trains  of  horses  and  mules,  loaded 
with  military  stores  and  baggage,  and  finally 
the  foot  soldiers  followed,  marching  irregularly 
in  a  long  column.  The  whole  train  must  have 
extended  many  miles,  and  must  have  appeared 
from  any  of  the  eminences  around  like  an 
enormous  serpent,  winding  its  way  tortuously 
through  the  wild  and  desolate  valleys. 

Hannibal  was  right  in  "his  suspicions.  The 
embassage  was  a  stratagem.  The  men  who 
sent  it  had  laid  an  ambuscade  in  a  very  narrow 
pass,  concealing  their  forces  in  thickets  and  in 
chasms,  and  in  nooks  and  corners  among  the 
rugged  rocks,  and  when  the  guides  had  led  the 
army  well  into  the  danger,  a  sudden  signal  was 
given,  and  these  concealed  enemies  rushed  down 
upon  them  in  great  numbers,  breaking  into  their 
ranks,  and  renewing  the  scene  of  terrible  uproar, 
.tumult,  and  destruction  which  had  been  wit- 
nessed in  the  other  defile.  One  would  have 
thought  that  the  elephants,  being  so  unwieldy 
and  so  helpless  in  such  a  scene,  would  have  been 
the  first  objects  of  attack.  But  it  was  not  so. 
H 


114  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 


The  elephants.  Hannibal's  army  divided 

The  mountaineers  were  afraid  of  them.  They 
had  never  seen  such  animals  before,  and  they 
felt  for  them  a  mysterious  awe,  not  knowing 
what  terrible  powers  such  enormous  beasts  might 
be  expected  to  wield.  They  kept  away  from 
them, 'therefore,  and  from  the  horsemen,  and 
poured  down  upon  the  head  of  the  column  of 
foot  soldiers  which  followed  in  the  rear. 

They  were  quite  successful  at  the  first  onset. 
They  broke  through  the  head  of  the  column, 
and  drove  the  rest  back.  The  horses  and  ele- 
phants, in  the  mean  time,  moved  forward,  bear- 
ing the  baggage  with  them,  so  that  the  two  por- 
tions of  the  army  were  soon  entirely  separated. 
Hannibal  was  behind,  with  the  soldiers.  The 
mountaineers  made  good  their  position,  and,  as 
night  came  on,  the  contest  ceased,  for  in  such 
wilds  as  these  no  one  can  move  at  all,  except 
with  the  light  of  day.  The  mountaineers,  how- 
ever, remained  in  their  place,  dividing  the  army, 
and  Hannibal  continued,  during  the  night,  in  a 
state  of  great  suspense  and  anxiety,  with  the 
elephants  and  the  baggage  separated  from  him, 
and  apparently  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 

During  the  night  he  made  vigorous  prepara- 
tions for  attacking  the  mountaineers  the  next 
day.     iVs  soon  as  the  morning  light  appeared, 


B.C.217.]  Crossing   the   Alps.  115 


Hannibal's  attack  on  the  mountaineers.  They  embarrass  his  march. 

he  made  the  attack,  and  he  succeeded  in  driving 
the  enemy  away,  so  far,  at  least,  as  to  allow 
him  to  get  his  army  together  again.  He  then 
began  once  more  to  move  on.  The  mountain- 
eers, however,  hovered  about  his  way,  and  did 
all  they  could  to  molest  and  embarrass  his 
march.  They  concealed  themselves  in  ambus- 
cades, and  attacked  the  Carthaginians  as  they 
passed.  They  rolled  stones  down  upon  them, 
or  discharged  spears  and  arrows  from  eminen- 
ces above ;  and  if  any  of  Hannibal's  army  be- 
came, from  any  reason,  detached  from  the  rest, 
they  would  cut  off  their  retreat,  and  then  take 
them  prisoners  or  destroy  them.  Thus  they 
gave  Hannibal  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  They 
harassed  his  march  continually,  without  pre- 
senting at  any  point  a  force  which  he  could 
meet  and  encounter  in  battle.  Of  course,  Han- 
nibal could  no  longer  trust  to  his  guides,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  make  his  way  as  he  best  could, 
sometimes  right,  but  often  wrong,  and  exposed 
to  a  thousand  difficulties  and  dangers,  which 
those  acquainted  with  the  country  might  have 
easily  avoided.  All  this  time  the  mountaineers 
were  continually  attacking  him,  in  bands  like 
those  of  robbers,  sometimes  in  the  van,  and  some- 
times in  the  rear,  wherever  the  nature  of  the 


116  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 


Hannibal's  indomitable  perseverance.  He  encamps. 

ground  or  the  circumstances  of  the  marching 
army  afforded  them  an  opportunity. 

Hannibal  persevered,  however,  through  all 
these  discouragements,  protecting  his  men  as 
far  as  it  was  in  his  power,  but  pressing  earn- 
estly on,  until  in  nine  days  he  reached  the  sum- 
mit. By  the  summit,  however,  is  not  meant 
the  summit  of  the  mountains,  but  the  summit 
of  the  pass,  that  is,  the  highest  point  which  it 
was  necessary  for  him  to  attain  in  going  over. 
In  all  mountain  ranges  there  are  depressions, 
which  are  in  Switzerland  called  necks,*  and  the 
pathways  and  roads  over  the  ranges  lie  always 
in  these.  In  America,  such  a  depression  in  a 
ridge  of  land,  if  well  marked  and  decided,  is 
called  a  notch.  Hannibal  attained  the  highest 
point  of  the  col,  by  which  he  was  to  pass  over, 
in  nine  days  after  the  •  great  battle.  There 
were,  however,  of  course,  lofty  peaks  and  sum- 
mits towering  still  far  above  him. 

Ho  encamped  here  two  days  to  rest  and  re- 
fresh his  men.  The  enemy  no  longer  molested 
him.  In  fact,  parties  were  continually  coming 
into  the  camp,  of  men  and  horses,  that  had  got 
lost,   or  had  been  left  in   the    valleys  below 

*  The  French  word  is  col.  Thus,  there  is  the  Col  de  Balme, 
the  Col  de  Geant,  &c. 


B.C.217.]  Crossing   the   Alps.  117 

Return  of  straggling  parties.  Dreary  scenery  of  the  summit 

They  came  in  slowly,  some  wounded,  others 
exhausted  and  spent  by  fatigue  and  exposure. 
In  some  cases  horses  came  in  alone.  They  were 
horses  that  had  slipped  or  stumbled,  and  fallen 
among  the  rocks,  or  had  sunk  down  exhausted 
by  their  toil,  and  had  thus  been  left  behind,  and 
afterward;  recovering  their  strength,  had  fol- 
lowed on,  led  by  a  strange  instinct  to  keep  to 
the  tracks  which  their  companions  had  made, 
and  thus  they  rejoined  the  camp  at  last  in  safety. 
In  fact,  one  great  reason  for  Hannibal's  de- 
lay at  his  encampment  on  or  near  the  summit 
of  the  pass,  was  to  afford  time  for  all  the  miss- 
ing men  to  join  the  army  again,  that  had  the 
power  to  do  so.  Had  it  not  been  for  this  ne- 
cessity, he  would  doubtless  have  descended  some 
distance,  at  least,  to  a  more  warm  and  sheltered 
position  before  seeking  repose.  A  more  gloomy 
and  desolate  resting-place  than  the  summit  of 
an  Alpine  pass  can  scarcely  be  found.  The 
bare  and  barren  rocks  are  entirely  destitute  of 
vegetation,  and  they  have  lost,  besides,  the  sub- 
lime and  picturesque  forms  which  they  assume 
further  below.  They  spread  in  vast,  naked 
fields  in  every  direction  around  the  spectator, 
rising  in  gentle  ascents,  bleak  and  dreary,  the 
surface  whitened  as  if  bleached  by  the  perpet- 


118  Hannibal.  [B.C.  21? 

Storms  in  the  mountains.  A  dreary  encampment 

ual  rains.  '  Storms  are,  in  fact,  almost  perpet- 
ual in  these  elevated  regions.  The  vast  cloud 
which,  to  the  eye  of  the  shepherd  in  the  valley 
below,  seems  only  a  fleecy  cap,  resting  serenely 
upon  the  summit,  or  slowly  floating  along  the 
sides,  is  really  a  driving  mist,  or  cold  and  stormy 
rain,  howling  dismally  over  interminable  fields 
of  broken  rocks,  as  if  angry  that  it  can  make 
nothing  grow  upon  them,  with  all  its  watering 
Thus  there  are  seldom  distant  views  to  be  ob- 
tained, and  every  thing  near  presents  a  scene 
of  simple  dreariness  and  desolation. 

Hannibal's  soldiers  thus  found  themselves  in 
the  midst  of  a  dismal  scene  in  their  lofty  en- 
campment. There  is  one  special  source  of  dan- 
ger, too,  in  such  places  as  this,  which  the  low- 
er portions  of  the  mountains  are  less  exposed  to, 
and  that  is  the  entire  obliteration  of  the  path- 
way by  falls  of  snow.  It  seems  almost  absurd 
to  speak  of  pathway  in  such  regions,  where 
there  is  no  turf  to  be  worn,  and  the  boundless 
fields  of  rocks,  ragged  and  hard,  will  take  no 
trace  of  footsteps.  There  are,  however,  gener- 
ally some  faint  traces  of  way,  and  where  these 
fail  entirely  the  track  is  sometimes  indicated  by 
small  piles  of  stones,  placed  at  intervals  along 
the  line  of  route.     An  unpracticed  eye  would 


B.C.217.]  Crossing   the    Alps.  119 

Landmarks.  A  snow  storm. 

scarcely  distinguish  these  little  landmarks,  in 
many  cases,  from  accidental  heaps  of  stones 
which  lie  every  where  around.  They,  howev- 
er, render  a  very  essential  service  to  the  guides 
and  to  the  mountaineers,  who  have  been  accus- 
tomed to  conduct  their  steps  by  similar  aids  in 
other  portions  of  the  mountains. 

But  when  snow  begins  to  fall,  all  these  and 
every  other  possible  means  of  distinguishing  the 
way  are  soon  entirely  obliterated.  The  whole 
surface  of  the  ground,  or,  rather,  of  the  rocks, 
is  covered,  and  all  landmarks  disappear.  The 
little  monuments  become  nothing  but  slight  in- 
equalities in  the  surface  of  the  snow,  undistin- 
guishable  from  a  thousand  others.  The  air  is 
thick  and  murky,  and  shuts  off  alike  all  distant 
prospects,  and  the  shape  and  conformation  of 
the  land  that  is  near ;  the  bewildered  traveler 
has  not  even  the  stars  to  guide  him,  as  there  is 
nothing  but  dark,  falling  flakes,  descending  from 
an  impenetrable  canopy  of  stormy  clouds,  to  be 
seen  in  the  sky. 

Hannibal  encountered  a  snow  storm  while  on 
the  summit  of  the  pass,  and  his  army  were  very 
much  terrified  by  it.  It  was  now  November. 
The  army  had  met  with  so  many  detentions 
and  delays  that  their  journey  had  been  protract- 


L20  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

The  army  resumes  its  march.  Hannibal  among  the  pioneers. 

ed  to  a  late  period.  It  would  be  unsafe  to  at- 
tempt to  wait  till  this  snow  should  melt  again. 
A.s  soon,  therefore,  as  the  storm  ended,  and  the 
clouds  cleared  away,  so  as  to  allow  the  men  to 
see  the  general  features  of  the  country  around, 
the  camp  was  broken  up  and  the  army  put  in 
motion.  The  soldiers  marched  through  the  snow 
with  great  anxiety  and  fear.  Men  went  be- 
fore to  explore  the  way,  and  to  guide  the  rest 
by  flags  and  banners  which  they  bore.  Those 
who  went  first  made  paths,  of  course,  for  those 
who  followed  behind,  as  the  snow  was  tram- 
pled down  by  their  footsteps.  Notwithstanding 
these  aids,  however,  the  army  moved  on  very 
laboriously  and  with  much  fear. 

At  length,  however,  after  descending  a  short 
distance,  Hannibal,  perceiving  that  they  must 
soon  come  in  sight  of  the  Italian  valleys  and 
plains  which  lay  beyond  the  Alps,  went  forward 
among  the  pioneers,  who  had  charge  of  the  ban- 
ners by  which  the  movements  of  the  army  were 
directed,  and,  as  soon  as  the  open  country  be- 
gan to  come  into  view,  he  selected  a  spot  where 
the  widest  prospect  was  presented,  and  halted 
his  army  there  to  let  them  take  a  view  of  the 
beautiful  country  which  now  lay  before  them. 
The  Alps  are  very  precipitous  on  the  Italian 


B.C.  217.]    Crossing  the  Alps.  123 

First  sight  of  Italy,  Joy  of  the  army.  Hannibal's  speech 

side.  The  descent  is  very  sudden,  from  the  cold 
and  icy  summits,  to  a  broad  expanse  of  the  most 
luxuriant  and  sunny  plains.  Upon  these  plains, 
which  were  spread  out  in  a  most  enchanting 
landscape  at  their  feet,  Hannibal  and  his  sol- 
diers now  looked  down  with  exultation  and  de- 
light. Beautiful  lakes,  studded  with  still  more 
beautiful  islands,  reflected  the  beams  of  the  sun. 
An  endless  succession  of  fields,  in  sober  autum- 
nal colors,  with  the  cottages  of  the  laborers  and 
stacks  of  grain  scattered  here  and  there  upon 
them,  and  rivers  meandering  through  verdant 
meadows,  gave  variety  and  enchantment  to  the 
view. 

Hannibal  made  an  address  to  his  officers  and 
men,  congratulating  them  on  having  arrived,  at 
last,  so  near  to  a  successful  termination  of  their 
toils.  "  The  difficulties  of  the  way,"  he  said, 
"  are  at  last  surmounted,  and  these  mighty  bar- 
riers that  we  have  scaled  are  the  walls,  not  only 
of  Italy,  but  of  Rome  itself.  Since  we  have 
passed  the  Alps,  the  Romans  will  have  no  pro- 
tection against  us  remaining.  It  is  only  one 
battle,  when  we  get  down  upon  the  plains,  or 
at  most  two,  and  the  great  city  itself  will  be 
entirely  at  our  disposal." 

The  whole  army  were  much  animated  and 


122  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 


Fatigues  of  the  march.  New  difficulties. 

encouraged,  both  by  the  prospect  which  present- 
ed itself  to  their  view,  and  by  the  words  of  Han- 
nibal. They  prepared  for  the  descent,  antici- 
pating little  difficulty ;  but  they  found,  on  re- 
commencing their  march,  that  their  troubles 
were  by  no  means  over.  The  mountains  are 
far  steeper  on  the  Italian  side  than  on  the  other, 
and  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  find  paths  by 
which  the  elephants  and  the  horses,  and  even 
the  men,  could  safely  descend.  They  moved  on 
for  some  time  with  great  labor  and  fatigue,  un- 
til, at  length,  Hannibal,  looking  on  before,  found 
that  the  head  of  the  column  had  stopped,  and 
the  whole  train  behind  was  soon  jammed  to- 
gether, the  ranks  halting  along  the  way  in  suc- 
cession, as  they  found  their  path  blocked  up  by 
the  halting  of  those  before  them. 

Hannibal  sent  forward  to  ascertain  the  cause 
of  the  difficulty,  and  found  that  the  van  of  the 
army  had  reached  a  precipice  down  which  it 
was  impossible  to  descend.  It  was  necessary 
to  make  a  circuit  in  hopes  of  finding  some  prac- 
ticable way  of  getting  down.  The  guides  and 
pioneers  went  on,  leading  the  army  after  them, 
and  soon  got  upon  a  glacier  which  lay  in  their 
way.  There  was  fresh  snow  upon  the  surface, 
covering  the  ice  and  concealing  the  crevasses. 


B.C. 217.]    Crossing  the  Alps.  123 

March  over  the  glacier.  A  formidable  barrier. 

as  they  are  termed — that  is,  the  great  cracks 
and  fissures  which  extend  in  the  glaciers  down 
through  the  body  of  the  ice.  The  army  moved 
on,  trampling  down  the  new  snow,  and  making 
at  first  a  good  road- way  by  their  footsteps ;  but 
very  soon  the  old  ice  and  snow  began  to  be 
trampled  up  by  the  hoofs  of  the  horses  and  the 
heavy  tread  of  such  vast  multitudes  of  armed 
men.  It  softened  to  a  great  depth,  and  made 
the  work  of  toiling  through  it  an  enormous  la- 
bor. Besides,  the  surface  of  the  ice  and  snow 
sloped  steeply,  and  the  men  and  beasts  were 
continually  falling  or  sliding  down,  and  getting 
swallowed  up  in  avalanches  which  their  own 
weight  set  in  motion,  or  in  concealed  crevasses 
where  they  sank  to  rise  no  more. 

They,  however,  made  some  progress,  though 
slowly,  and  with  great  danger.  They  at  last 
got  below  the  region  of  the  snow,  but  here  they 
encountered  new  difficulties  in  the  abruptness 
and  ruggedness  of  the  rocks,  and  in  the  zigzag 
and  tortuous  direction  o£the  way.  At  last  they 
came  to  a  spot  where  their  further  progress  ap-. 
peared  to  be  entirely  cut  off  by  a  large  mass  of 
rock,  which  it  seemed  necessary  to  remove  in 
order  to  widen  the  passage  sufficiently  to  allow 
them  to  go  on.     The  Roman  historian  says  that 


124  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal  cuts  hie  way  through  the  rocks. 

Hannibal  removed  these  rocks  by  building  great 
fires  upon  them,  and  then  pouring  on  vinegar, 
which  opened  seams  and  fissures  in  them,  by 
means  of  which  the  rocks  could  be  split  and 
pried  to  pieces  with  wedges  and  crowbars.  On 
reading  this  account,  the  mind  naturally  pauses 
to  consider  the  probability  of  its  being  true.  As 
they  had  no  gunpowder  in  those  days,  they  were 
compelled  to  resort  to  some  such  method  as  the 
one  above  described  for  removing  rocks.  There 
are  some  species  of  rock  which  are  easily  crack- 
ed and  broken  by  the  action  of  fire.  Others  re- 
sist it.  There  seems,  however,  to  be  no  reason 
obvious  why  vinegar  should  materially  assist  in 
the  operation.  Besides,  we  can  not  suppose 
that  Hannibal  could  have  had,  at  such  a  time 
and  place,  any  very  large  supply  of  vinegar  on 
hand.  On  the  whole,  it  is  probable  that,  if  any 
such  operation  was  performed  at  all,  it  was  on 
a  very  small  scale,  and  the  results  must  have 
been  very  insignificant  at  the  time,  though  the 
fact  has  since  been  greatly  celebrated  in  history. 
.  In  coming  over  the  snow,  and  in  descending 
the  rocks  immediately  below,  the  army,  and  es- 
pecially the  animals  connected  with  it,  suffered 
a  great  deal  from  hunger.  It  was  difficult  to 
procure   forage   for    them    of   any   kind.      At 


B.C.217.]    Crossing  the   Alps.  125 

The  army  in  safety  on  the  plains  of  Italy. 

length,  however,  as  they  continued  their  de- 
scent, they  came  first  into  the  region  of  forests, 
and  soon  after  to  slopes  of  grassy  fields  descend- 
ing into  warm  and  fertile  valleys.  Here  the 
animals  were  allowed  to  stop  and  rest,  and  re- 
new their  strength  by  abundance  of  food.  The 
men  rejoiced  that  their  toils  and  dangers  were 
over,  and,  descending  easily  the  remainder  of 
the  way,  they  encamped  at  last  safely  on  the 
plains  of  Italy. 


126  Hannibal.  [RO.217. 

Miaerable  condition  of  the  army.  Its  prr^i  lossea 


Chapter   VI. 

Hannibal  in  the  North  of  Italy. 

\7£7"HEN  Hannibal's  army  found  themselves 
*  *  on  the  plains  of  Italy,  and  sat  down  qui- 
etly to  repose,  they  felt  the  effects  of  their  fa- 
tigues and  exposures  far  more  sensibly  than 
they  had  done  under  the  excitement  which  they 
naturally  felt  while  actually  upon  the  mount- 
ains. They  were,  in  fact,  in  a  miserable  con- 
dition. Hannibal  told  a  Roman  officer  whom 
he  afterward  took  prisoner  that  more  than  thir- 
ty thousand  perished  on  the  way  in  crossing  the 
mountains ;  some  in  the  battles  which  were 
fought  in  the  passes,  and  a  greater  number  still, 
probably,  from  exposure  to  fatigue  and  cold,  and 
from  falls  among  the  rocks  and  glaciers,  and 
diseases  produced  by  destitution  and  misery. 
The  remnant  of  the  army  which  was  left  on 
reaching  the  plain  were  emaciated,  sickly,  rag- 
ged, and  spiritless ;  far  more  inclined  to  lie 
down  and  die,  than  to  go  on  and  undertake  the 
conquest  of  Italy  and  Rome. 

After  some  days,  however,  they  began  to  re- 
cruit     Although  they  had  been  half  starved 


B.C.217.]     HANNIBAL    JJY    ]Yi\*  127 

Feelings  of  Hannibal's  soldiers.  Plans  of  Scipio 

among  the  mountains,  they  had  now  plenty  of 
wholesome  food.  They  repaired  their  tattered 
garments  and  their  broken  weapons.  They 
talked  with  one  another  about  the  terrific  scenes 
through  which  they  had  been  passing,  and  the 
dangers  which  they  had  surmounted,  and  thus, 
gradually  strengthening  their  impressions  of  the 
greatness  of  the  exploits  they  had  performed, 
they  began  soon  to  awaken  in  each  other's 
breasts  an  ambition  to  go  on  and  undertake  the 
accomplishment  of  other  deeds  of  daring  and 
glory. 

We  left  Scipio  with  his  army  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Rhone,  about  to  set  sail  for  Italy  with  a 
part  of  his  force,  while  the  rest  of  it  was  sent 
on  toward  Spain.  Scipio  sailed  along  the  coast 
by  Genoa,  and  thence  to  Pisa,  where  he  landed. 
He  stopped  a  little  while  to  recruit  his  soldiers 
after  the  voyage,  and  in  the  mean  time  sent  or- 
ders to  all  the  Roman  forces  then  in  the  north 
of  Italy  to  join  his  standard.  He  hoped  in  this 
way  to  collect  a  force  strong  enough  to  encoun- 
ter Hannibal.  These  arrangements  being  made, 
he  marched  to  the  northward  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible. He  knew  in  what  condition  Hannibal's 
army  had  descended  from  the  Alps,  and  wished 
to  attack  them  before  they  should  have  time  to 


128  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

The  armies  approach  each  other.  Feelings  of  Hannibal  and  Sclpia 

recover  from  the  effects  of  their  privations  and 
sufferings.  He  reached  the  Po  before  he  saw 
any  thing  of  Hannibal. 

Hannibal,  in  the  mean  time,  was  not  idle. 
As  soon  as  his  men  were  in  a  condition  to  move, 
he  began  to  act  upon  the  tribes  that  he  found  at 
the  foot  of  the  mountains,  offering  his  friendship 
to  some,  and  attacking  others.  He  thus  con- 
quered those  who  attempted  to  resist  him,  mov- 
ing, all  the  time,  gradually  southward  toward 
the  Po.  That  river  has  numerous  branches,  and 
among  them  is  one  named  the  Ticinus.  It  was 
on  the  banks  of  this  river  that  the  two  armies 
at  last  came  together. 

Both  generals  must  have  felt  some  degree  of 
solicitude  in  respect  to  the  result  of  the  contest 
which  was  about  to  take  place.  Scipio  knew 
very  well  Hannibal's  terrible  efficiency  as  a  war- 
rior, and  he  was  himself  a  general  of  great  dis 
tinction,  and  a  Roman,  so  that  Hannibal  had  no 
reason  to  anticipate  a  very  easy  victory.  What- 
ever doubts  or  fears,  however,  general  officers 
may  feel  on  the  eve  of  an  engagement,  it  is  al- 
ways considered  very  necessary  to  conceal  them 
entirely  from  the  men,  and  to  animate  and  en- 
courage the  troops  with  a  most  undoubting  con 
fidence  that  they  will  gain  the  victory. 


B.C.  217.]    Hannibal  in  Italy.  129 

Address  of  Scipio  to  the  Roman  army. 

Both  Hannibal  and  Scipio,  accordingly,  made 
addresses  to  their  respective  armies — at  least  so 
say  the  historians  of  those  times — each  one  ex- 
pressing to  his  followers  the  certainty  that  the 
other  side  would  easily  be  beaten.  The  speech 
attributed  to  Scipio  was  somewhat  as  follows: 

"  I  wish  to  say  a  few  words  to  you,  soldiers, 
before  we  go  into  battle.  It  is,  perhaps,  scarce- 
ly necessary.  It  certainly  would  not  be  neces- 
sary if  I  had  now  under  my  command  the  same 
troops  that  I  took  with  me  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Rhone.  They  knew  the  Carthaginians  there, 
and  would  not  have  feared  them  here.  A  body 
of  our  horsemen  met  and  attacked  a  larger  body 
of  theirs,  and  defeated  them.  We  then  advanced 
with  our  whole  force  toward  their  encampment, 
in  order  to  give  them  battle.  They,  however, 
abandoned  the  ground  and  retreated  before  we 
reached  the  spot,  acknowledging,  by  their  flight, 
their  own  fear  and  our  superiority.  If  you  had 
been  with  us  there,  and  had  witnessed  these 
facts,  there  would  have  been  no  need  that  I 
should  say  any  thing  to  convince  you  now  how 
easily  you  are  going  to  defeat  this  Carthaginian 
foe. 

"We  have  had  a  war  with  this  same  nation 
before.  We  conquered  them  then,  both  by  land 
T 


130  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 


Address  of  Scipic  to  the  Roman  army. 


and  sea  ;  and  when,  finally,  peace  was  made,  we 
required  them  to  pay  us  tribute,  and  we  contin- 
ued to  exact  it  from  them  for  twenty  years. 
They  are  a  conquered  nation ;  and  now  this 
miserable  army  has  forced  its  way  insanely  over 
the  Alps,  just  to  throw  itself  into  our  hands 
They  meet  us  reduced  in  numbers,  and  exhaust- 
ed in  resources  and  strength.  More  than  half 
of  their  army  perished  in  the  mountains,  and 
those  that  survive  are  weak,  dispirited,  ragged, 
and  diseased.  And  yet  they  are  compelled  to 
meet  us.  If  there  was  any  chance  for  retreat, 
or  any  possible  way  for  them  to  avoid  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  battle,  they  would  avail  themselves 
of  it.  But  there  is  not.  They  are  hemmed  in 
by  the  mountains,  which"  are  now,  to  them,  an 
impassable  wall,  for  they  have  not  strength  to 
scale  them  again.  They  are  not  real  enemies ; 
they  are  the  mere  remnants  and  shadows  of  en- 
emies. They  are  wholly  disheartened  and  dis- 
couraged, their  strength  and  energy,  both  of 
soul  and  body,  being  spent  and  gone,  through 
the  cold,  the  hunger,  and  the  squalid  misery 
they  have  endured.  Their  joints  are  benumbed, 
their  sinews  stiffened,  and  their  forms  emacia- 
ted. Their  armor  is  shattered  and  broken,  their 
horses  are  lamed,  and  all  their  equipments  worn 


B.C. 217.]    Hannibal  in  Italy.  131 

Hannibal's  ingenious  method  of  introducing  his  speech. 

out  and  ruined,  so  that  really  what  most  I  fear 
is  that  the  world  will  refuse  us  the  glory  of  the 
victory,  and  say  that  it  was  the  Alps  that  con- 
quered Hannibal,  and  not  the  Roman  army. 

"  Easy  as  the  victory  is  to  be,  however,  we 
must  remember  that  there  is  a  great  deal  at 
stake  in  the  contest.  It  is  not  merely  for  glory 
that  we  are  now  about  to  contend.  If  Hannibal 
conquers,  he  will  march  to  Rome,  and  our  wives, 
our  children,  and  all  that  we  hold  dear  win  be 
at  his  mercy.  Remember  this,  and  go  into  the 
battle  feeling  that  the  fate  of  Rome  itself  is  de- 
pending upon  the  result." 

An  oration  is  attributed  to  Hannibal,  too,  on 
the  occasion  of  this  battle.  He  showed,  howev- 
er, his  characteristic  ingenuity  and  spirit  of  con- 
trivance in  the  way  in  which  he  managed  to  at- 
tract strong  attention  to  what  he  was  going  to 
say,  by  the  manner  in  which  he  introduced  it. 
He  formed  his  army  into  a  circle,  as  if  to  wit- 
ness a  spectacle.  He  then  brought  in  to  the 
center  of  this  circle  a  number  of  prisoners  that 
he  had  taken  among  the  Alps — perhaps  they 
were  the  hostages  which  had  been  delivered  to 
him,  as  related  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Who- 
ever they  were,  however,  whether  hostages  or 
captives  taken  in  the  battles  which  hal  been 


132  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Curious  combat.  Effect  on  the  army. 

fought  in  the  defiles,  Hannibal  had  brought 
them  with  his  army  down  into  Italy,  and  now 
introducing  them  into  the  center  of  tne  circle 
which  the  army  formed,  he  threw  down  before 
them  such  arms  as  they  were  accustomed  to  use 
in  their  native  mountains,  and  asked  them  wheth- 
er they  would  be  willing  to  take  those  weapons 
and  fight  each  other,  on  condition  that  each  one 
who  killed  his  antagonist  should  be  restored  to 
his  liberty,  and  have  a  horse  and  armor  given 
him,  so  that  he  could  return  home  with  honor. 
The  barbarous  monsters  said  readily  that  they 
would,  and  seized  the  arms  with  the  greatest 
avidity.  Two  or  three  pairs  of  combatants  were 
allowed  to  fight.  One  of  each  pair  was  killed, 
and  the  other  set  at  liberty  according  to  the 
promise  of  Hannibal.  The  combats  excited  the 
greatest  interest,  and  awakened  the  strongest 
enthusiasm  among  the  soldiers  who  witnessed 
them.  When  this  effect  had  been  sufficiently 
produced,  the  rest  of  the  prisoners  were  sent 
away,  and  Hannibal  addressed  the  vast  ring  of 
soldiery  as  follows : 

"I  have  intended,  soldiers,  in  what  you  have 
now  seen,  not  merely  to  amuse  you,  but  to  give 
you  a  picture  of  your  own  situation.  You  are 
hemmed  in  on  the  right  and  left  by  two  seas, 


B.C.217.]    Hannibal  in  Italy.  133 

Hannibal's  speech  to  his  army.  His  words  of  encouragement 

and  you  have  not  so  much  as.  a  single  ship  upon 
either  of  them.  Then  there  is  the  Po  before 
you  and  the  Alps  behind.  The  Po  is  a  deeper, 
and  more  rapid  and  turbulent  river  than  the 
Rhone  ;  and*  as  for  the  Alps,  it  was  with  the  ut- 
most difficulty  that  you  passed  over  them  when 
you  were  in  full  strength  and  vigor ;  they  are 
an  insurmountable  wall  to  you  now.  You  are 
therefore  shut  in,  like  our  prisoners,  on  every 
side,  and  have  no  hope  of  life  and  liberty  but  in 
battle  and  victory. 

"  The  victory,  however,  will^not  be  difficult. 
I  see,  wherever  I  look  among  you,  a  spirit  of 
determination  and  courage  which  I  am  sure  will 
make  you  conquerors.  The  troops  which  you 
are  going  to  contend  against  are  mostly  fresh 
recruits,  that  know  nothing  of  the  discipline  of 
the  camp,  and  can  never  successfully  confront 
such  war-worn  veterans  as  you.  You  all  know 
each  other  well,  and  me.  I  was,  in  fact,  a  pu- 
pil with  you  for  many  years,  before  I  took  the- 
command.  But  Scipio's  forces  are  strangers  to 
one  another  and  to  him,  and,  consequently,  have 
no  common  bond  of  sympathy ;  and  as  for  Scipic 
himself,  his  very  commission  as  a  Roman  gen- 
eral is  only  six  months  old. 

"  Think,  too,  what  a  splendid  and  prosperous 


134  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 


Hannibal's  promises.  His  real  feelings. 

career  victory  will  open  before  you.  It  will 
conduct  you  to  Rome.  It  will  make  you  mas- 
ters of  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  wealthiest 
cities  in  the  world.  Thus  far  you  have  fought 
your  battles  only  for  glory  or  for  dominion ; 
now,  you  will  have  something  more  substantial 
to  reward  your  success.  There  will  be  great 
treasures  to  be  divided  among  you  if  we  con- 
quer, but  if  we  are  defeated  we  are  lost.  Hem- 
med in  as  we  are  on  every  side,  there  is  no 
.  place  that  we  can  reach  by  flight.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  such  alternative  as  flight  left  to  us. 
We  must  conquer" 

It  is  hardly  probable  that  Hannibal  could 
have  really  and  honestly  felt  all  the  confidence 
that  he  expressed  in  his  harangues  to  his  sol- 
diers. He  must  have  had  some  fears.  In  fact, 
in  all  enterprises  undertaken  by  man,  the  indi- 
cations of  success,  and  the  hopes  based  upon 
them,  will  fluctuate  from  time  to  time,  and 
•cause  his  confidence  in  the  result  to  ebb  and 
flow,  so  that  bright  anticipations  of  success  and 
triumph  will  alternate  in  his  heart  with  feelings 
of  discouragement  and  despondency.  This  ef- 
fect is  experienced  by  all ;  by  the  energetic  and 
decided  as  well  as  by  the  timid  and  the  falter- 
ing.    The  former,  however,  never  allow  thesa 


B.C.217.]    Hannibal  in  Italy.  13n 

Hannibal's  energy  and  decision.  His  steady  resolution 

fluctuations  of  hope  and  fear  to  influence  their 
action.  They  consider  well  the  substantial 
grounds  for  expecting  success  before  commenc- 
ing their  undertaking,  and  then  go  steadily  for- 
ward, under  all  aspects  of  the  sky — when  it 
shines  and  when  it  rains — till  they  reach  the 
end.  The  inefficient  and  undecided  can  act 
only  under  the  stimulus  of  present  hope.  The 
end  they  aim  at  must  be  visibly  before  them  all 
the  time.  If  for  a  moment  it  passes  out  of  view, 
their  motive  is  gone,  and  they  can  do  no  more, 
till,  by  some  change  in  circumstances,  it  comes 
in  sight  again. 

Hannibal  was  energetic  and  decided.  The 
time  for  him  to  consider  whether  he  would  en- 
counter the  hostility  of  the  Roman  empire, 
aroused  to  the  highest  possible  degree,  was 
when  his  army  was  drawn  up  upon  the  banks 
of  the  Iberus,  before  they  crossed  it.  The  Ibe- 
rus  was  his  Rubicon.  That  line  once  over- 
stepped, j;here  was  to  be  no  further  faltering. 
The  difficulties  which  arose  from  time  to  time 
to  throw  a  cloud  over  his  prospects,  only  seem- 
ed to  stimulate  him  to  fresh  energy,  and  to  awa- 
ken a  new,  though  still  a  calm  and  steady  reso- 
lution. It  was  so  at  the  Pyrenees ;  it  was  so 
at  the  Rhone  ;  it  was  so  among  the  Alps,  where 


136  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal's  unfaltering  courage.  Movements  of  Scipio 

tho  difficulties  and  dangers  would  have  induced 
almost  any  other  commander  to  have  returned ; 
and  it  was  still  so,  now  that  he  found  himself 
shut  in  on  every  hand  by  the  stern  boundaries 
of  Northern  Italy,  which  he  could  not  possibly 
hope  again  to  pass,  and  the  whole  disposable 
force  of  the  Roman  empire,  commanded,  too,  by 
one  of  the  consuls,  concentrated  before  him. 
The  imminent  danger  produced  no  faltering, 
and  apparently  no  fear. 

.  The  armies  were  not  yet  in  sight  of  each  oth- 
er. They  were,  in  fact,  yet  on  opposite  sides 
of  the  River  Po.  The  Roman  commander  con- 
cluded to  march  his  troops  across  the  river,  and 
advance  in  search  of  Hannibal,  who  was  still 
at  some  miles'  distance.  After  considering  the 
various  means  of  crossing  the  stream,  he  deci- 
ded finally  on  building  a  bridge. 

Military  commanders  generally  throw  some 
sort  of  a  bridge  across  a  stream  of  water  lying 
in  their  way,  if  it  is  too  deep  to  be  easily  forded, 
unless,  indeed,  it  is  so  wide  and  rapid  as  to  make 
the  construction  of  the  bridge  difficult  or  im- 
practicable. In  this  latter  case  they  cross  as 
well  as  they  can  by  means  of  boats  and  rafts, 
and  by  swimming.  The  Po,  though  not  a  very 
large  stream  at  this  point,  was  too  deep  to  ba 


B.C.  217.]   Hannibal  *»   Italy.    .  137 

Scipio's  bridge  over  the  Po.  The  army  crosses  the  river. 

forded,  and  Scipio  accordingly  built  a  bridge. 
The  soldiers  cut  down  the  trees  which  grew  in 
the  forests  along  the  banks,  and  after  trimming 
off  the  tops  and  branches,  they  rolled  the  trunks 
into  the  water.  They  placed  these  trunks  side 
by  side,  with  others,  laid  transversely  and  pinned 
down,  upon  the  top.  Thus  they  formed  rafts, 
which  they  placed  in  a  line  across  the  stream, 
securing  them  well  to  each  other  and  to  the 
banks.  This  made  the  foundation  for  the  bridge, 
and  after  this  foundation  was  covered  with  oth- 
er materials,  so  as  to  make  the  upper  surface  a 
convenient  roadway,  the  army  were  conducted 
across  it,  and  then  a  small  detachment  of  sol- 
diers were  stationed  at  each  extremity  of  it  as 
a  guard. 

Such  a  bridge  as  this  answers  a  very  good 
temporary  purpose,  and  in  still  water,  as,  for 
example,  over  narrow  lakes  or  very  sluggish 
streams,  where  there  is  very  little  current,  a 
floating  structure  of  this  kind  is  sometimes  built 
for  permanent  service.  Such  bridges  will  not, 
however,  stand  on  broad  and  rapid  rivers  liable 
to  floods.  The  pressure  of  the  water  alone,  in 
such  cases,  would  very  much  endanger  all  the 
fastenings;  and  in  cases  where  drift  wood  or 
ice  is  brought  down  by  the  stream,  the  floating 


138  .  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Hannibal's  warlike  operations.  He  concentrates  his  army 

masses,  not  being  able  to  pass  under  the  bridge, 
would  accumulate  above  it,  and  would  soon 
bear  upon  it  with  so  enormous  a  pressure  that 
nothing  could  withstand  its  force.  The  bridge 
would  be  broken  away,  and  the  whole  accumu- 
lation— bridge,  drift-wood,  and  ice — would  be 
borne  irresistibly  down  the  stream  together. 

Scipio's  bridge,  however,  answered  very  well 
for  his  purpose.  His  army  passed  over  it  in 
safety.  When  Hannibal  heard  of  this,  he  knew 
that  the  battle  was  at  hand.  Hannibal  was  him- 
self at  this  time  about  five  miles  distant.  While 
Scipio  was  at  work  upon  the  bridge,  Hannibal 
was  employed,  mainly,  as  he  had  been  all  the 
time  since  his  descent  from  the  mountains,  in 
the  subjugation  of  the  various  petty  nations  and 
tribes  north  of  the  Po.  Some  of  them  were 
well  disposed  to  join  his  standard.  Others  were 
allies  of  the  Romans,  and  wished  to  remain  so. 
He  made  treaties  and  sent  help  to  the  former, 
and  dispatched  detachments  of  troops  to  intim- 
idate and  subdue  the  latter.  When,  however, 
he  learned  that  Scipio  had  crossed  the  river,  he 
ordered  all  these  detachments  to  come  immedi- 
ately in,  and  he  began  to  prepare  in  earnest  for 
the  contest  that  was  impending. 

He  called  together  an  assembly  of  his  soldiers, 


B.C.  217.]    Hannibal   in   Italy.  139 

Hannibal  addresses  his  soldiers.  He  promises  them  lands. 

and  announced  to  them  finally  that  the  battle 
was  now  nigh.  He  renewed  the  words  of  en- 
couragement that  he  had  spoken  before,  and  in 
addition  to  what  he  then  said,  he  now  promised 
the  soldiers  rewards  in  land  in  case  they  proved 
victorious.  "  I  will  give  you  each  a  farm,"  said 
he,  "  wherever  you  choose  to  have  it,  either  in 
Africa,  Italy,  or  Spain.  If,  instead  of  the  land, 
any  of  you  shall  prefer  to  receive  rather  an  equiv- 
alent in  money,  you  shall  have  the  reward  in 
that  form,  and  then  you  can  return  home  and 
live  with  your  friends,  as  before  the  war,  under 
circumstances  which  will  make  you  objects  of 
envy  to  those  who  remained  behind.  If  any  of 
you  would  like  to  live  in  Carthage,  I  will  have 
you  made  free  citizens,  so  that  you  can  live  there 
in  independence  and  honor." 

But  what  security  would  there  be  for  the 
faithful  fulfillment  of  these  promises  ?  In  mod- 
ern times  such  security  is  given  by  bonds,  with 
pecuniary  penalties,  or  by  the  deposit  of  titles 
to  property  in  responsible  hands.  In  ancient 
days  they  managed  differently.  The  promiser 
bound  himself  by  some  solemn  and  formal  mode 
of  adjuration,  accompanied,  in  important  cases, 
with  certain  ceremonies,  which  were  supposed 
to  seal  and  confirm  the  obligation  assumed.     In 


140  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Ratifying  a  promise.  Omen* 

this  case  Hannibal  brought  a  lamb  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  assembled  army.  He  held  it  before 
them  with  his  left  hand,  while  with  his  right 
he  grasped  a  heavy  stone.  He  then  called  aloud 
upon  the  gods,  imploring  them  to  destroy  him 
as  he  was  about  to  slay  the  lamb,  if  he  failed 
to  "perform  faithfully  and  fully  the  pledges  that 
ho  had  made.  He  then  struck  the  poor  lamb  a 
heavy  blow  with  the  stone.  The  animal  fell 
dead  at  his  feet,  and  Hannibal  was  thenceforth 
bound,  in  the  opinion  of  the  army,  by  a  very 
solemn  obligation  indeed,  to  be  faithful  in  ful- 
filling his  word. 

The  soldiers  were  greatly  animated  and  ex- 
cited by  these  promises,  and  were  in  haste  to 
have  the  contest  come  on.  The  Roman  sol- 
diers, it  seems,  were  in  a  different  mood  of 
mind.  Some  circumstances  had  occurred  which 
they  considered  as  bad  omens,  and  they  were 
very  much  dispirited  and  depressed  by  them. 
It  is  astonishing  that  men  should  ever  allow 
their  minds  to  be  affected  by  such  wholly  acci 
dental  occurrences  as  these  were.  One  of  them 
was  this :  a  wolf  came  into  their  camp,  from 
one  of  the  forests  near,  and  after  wounding  sev- 
eral men,  made  his  escape  again.  The  other 
was  more  trifling  still.     A  swarm  of  bees  flew 


B.C.  217.]    Hannibal  in  Italy.  141 

The  battle.  The  Romans  thrown  into  confusion 

mto  the  encampment,  and  lighted  upon  a  tree 
just  over  Scipio's  tent.  This  was  considered, 
for  some  reason  or  other,  a  sign  that  some  ca- 
lamity was  going  to  befall  them,  and  the  men 
were  accordingly  intimidated  and  disheartened. 
They  consequently  looked  forward  to  the  battle 
with  uneasiness  and  anxiety,  while  the  army  of 
Hannibal  anticipated  it  with  eagerness  and 
pleasure. 

The  battle  came  on,  at  last,  very  suddenly, 
and  at  a  moment  when  neither  party  were  ex- 
pecting it.  A  large  detachment  of  both  armies 
were  advancing  toward  the  position  of  the  other, 
near  the  River  Ticinus,  to  reconnoiter,  when 
they  met,  and  the  battle  began.  Hannibal  ad- 
vanced with  great  impetuosity,  and  sent,  at  the 
same  time,  a  detachment  around  to  attack  his 
enemy  in  the  rear.  The  Romans  soon  began 
to  fall  into  confusion;  the  horsemen  and  foot 
soldiers  got  entangled  together ;  the  men  were 
trampled  upon  by  the  horses,  and  the  horses 
were  frightened  by  the  men.  In  the  midst  of 
this  scene,  Scipio  received  a  wound.  A  consul 
was  a  dignitary  of  very  high  consideration.  He 
was,  in  fact,  a  sort  of  semi-king.  The  officers, 
and  all  the  soldiers,  so  fast  as  they  heard  that 
the  consul  was  wounded,  were  terrified  and  dis^ 


142  Hannibal.  [B.C.  21? 

Scipio  wounded.  The  Romans  driven  back  across  the  river    ■ 

mayed.  and  the  Romans  began  to  retreat. 
Scipio  had  a  young  son,  named  also  Scipio,  who 
was  then  about  twenty  years  of  age.  He  was 
fighting  by  the  side  of  his  father  when  he  re- 
ceived his  wound.  He  protected  his  father,  got 
him  into  the  center  of  a  compact  body  of  caval- 
ry, and  moved  slowly  off  the  ground,  those  in  ■ 
the  rear  facing  toward  the  enemy  and  beating 
them  back,  as  they  pressed  on  in  pursuit  of 
them.  In  this  way  they  reached  their  camp. 
Here  they  stopped  for  the  night.  They  had 
fortified  the  place,  and,  as  night  was  coming  on, 
Hannibal  thought  it  not  prudent  to  press  on  and 
attack  them  there.  He  waited  for  the  morning. 
Scipio,  however,  himself  wounded  and  his  army 
discouraged,  thought  it  not  prudent  for  him  to 
wait  till"  the  morning.  At  midnight  he  put  his 
whole  force  in  motion  on  a  retreat.  He  kept 
the  camp-fires  burning,  and  did  every  thing  else 
in  his  power  to  prevent  the  Carthaginians  ob- 
serving any  indications  of  his  departure.  His 
army  marched  secretly  and  silently  till  they 
reached  the  river.  They  recrossed  it  by  the 
bridge  they  had  built,  and  then,  cutting  away 
the  fastenings  by  which  the  different  rafts  wero 
held  together,  the  structure  was  at  once  de- 
stroyed, and  the  materials  of  which  it  was  com- 


B.C.217.]    Hannibal  in  Itam.  143 

The  Romans  destroy  the  bridge  over  the  Ticinus 

posed  floated  away,  a  mere  mass  of  ruins,  down 
the  stream.  From  the  Ticinns  they  floated, 
we  may  imagine,  into  the  Po,  and  thence  down 
the  Po  into  the  Adriatic  Sea,  where  they  drifted 
about  upon  the  waste  of  waters  till  they  were 
at  last,  one  after  another,  driven  by  storms  upon 
the  sandy  shores. 


144  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Hannibal  pursues  the  Romans.  He  takes  some  prisoners. 


Chapter   VII. 

The   Apennines. 

A  S  soon  as  Hannibal  was  apprised  in  the 
■+*-  morning  that  Scipio  and  his  forces  had  left 
their  ground,  he  pressed  on  after  them,  very 
earnest  to  overtake  them  before  they  should 
reach  the  river.  But  he  was  too  late.  The 
main  body  of  the  Roman  army  had  got  over. 
There  was,  however,  a  detachment  of  a  few 
hundred  men,  who  had  been  left  on  Hannibal's 
side  of  the  river  to  guard  the  bridge  until  all 
the  army  should  have  passed,  and  then  to  help 
in  cutting  it  away.  They  had  accomplished 
this  before  Hannibal's  arrival,  but  had  not  had 
time  to  contrive  any  way  to  get  across  the  river 
themselves.  Hannibal  took  them  all  prisoners. 
The  condition  and  prospects  of  both  the  Ro- 
man and  Carthaginian  cause  were  entirely 
changed  by  this  battle,  and  the  retreat  of  Scipio 
across  the  Po.  All  the  nations  of  the  north  of 
Italy,  who  had  been  subjects  or  allies  of  the  Ro- 
mans, now  turned  to  Hannibal.  They  sent 
embassies  into  his   camp,  offering   him   their 


B.C.217.J       The   Apennines.  145 

Revolt  of  some  Gauls  from  the  Romans.         Hannibal  crosses  the  river. 

friendship  and  alliance.  In  fact,  there  was  a 
large  body  of  Gauls  in  the  Roman  camp,  who 
were  fighting  under  Scipio  at  the  battle  of  Ti- 
cinus,  who  deserted  his  standard  immediately 
afterward,  and  came  over  in  a  mass  to  Hanni- 
bal. They  made  this  revolt  in  the  night,  and, 
instead  of  stealing  away  secretly,  they  raised  a 
prodigious  tumult,  killed  the  guards,  filled  the 
encampment  with  their  shouts  and  outcries,  and 
created  for  a  time  an  awful  scene  of  terror. 

Hannibal  received  them,  but  he  was  too  sa- 
gacious to  admit  such  a  treacherous  horde  into 
his  army.  He  treated  them  with  great  consid- 
eration and  kindness,  and  dismissed  them  with 
presents,  that  they  might  all  go  to  their  respect- 
ive homes,  charging  them  to  exert  their  influ- 
ence in  his  favor  among  the  tribes  to  which  they 
severally  belonged. 

Hannibal's  soldiers,  too,  were  very  much  en- 
couraged by  the  commencement  they  had  made. 
The  army  made  immediate  preparations  for 
crossing  the  river.  Some  of  the  soldiers  built 
rafts,  others  went  up  the  stream  in  search  of 
places  to  ford.  Some  swam  across.  They  could 
adopt  these  or  any  other  modes  in  safety,  for  the 
Romans  made  no  stand  on  the  opposite  bank  to 
oppose  them,  but  moved  rapidly  on,  as  fast  as 
K 


14«  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

I)  sin;iy  of  the  Rinnans.  Sempronius  recalled  to  Italy 

Scipio  could  be  carried.  His  wounds  began  tc 
inflame,  and  were  extremely  painful. 

In  fact,  the  Romans  were  dismayed  at  the 
danger  which  now  threatened  them.  As  soon 
as  news  of  these  events  reached  the  city,  the 
authorities  there  sent  a  dispatch  immediately 
to  Sicily  to  recall  the  other  consul.  His  name 
was  Sempronius.  It  will  be  recollected  that, 
when  the  lots  were  cast  between  him  and  Scip. 
io,  it  fell  to  Scipio  to  proceed  to  Spain,  with  a 
view  to  arresting  Hannibal's  march,  while  Sem- 
pronius went  to  Sicily  and  Africa.  The  object 
of  this  movement  was  to  threaten  and  attack 
the  Carthaginians  at  home,  in  order  to  distract 
their  attention  and  prevent  their  sending  any 
fresh  forces  to  aid  Hannibal,  and,  perhaps,  even 
to  compel  them  to  recall  him  from  Italy  to  de- 
fend their  own  capital.  But  now  that  Hanni- 
bal had  not  only  passed  the  Alps,  but  had  also 
crossed  the  Po,  and  was  marching  toward  Rome 
— Scipio  himself  disabled,  and  his  army  flying 
before  him — they  were  obliged  at  once  to  aban- 
don the  plan  of  threatening  Carthage.  They 
sent  with  all  dispatch  an  order  to  Sempronius 
to  hasten  home  and  assist  in  the  defense  of 
Rome. 

Sempronius  was  a  man  of  a  very  prompt  and 


B.C.  217.]       The   Apennines.  147 

Sufferings  of  Scipio  from  his  wound.  He  is  joined  by  Sempronius 

impetuous  character,  with  great  confidence  in 
his  own  powers,  and  very  ready  for  action.  He 
came  immediately  into  Italy,  recruited  new  sol- 
diers for  the  army,  put  himself  at  the  head  of 
his  forces,  and  marched  northward  to  join  Scipio 
in  the  valley  of  the  Po.  Scipio  was  suffering 
great  pain  from  his  wounds,  and  could  do  but  lit- 
tle toward  directing  the  operations  of  the  army. 
He  had  slowly  retreated  before  Hannibal,  the 
fever  and  pain  of  his  wounds  being  greatly  ex- 
asperated by  the  motion  of  traveling.  In  this 
manner  he  arrived  at  the  Trebia,  a  small  stream 
flowing  northward  into  the  Po.  He  crossed  this 
stream,  and  finding  that  he  could  not  go  any 
further,  on  account  of  the  torturing  pain  to  which 
it  put  him  to  be  moved,  he  halted  his  army, 
marked  out  an  encampment,  threw  up  fortifica- 
tions around  it,  and  prepared  to  make  a  stand. 
To  his  great  relief,  Sempronius  soon  came  up 
and  joined  him  here. 

There  were  now  two  generals.  Napoleon 
used  to  say  that  one  bad  commander  was  bet- 
ter than  two  good  ones,  so  essential  is  it  to  suc- 
cess in  all  military  operations  to  secure  that 
promptness,  and  confidence,  and  decision  which 
can  only  exist  where  action  is  directed  by  one 
single  mind.     Sempronius  and  Scipio  disagreed 


148  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

The  Roman  commanders  disagree.  Skirmishes 

as  to  the  proper  course  to  be  pursued.  Sempro- 
nius  wished  to  attack  Hannibal  immediately. 
Scipio  was  in  favor  of  delay.  Sempronius  at- 
tributed Scipio's  reluctance  to  give  battle  to  the 
dejection  of  mind  and  discouragement  produced 
by  his  wound,  or  to  a  feeling  of  envy  lest  he, 
Sempronius,  should  have  the  honor  of  conquer- 
ing the  Carthaginians,  while  he  himself  was 
helpless  in  his  tent.  On  the  other  hand,  Scipio 
thought  Sempronius  inconsiderate  and  reckless, 
and  disposed  to  rush  heedlessly  into  a  contest 
with  a  foe  whose  powers  and  resources  he  did 
not  understand. 

In  the  mean  time,  while  the  two  command- 
ers were  thus  divided  in  opinion,  some  skirmish 
es  and  small  engagements  took  place  between 
detachments  from  the  two  armies,  in  which  Sem- 
pronius thought  that  the  Romans  had  the  ad- 
vantage. This  excited  his  enthusiasm  more 
and  more,  and  he  became  extremely  desirous  tc 
bring  on  a  general  battle.  He  began  to  be  quite 
out  of  patience  with  Scipio's  caution  and  delay. 
The  soldiers,  he  said,  were  full  of  strength  and 
courage,  all  eager  for  the  combat,  and  it  was 
absurd  to  hold  them  back  on  account  of  the  fee- 
bleness of  one  sick  man.  "  Besides,"  said  he, 
"of  what  use  can  it  be  to  delay  any  longer? 


B.C.  217.]       The   Apeninnes.  149 

Scmpronius  eager  for  a  battle.  Hannibal's  stratagem 

We  are  as  ready  to  meet  the  Carthaginians  now 
as  we  shall  ever  be.  There  is  no  third  consul 
to  come  and  help  us ;  and  what  a  disgrace  it  is 
for  us  Romans,  who  in  the  former  war  led  our 
troops  to  the  very  gates  of  Carthage,  to  allow 
Hannibal  to  bear  sway  over  all  the  north  of  It- 
aly, while  we  retreat  gradually  before  him, 
afraid  to  encounter  now  a  force  that  we  have 
always  conquered  before." 

Hannibal  was  not  long  in  learning,  through 
his  spies,  that  there  was  this  difference  of  opin- 
ion between  the  Roman  generals,  and  that  Sem- 
pronius  was  full  of  a  presumptuous  sort  of  ardor, 
and  he  began  to  think  that  he  could  contrive 
some  plan  to  draw  the  latter  out  into  battle  un- 
der circumstances  in  which  he  would  have  to 
act  at  a  great  disadvantage.  He  did  contrive 
such  a  plan.  It  succeeded  admirably  ;  and  the 
case  was  one  of  those  numerous  instances  which 
occurred  in  the  history  of  Hannibal,  of  success- 
ful stratagem,  which  led  the  Romans  to  say  that 
his  leading  traits  of  character  were  treachery 
arid  cunning. 

Hannibal's  plan  was,  in  a  word,  an  attempt 
to  draw  the  Roman  army  out  of  its  encamp- 
ment on  a  dark,  cold,  and  stormy  night  in  De- 
cember, and  get  them  into  the  river.     This  riv 


150  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217 

Details  of  Hannibal's  scheme.  The  ambuscade 

er  was  the  Trebia.  It  flowed  north  into  the  Po, 
between  the  Roman  and  Carthaginian  camps. 
His  scheme,  in  detail,  was  to  send  a  part  of  his 
army  over  the  river  to  attack  the  Romans  in  the 
night  or  very  early  in  the  morning.  He  hoped 
that  by  this  means  Sempronius  would  be  induc- 
ed to  come  out  of  his  camp  to  attack  the  Car- 
thaginians. The  Carthaginians  were  then  to 
fly  and  recross  the  river,  and  Hannibal  hoped 
that  Sempronius  would  follow,  excited  by  the 
ardor  of  pursuit.  Hannibal  was  then  to  have  a 
strong  reserve  of  the  army,  that  bad  remained 
all  the  time  in  warmth  and  safety,  to  come  out 
and  attack  the  Romans  with  unimpaired  strength 
and  vigor,  while  the  Romans  themselves  would 
be  benumbed  by  the  cold  and  wet,  and  disor- 
ganized by  the  confusion  produced  in  crossing 
the  stream. 

A  part  of  Hannibal's  reserve  were  to  be  plac- 
ed in  an  ambuscade.  There  were  some  mead 
ows  near  the  water,  which  were  covered  in 
many  places  with  tall  grass  and  bushes.  Han- 
nibal went  to  examine  the  spot,  and  found  th&t 
this  shrubbery  was  high  enough  for  even  horse- 
men to  be  concealed  in  it.  He  determined  to 
place  a  thousand  foot  soldiers  and  a  thousand 
horsemen  here,  the  most  efficient  and  coura- 


B.C.217.]       The  Apennines.  "                 15] 
— » . . . 

Two  thousand  chosen  men.  Hannibal's  manner  of  choosing  them 

geous  in  the  army.     He  selected  them  in  the* 
following  manner : 

He  called  one  of  his  lieutenant  generals  to 
the  spot,  explained  somewhat  of  his  design  to 
him,  and  then  asked -him  to  go  and  choose  from 
the  cavalry  and  the  infantry,  a  hundred  each, 
the  best  soldiers  he  could  find.  This  two  hund- 
red were  then  assembled,  and  Hannibal,  after 
surveying  them  with  looks  of  approbation  and 
pleasure,  said,  "  Yes,  you  are  the  men  I  want, 
only,  instead  of  two  hundred,  I  need  two  thou- 
sand. Go  back  to  the  army,  and  select  and 
bring  to  me,  each  of  you,  nine  men  like  your- 
selves." It  is  easy  to  be  imagined  that  the  sol- 
diers were  pleased  with  this  commission,  and 
that  they  executed  it  faithfully.  The  whole 
force  thus  chosen  was  soon"  assembled,  and  sta- 
tioned in  the  thickets  above  described,  where 
they  lay  in  ambush  ready  to  attack  the  Romans 
after  they  should  pass  the  river. 

Hannibal  also  made  arrangements  for  leaving 
a  large  part  of  his  army  in  his  own  camp,  ready 
for  battle,  with  orders  that  they  should  partake 
)f  food  and  refreshments,  and  keep  themselves 
warm  by  the  fires  until  they  should  be  called 
upon.  All  things  being  thus  ready,  he  detach- 
ed a  body  of  horsemen  to  cross  the  river,  and 


152  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

w 

Attack  on  the  Roman  camp.  Success  of  Hannibal's  stratagem. 

>  see  if  they  could  provoke  the  Romans  to  come 
out  of  their  camp  and  pursue  them. 

"  Go,"  said  Hannibal,  to  the  commander  of 
this  detachment,  "  pass  the  stream,  advance  to 
the  Roman  camp,  assail  the  guards,  and  when 
the  army  forms  and  comes  out  to  attack  you,  re- 
treat slowly  before  them  back  across  the  river." 

The  detachment  did  as  it  was  ordered  to  do. 
When  they  arrived  at  the  camp,  which  was 
soon  after  break  of  day — for  it  was  a  part  of 
Hannibal's  plan  to  bring  the  Romans  out  before 
they  should  have  had  time  to  breakfast — Sem- 
pronius,  at  the  first  alarm,  called  all  the  soldiers 
to  arms,  supposing  that  tho  whole  Carthaginian 
force  was  attacking  them.  It  was  a  cold  and 
stormy  morning,  and  the  atmosphere  being  fill- 
ed with  rain  and  snow,  but  little  could  be  seen. 
Column  after  column  of  horsemen  and  of  in- 
fantry marched  out  of  the  camp.  The  Cartha- 
ginians retreated.  Sempronius  was  greatly  ex- 
cited at  the  idea  of  so  easily  driving  back  the 
assailants,  and,  as  they  retreated,  he  pressed  on 
in  pursuit  of  them.  As  Hannibal  had  antici- 
pated, he  became  so  excited  in  the  pursuit  that 
he  did  not  stop  at  the  banks  of  the  river.  The 
Carthaginian  horsemen  plunged  into  the  stream 
in  their  retreat,  and  the  Romans,  foot  soldiers 


B.C.  217.]      The  Apennines.  153 

Sempronius  crosses  the  river.  Impetuous  attack  of  Hannibal 

and  horsemen  together,  followed  on.  The  stream 
was  usually  small,  but  it  was  now  swelled  by 
the  rain  which  had  been  falling  all  the  night. 
The  water  was,  of  course,  intensely  cold.  The 
horsemen  got  through  tolerably  well,  but  the 
foot  soldiers  were  all  thoroughly  drenched  and 
benumbed ;  and  as  they  had  not  taken  any  food 
that  morning,  and  had  come  forth  on  a  very 
sudden  call,  and  without  any  sufficient  prepara- 
tion, they  felt  the  effects  of  the  exposure  in  the 
strongest  degree.  Still  they  pressed  on.  They 
ascended  the  bank  after  crossing  the  river,  and 
when  they  had  formed  again  there,  and  were 
moving  forward  in  pursuit  of  their  still  flying 
enemy,  suddenly  the  whole  force  of  Hannibal's 
reserves,  strong  and  vigorous,  just  from  their 
tents  and  their  fires,  burst  upon  them.  They 
had  scarcely  recovered  from  the  astonishment 
and  the  shock  of  this  unexpected  onset,  when 
the  two  thousand  concealed  in  the  ambuscade 
came  sallying  forth  in  the  storm,  and  assailed 
the  Romans  in  the  rear  with  frightful  shouts 
and  outcries. 

All  these  movements  took  place  very  rapidly. 
Only  a  very  short  period  elapsed  from  the  time 
that  the  Roman  army,  officers  and  soldiers,  were 
quietly  sleeping  in  their  camp,  or  rising  slowly 


154  Haxnibal.  [B.C.  217 

Situation  of  the  Roman  army.  Terrible  conflict 

to  prepare  for  the  routine  of  an  ordinary  day,  be- 
fore they  found  themselves  all  drawn  out  in  bat- 
tle array  some  miles  from  their  encampment, 
and  surrounded  and  hemmed  in  by  their  foes. 
The  events  succeeded  each  other  so  rapidly  as 
to  appear  to  the  soldiers  like  a  dream ;  but  very 
soon  their  wet  and  freezing  clothes,  their  limbs 
benumbed  and  stiffened,  the  sleet  which  was 
driving  along  the  plain,  the  endless  lines  of  Car- 
thaginian infantry,  hemming  them  in  on  all  sides, 
and  the  columns  of  horsemen  and  of  elephants 
charging  upon  them,  convinced  them  that  their 
situation  was  one  of  dreadful  reality.  The  ca- 
lamity, too,  which  threatened  them  was  of  vast 
extent,  as  well  as  imminent  and  terrible ;  for, 
though  the  stratagem  of  Hannibal  was  very  sim- 
ple in  its  plan  and  management,  still  he  had  ex- 
ecuted it  on  a  great  scale,  and  had  brought  out 
the  whole  Roman  army.  There  were,  it  is  said, 
about  forty  thousand  that  crossed  the  river,  and 
about  an  equal  number  in  the  Carthaginian 
army  to  oppose  them.  Such  a  body  of  combat- 
ants covered,  of  course,  a  large  extent  of  ground, 
and  the  conflict  that  ensued  was  one  of  the  most 
terrible  scenes  of  the  many  that  Hannibal  as- 
sisted in  enacting. 

The  conflict  continued  for  many  hours,  the 


RC.  217.]       The   Apennines 

Utter  defeat  of  the  Romans.  Scene  after  the  battle. 

Romans  getting  more  and  more  into  confusion 
all  the  time.  The  elephants  of  the  Carthagin- 
ians, that  is,  the  few  that  now  remained,  made 
great  havoc  in  their  ranks,  and  finally,  after  a 
combat  of  some  hours,  the  whole  army  was 
broken  up  and  fled,  some  portions  in  compact 
bodies,  as  their  officers  could  keep  them  togeth- 
er, and  others  in  hopeless  and  inextricable  con- 
fusion. They  made  their  way  back  to  the  riv- 
er, which  they  reached  at  various  points  up  and 
down  the  stream.  In  the  mean  time,  the  con- 
tinued rain  had  swollen  the  waters  still  more, 
the  low  lands  were  overflowed,  the  deep  places 
concealed,  and  the  broad  expanse  of  water  in 
the  center  of  the  stream  whirled  in  boiling  and 
turbid  eddies,  whose  surface  was  roughened  by 
the  December  breeze,  and  dotted  every  where 
with  the  drops  of  rain  still  falling. 

When  the  Roman  army  was  thoroughly  bro- 
ken up  and  scattered,  the  Carthaginians  gave 
up  the  further  prosecution  of  the  contest.  They 
were  too  wet,  cold,  and  exhausted  themselves 
to  feel  any  ardor  in  the  pursuit  of  their  enemies. 
Vast  numbers  of  the  Romans,  however,  attempt- 
ed to  recross  the  river,  and  were  swept  down 
and  destroyed  by  the  merciless  flood,  whose  force 
they  had  not  strength  enough  remaining  to  with- 


156  Hannibal.  [B.C.  217. 

Various  battles  of  Hannibal.  Scarcity  of  food 

stand.  Other  portions  of  the  troops  lay  hid  in 
lurking-places  to  which  they  had  retreated,  un- 
til night  came  on,  and  then  they  made  rafts  on 
which  they  contrived  to  float  themselves  back 
across  the  stream.  Hannibal's  troops  were  too 
wet,  and  cold,  and  exhausted  to  go  out  again 
into  the  storm,  and  so  they  were  unmolested  in 
these  attempts.  Notwithstanding  this,  howev- 
er, great  numbers  of  them  were  carried  down 
the  stream  and  lost. 

It  was  now  December,  too  late  for  Hannibal 
to  attempt  to  advance  much  further  that  season, 
and  yet  the  way  before  him  was  open  to  the 
Apennines,  by  the  defeat  of  Sempronius,  for 
neither  he  nor  Scipio  could  now  hope  to  make 
another  stand  against  him  till  they  should  re- 
ceive new  re-enforcements  from  Rome.  During 
the  winter  months  Hannibal  had  various  battles 
and  adventures,  sometimes  with  portions  and  de- 
tachments of  the  Roman  army,  and  sometimes 
with  the  native  tribes.  He  was  sometimes  in 
great  difficulty  for  want  of  food  for  his  army, 
until  at  length  he  bribed  the  governor  of  a  cas- 
tle, where  a  Roman  granary  was  kept,  to  deliver 
it  up  to  him,  and  after  that  he  was  well  supplied. 

The  natives  of  the  country  were,  however, 
not  at  all  well  disposed  toward  him,  and  in  the 


B.C. 217.]       The   Apennines.  157 

Valley  of  the  Arno.  Crossing  the  Apennines 

course  of  the  winter  they  attempted  to  impede 
his  operations,  and  to  harass  his  army  by  every 
means  in  their  power.  Finding  his  situation 
uncomfortable,  he  moved  on  toward  the  south, 
and  at  length  determined  that,  inclement  as  the 
season  was,  he  would  cross  the  Apennines. 

By  looking  at  the  map  of  Italy,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  great  valley  of  the  Po  extends 
across  the  whole  north  of  Italy.  The  valley  of 
the  Arno  and  of  the  Umbro  lies  south  of  it,  sep- 
arated from  it  by  a  part  of  the  Apennine  chain. 
This  southern  valley  was  Etruria.  Hannibal 
decided  to  attempt  to  pass  over  the  mountains 
into  Etruria.  He  thought  he  should  find  there 
a  warmer  climate,  and  inhabitants  more  well- 
disposed  toward  him,  besides  being  so  much 
nearer  Rome. 

But,  though  Hannibal  conquered  the  Alps, 
the  Apennines  conquered  him.  A  very  violent 
storm  arose  just  as  he  reached  the  most  exposed 
place  among  the  mountains.  It  was  intensely 
cold,  and  the  wind  blew  the  hail  and  snow  direct- 
ly into  the  faces  of  the  troops,  so  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  them  to  proceed.  They  halted  and 
turned  their  backs  to  the  storm,  but  the  wind 
increased  more  and  more,  and  was  attended 
with  terrific  thunder  and  lightning,  which  filled 


158  Hannibal.'  [B.C.  217 

Terrific  storm.  Death  of  the  elephanta 

the  soldiers  with  alarm,  as  they  were  at  such 
an  altitude  as  to  be  themselves  enveloped  in  the 
clouds  from  which  the  peals  and  flashes  were 
emitted.  Unwilling  to  retreat,  Hannibal  order- 
ed the  army  to  encamp  on  the  spot,  in  the  best 
shelter  they,  could  find.  They  attempted,  ac- 
cordingly, to  pitch  their  tents,  but  it  was  impos- 
sible to  secure  them.  The  wind  increased  to  a 
hurricane.  The  tent  poles  were  unmanageable, 
and  the  canvas  was  carried  away  from  its  fast- 
enings, and  sometimes  split  or  blown  into  rags 
by  its  flapping  in  the  wind.  The  poor  elephants, 
that  is,  all  that  were  left  of  them  from  previous 
battles  and  exposures,  sunk  down  under  this 
intense  cold  and  died.  One  only  remained  alive. 
Hannibal  ordered  a  retreat,  and  the  army 
went  back  into  the  valley  of  the  Po.  But  Han- 
nibal was  ill  at  ease  here.  The  natives  of  the 
country  were  very  weary  of  his  presence.  His 
army  consumed  their  food,  ravaged  their  coun- 
try, and  destroyed  all  their  peace  and  happiness. 
Hannibal  suspected  them  of  a  design  to  poison 
him  or  assassinate  him  in  some  other  way.  He 
was  continually  watching  and  taking  precau- 
tions against  these  attempts.  He  had  a  great 
many  different  dresses  made  to  be  used  as  dis- 
guises, and  false  hair  of  different  colors  and 


B.C.  217.J      The  Apennines.  159 

Hannibal's  uneasiness.  He  crosses  the  Apennines. 

fashion,  so  that  he  could  alter  his  appearance 
at  pleasure.  This  was  to  prevent  any  spy  01 
assassin  who  might  come  into  his  camp  from 
identifying  him  by  any  description  of  his  dress 
and  appearance.  Still,  notwithstanding  these 
precautions,  he  was  ill  at  ease,  and  at  the  very 
earliest  practicable  period  in  the  spring  he  made 
a  new  attempt  to  cross  the  mountains,  and  was 
now  successful. 

On  descending  the  southern  declivities  of  the 
Apennines  he  learned  that  a  new  Roman  army, 
under  a  new  consul,  was  advancing  toward  him 
from  the  south.  He  was  eager  to  meet  this 
force,  and  was  preparing  to  press  forward  at 
once  by  the  nearest  way.  He  found,  however, 
that  this  would  lead  him  across  the  lower  part 
of  the  valley  of  the  Arno,  w hich  was  here  very 
broad,  and,  though  usually  passable,  was  now 
overflowed  in  consequence  of  the  swelling  of  the 
waters  of  the  river  by  the  melting  of  the  snows 
upon  the  mountains.  The  whole  country  was 
now,  in  fact,  avast  expanse  of  marshes  and  fens 

Still,  Hannibal  concluded  to  cross  it,  and,  in 
the  attempt,  he  involved  his  army  in  difficulties 
and  dangers  as  great,  almost,  as  he  had  encoun- 
tered upon  the  Alps.  The  waters  were  rising 
continually;  they  filled   all  the  channels  and 


i60  Hannhjal  [B.C.  217 

Perilous  march.  Hannibal's  sicknew 

spread  over  extended  plains.  They  were  so 
turbid,  too,  that  every  thing  beneath  the  surface 
was  concealed,  and  the  soldiers  wading  in  them 
were  continually  sinking  into  deep  and  sudden 
channels  and  into  bogs  of  mire,  where  many 
were  lost.  They  were  all  exhausted  and  worn 
out  by  the  wet  and  cold,  and  the  long  continu- 
ance of  their  exposure  to  it.  They  were  four 
days  and  three  nights  in  this  situation,  as  their 
progress  was,  of  course,  extremely  slow.  The 
men,  during  all  this  time,  had  scarcely  any 
sleep,  and  in  some  places  the  only  way  by  which 
they  could  get  any  repose  was  to  lay  their  arms 
and  their  baggage  in  the  standing  water,  so  as 
to  build,  by  this  means,  a  sort  of  couch  or  plat- 
form on  which  they  could  lie.  Hannibal  him- 
self was  sick  too.  He  was  attacked  with  a  vio- 
lent inflammation  of  the  eyes,  and  the  sight  of 
one  of  them  was  in  the  end  destroyed.  He  was 
not,  however,  so  much  exposed  as  the  other 
officers ;  for  there  was  one  elephant  left  of  all 
those  that  had  commenced  the  march  in  Spain, 
and  Hannibal  rode  this  elephant  during  the  four 
days'  march  through  the  water.  There  were 
guides  and  attendants  to  precede  him,  for  the 
purpose,  of  finding  a  safe  and  practicable  road, 
and  by  their  aid,  with  the  help  of  the  animal's 
sasracitv.  he  got  safely  through. 


B.C.216.]  The  Dictator  Fabius.        163 

Alarm  at  Rome.  The  consul  Flaminnw. 


I 


Chapter  VIII. 

The   Dictator   Fabius. 

N  the  mean  time,  while  Hannibal  was  thus 
rapidly  making  his  way  toward  the  gates  of 
Rome,  the  people  of  the  city  became  more  and 
more  alarmed,  until  at  last  a  general  feeling  ^ 
of  terror  pervaded  all  the  ranks  of  society.  Cit-. 
izens  and  soldiers  were  struck  with  one  common 
dread.  They  had  raised  a  new  army  and  put 
it  under  the  command  of  a  new  consul,  for  the 
terms  of  service  of  the  others  had  expired. 
Flaminius  was  the  name  of  this  new  command- 
er, and  he  was  moving  northward  at  the  head 
of  his  forces  at  the  time  that  Hannibal  was  con- 
ducting his  troops  with  so  much  labor  and  diffi- 
culty through  the  meadows  and  morasses  of  the 
Arno. 

This  army  was,  however,  no  more  successful 
than  its  predscessors  had  been.  Hannibal  con- 
trived to  entrap  Flaminius  by  a  stratagem,  as 
he  had  entrapped  Sempronius  before.  There  is 
in  the  eastern  part  of  Etruria,  near  the  mount- 
ains, a  lake  called  Lake  Thrasymene.     It  hap- 


164  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

Another  stratagem.  Confidence  of  Flaminius 

pened  that  this  lake  extended  so  near  to  the 
base  of  the  mountains  as  to  leave  only  a  narrow 
passage  between — a  passage  but  little  wider 
than  was  necessary  for  a  road.  Hannibal  con- 
trived to  station  a  detachment  of  his  troops  in 
ambuscade  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains,  and 
others  on  the  declivities  above,  and  then  in  some 
way  or  other  to  entice  Flaminius  and  his  army 
through  the  defile.  Flaminius  was,  like  Sem- 
pronius,  ardent,  self-confident,  and  vain.  He 
despised  the  power  of  Hannibal,  and  thought 
that  his  success  hitherto  had  been  owing  to  the 
inefficiency  or  indecision  of  his  predecessors. 
For  his  part,  his  only  anxiety  was  to  encounter 
him,  for  he  was  sure  of  an  easy  victory.  He 
advanced,  therefore,  boldly  and  without  concern 
into  the  pass  of  Thrasymene,  when  he  learned 
that  Hannibal  was  encamped  beyond  it. 

Hannibal  had  established  an  encampment 
openly  on  some  elevated  ground  beyond  the  pass, 
and  as  Flaminius  and  his  troops  came  into  the 
narrowest  part  of  the  defile,  they  saw  this  en- 
campment at  a  distance  before  them,  with  a 
broad  plain  beyond  the  pass  intervening.  They 
supposed  that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  was 
there,  not  dreaming  of  the  presence  of  the  strong 
detachments  which  were  hid  on  the  slopes  of 


B.C.216.]  The   Dictator  Fabius.        165 

Complete  rout  of  the  Romans.  Effects  of  the  battle 

the  .mountains  above  them,  and  were  looking 
down  upon  them  at  that  very  moment  from  be- 
hind rocks  and  bushes.  When,  therefore,  the 
Romans  had  got  through  the  pass,  they  spread 
out  upon  the  plain  beyond  it,  and  were  advan- 
cing to  the  camp,  when  suddenly  the  secreted 
troops  burst  forth  from  their  ambuscade,  and, 
pouring  down  the  mountains,  took  complete  pos- 
session of  the  pass,  and  attacked  the  Romans  in 
the  rear,  while  Hannibal  attacked  them  in  the 
van.  Another  long,  and  desperate,  and  bloody 
contest  ensued.  The  Romans  were  beaten  at 
avery  point,  and,  as  they  were  hemmed  in  be- 
tween the  lake,  the  mountain,  and  the  pass, 
they  could  not  retreat;  the  army  was,  accord- 
ingly, almost  wholly  cut  to  pieces.  Flaminius 
himself  was  killed. 

The  news  of  this  battle  spread  every  where, 
and  produced  the  strongest  sensation.  Hanni- 
bal sent  dispatches  to  Carthage  announcing 
what  he  considered  his  final  victory  over  the 
great  foe,  and  the  news  was  received  with  the 
greatest  rejoicings.  At  Rome,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  news  produced  a  dreadful  shock  of  dis- 
appointment and  terror.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
last  hope  of  resisting  the  progress  of  their  terri- 
ble enemy  was  gone,  and  that  they  had  nothing 


166  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

Panic  of  the  Romans.  Their  superstitious  fears 

now  to  do  but  to  sink  down'in  despair,  and  await 
the  hour  when  his  columns  should  come  pour- 
ing in  through  the  gates  of  the  city. 

The  people  of  Rome  were,  in  fact,  prepared 
for  a  panic,  for  their  fears  had  been  increasing 
and  gathering  strength  for  some  time.  They 
were  very  superstitious  in  those  ancient  days 
in  respect  to  signs  and  omens.  A  thousand  tri- 
fling occurrences,  which  would,  at  the  present 
day,  be  considered  of  no  consequence  whatever, 
were  then  considered  bad  signs,  auguring  terri- 
ble calamities  ;  and,  on  occasions  like  these, 
when  calamities  seemed  to  be  impending,  ever} 
thing  was  noticed,  and  circumstances  which 
would  not  have  been  regarded  at  all  at  ordinary 
times,  were  reported  from  one  to  another,  the 
stories  being  exaggerated  as  they  spread,  until 
the  imaginations  of  the  people  were  filled  with 
mysterious  but  invincible  fears.  So  universal 
was  the  belief  in  these  prodigies  and  omens,  that 
they  were  sometimes  formally  reported  to  the 
senate,  committees  were  appointed  to  inquire 
ir.to  them,  and  solemn  sacrifices  were  offered  to 
"  expiate  them,"  as  it  was  termed,  that  is,  to 
avert  the  displeasure  of  the  gods,  which  the 
omens  were  supposed  to  foreshadow  and  portend. 

A  very  curious  list  of  these  omens  was  re 


B.C.216.]  The   Dictator  Fabius         167 

. |  . 

Omens  and  bad  signs.  Their  influence. 

ported  to  the  senate  during  the  winter  and 
spring  in  which  Hannibal  was  advancing  to- 
ward Rome.  An  ox  from  the  cattle-market 
had  got  into  a  house,  and,  losing  his  way,  had 
climbed  up  into  the  third  story,  and,  being  fright- 
ened by  the  noise  and  uproar  of  those  who  fol- 
lowed him,  ran  out  of  a  window  and  fell  down 
to  the  ground.  A  light  appeared  in  the  sky  in 
the  fcrm  of  ships.  A  temple  was  struck  with 
lightning.  A  spear  in  the  hand  of  a  statue  of 
Juno,  a  celebrated  goddess,  shook,  one  day,  of  it- 
self. Apparitions  of  men  in  white  garments 
were  seen  in  a  certain  place.  A  wolf  came  into 
a  camp,  and  snatched  the  sword  of  a  soldier  on 
guard  out  of  his  hands,  and  ran  away  with  it. 
The  sun  one  day  looked  smaller  than  usual. 
Two  moons  were  seen  together  in  the  sky.  This 
was  in  the  daytime,  and  one  of  the  moons  was 
doubtless  a  halo  or  a  white  cloud.  Stones  fell 
out  of  the  sky  at  a  place  called  Picenum.  This 
was  one  of  the  most  dreadful  of  all  the  omens, 
though  it  is  now  known  to  be  a  common  occur- 
rence. 

These  omens  were  all,  doubtless,  real  occur- 
rences, more  or  less  remarkable,  it  is  true,  but, 
of  course,  entirely  unmeaning  in  respect  to 
their  being  indications  of  impending  calamities 


L68  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

T . — 

Curious  transformations.  Importance  attached  to  these  stories 

There  were  other  things  reported  to  the  senate 
which  must  have  originated  almost  wholly  in 
the  imaginations  and  fears  of  the  observers. 
Two  shields,  it  was  said,  in  a  certain  camp, 
sweat  blood.  Some  people  were  reaping,  and 
bloody  ears  of  grain  fell  into  the  basket.  This, 
of  course,  must  have  been  wholly  imaginary, 
unless,  indeed,  one  of  the  reapers  had  cut  his 
fingers  with  the  sickle.  Some  streams  and 
fountains  became  bloody ;  and,  finally,  in  one 
place  in  the  country,  some  goats  turned  into 
sheep.  A  hen,  also,  became  a  cock,  and  a  cock 
changed  to  a  hen. 

Such  ridiculous  stories  would  not  be  worthy 
of  a  moment's  attention  now,  were  it  not  for  the 
degree  of  importance  attached  to  them  then. 
They  were  formally  reported  to  the  Roman  sen- 
ate, the  witnesses  who  asserted  that  they  had 
seen  them  were  called  in  and  examined,  and  a 
solemn  debate  was  held  on  the  question  what 
should  be  done  to  avert  the  supernatural  influ- 
ences of  evil  which  the  omens  expressed.  The 
senate  decided  to  have  three  days  of  expiation 
and  sacrifice,  during  which  the  whole  people  of 
Rome  devoted  themselves  to  the  religious  ob- 
servances which  they  thought  calculated  to  ap- 
pease the  wrath  of  Heaven.     They  made  van- 


RC.216.]  The   Dictator  Fabius.       169 

Feverish  excitement  at  Rome.  News  of  the  battle. 

ous  offerings  and  gifts  to  the  different  gods, 
among  which  one  was  a  golden  thunderbolt  of 
fifty  pounds'  weight,  manufactured  for  Jupiter, 
whom  they  considered  the  thunderer. 

All  these  things  took  place  before  the  battle 
at  Lake  Thrasymene,  so  that  the  whole  com- 
munity were  in  a  very  feverish  state  of  excite 
ment  and:  anxiety  before  the  news  from  Flamin- 
ius  arrived.  When  these  tidings  at  last  came, 
they  threw  the  whole  city  into  utter  consterna- 
tion. Of  course,  the  messenger  went  directly 
to  the  senate-house  to  report  to  the  government, 
but  the  story  that  such  news  had  arrived  soon 
spread  about  the  city,  and  the  whole  population 
crowded  into  the  streets  and  public  squares,  all 
eagerly  asking  for  the  tidings.  An  enormous 
throng  assembled  before  the  senate-house  call- 
ing for  information.  A  public  officer  appeared 
at  last,  and  said  to  them  in  a  loud  voice,  "  We 
have  been  defeated  in  a  great  battle."  He  would 
say  no  more.  Still  rumors  spread  from  one  to 
another,  until  it  was  generally  known  through- 
out the  city  that  Hannibal  had  conquered  the 
Roman  army  again  in  a  great  battle,  that  great 
numbers  of  the  soldiers  had  fallen  or  been  taken 
prisoners,  and  that  the  consul  himself  was  slain. 

The  night  was  passed  in  great  anxiety  and 


170  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

Gatherings  of  the  people.  Arrival  of  stragglers 

terror,  and  the  next  day,  and  for  several  of  the 
succeeding  days,  the  people  gathered  in  great 
numbers  around  the  gates,,  inquiring  eagerly  for 
news  of  every  one  that  came  in  from  the  coun- 
try. Pretty  soon  scattered  soldiers  and  small 
bodies  of  troops  began  to  arrive,  bringing  with 
them  information  of  the  battle,  each  one  having 
a  different  tale  to  tell,  according  to  his  own  in- 
dividual experience  in  the  scene.  Whenever 
these  men  arrived,  the  people  of  the  city,  and 
especially  the  women  who  had  husbands  or  sons 
in  the  army,  crowded  around  them,  overwhelm- 
ing them  with  questions,  and  making  them  tell 
their  tale  again  and  again,  as  if  the  intolerable 
suspense  and  anxiety  of  the  hearers  could  not 
be  satisfied.  The  intelligence  was  such  as  in 
general  to  confirm  and  increase  the  fears  of 
those  who  listened  to  it ;  but  sometimes,  when 
it  made  known  the  safety  of  a  husband  or  a  son, 
it  produced  as  much  relief  and  rejoicing  as  it 
did  in  other  cases  terror  and  despair.  That  ma- 
ternal love  was  as  strong  an  impulse  in  those 
rough  days  as  it  is  in  the  more  refined  and  culti- 
vated periods  of  the  present  age,  is  evinced  by 
the  fact  that  two  of  these  Roman  mothers,  on 
seeing  their  sons  coming  suddenly  into  theii 
presence,  alive  and  well,  when  they  had  heard 


B.C.  216.]  The   Dictatok  Fabius. 

171 

Appointment  of  a  dictator. 

Fabiua. 

that  they  had  fallen  in  battle,  were  killed  at 
once  by  the  shock  of  surprise  and  joy,  as  if  by  a 
blow. 

In  seasons  of  great  and  imminent  danger  to 
the  commonwealth,  it  was  the  custom  of  the 
Romans  to  appoint  what  they  called  a  dictator, 
that  is,  a  supreme  executive,  who  was  clothed 
with  absolute  and  unlimited  powers  ;  and  it  de- 
volved on  him  to  save  the  state  from  the  threat- 
ened ruin  by  the  most  prompt  and  energetic  ac- 
tion. This  case  was  obviously  one  of  the  emer- 
gencies requiring  such  a  measure.  There  was 
no  time  for  deliberations  and  debates  ;  for  delib- 
erations and  debates,  in  periods  of  such  excite- 
ment and  danger,  become  disputes,  and  end  in 
tumult  and  uproar.  Hannibal  was  at  the  head 
of  a  victorious  army,  ravaging  the  country  which 
he  had  already  conquered,  and  with  no  obstacle 
between  him  and  the  city  itself.  It  was  an 
emergency  calling  for  the  appointment  of  a  dic- 
tator. The  people  made  choice  of  a  man  of 
great  reputation  for  experience  and  wisdom, 
named  Fabius,  and  placed  the  whole  power  of 
the  state  in  his  hands.  All" other  authority  was 
suspended,  and  every  thing  was  subjected  to 
his  sway.  The  whole  city,  with  the  life  and 
property  of  every  inhabitant,  was  placed  at  his 


172  Hannibal.  [B.C.216 

Measures  of  Fabius.  Religious  ceremonies. 

disposal ;  the  army  and  the  fleets  were  also  un- 
der his  command,  even  the  consuls  being  sub- 
ject to  his  orders. 

Fabius  accepted  the  vast  responsibility  which 
his  election  imposed  upon  him,  and  immediately 
began  to  take  the  necessary  measures.  He  first 
made  arrangements  for  performing  solemn  re- 
ligious ceremonies,  to  expiate  the  omens  and 
propitiate  the  gods.  He  brought  out  all  the 
people  in  great  convocations,  and  made  them 
take  vows,  in  the  most  formal  and  imposing 
manner,  promising  offerings  and  celebrations  in 
honor  of  the  various  gods,  at  some  future  time, 
in  case  these  divinities  would  avert  the  threat- 
ening danger.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether 
Fabius,  in  doing  these  things,  really  believed 
that  they  had  any  actual  efficiency,  or  whether 
he  resorted  to  them  as  a  means  of  calming  and 
quieting  the  minds  of  the  people,  and  producing 
that  composure  and  confidence  which  always 
results  from  a  hope  of  the  favor  of  Heaven.  If 
this  last  was  his  object,  his  conduct  was  emi- 
nently wise. 

Fabius,  also,  immediately  ordered  a  large  levy 
of  troops  to  be  made.  His  second  in  command, 
called  his  master  of  horse,  was  directed  to  make 
this  Jovy,  and  .to  assemble  the  troops  at  a  place 


B.C.216.]  The  Dictator  Fabius.        173 

Minucius.  Supreme  authority  of  a  dictator. 

called  Tibur,  a  few  miles  east  of  the  city. 
There  was  always  a  master  of  horse  appointed 
to  attend  upon  and  second  a  dictator.  The 
name  of  this  officer  in  the  case  of  Fabius  was 
Minucius.  Minucius  was  as  ardent,  prompt, 
and  impetuous,  as  Fabius  was  cool,  prudent, 
and  calculating.  He  levied  the  troops  and 
brought  them  to  their  place  of  rendezvous.  Fa- 
bius went  out  to  take  the  command  of  them. 
One  of  the  consuls  was  coming  to  join  him,  with 
a  body  of  troops  which  he  had  under  his  com- 
mand. Fabius  sent  word  to  him  that  he  must 
come  without  any  of  the  insignia  of  his  author- 
ity, as  all  his  authority,  semi-regal  as  it  was  in 
ordinary  times,  was  superseded  and  overruled 
in  the  presence  of  a  dictator.  A  consul  was 
accustomed  to  move  in  great  state  on  all  occa- 
sions. He  was  preceded  by  twelve  men,  bear- 
ing badges  and  insignia,  to  impress  the  army 
and  the  people  with  a  sense  of  the  greatness  of 
his  dignity.  To  see,  therefore,  a  consul  divest- 
ed of  all  these  marks  of  his  power,  and  coming 
into  the  dictator's  presence  as  any  other  officer 
would  come  before  an  acknowledged  superior, 
made  the  army  of  Fabius  feel  a  very  strong 
sense  of  the  greatness  of  their  new  commander's 
dignity  and  power. 


174  Hannibal.  [B.C  216. 


•Proclamation  of  Fabius.  Progress  of  B  annibal. 

Fabius  then  issued  a  proclamation,  which  he 
sent  by  proper  messengers  into  all  the  region  oi 
country  around  Rome,  especially  to  that  part 
toward  the  territory  which  was  in  possession  of 
Hannibal.  In  this  proclamation  he  ordered  all 
the  people  to  abandon  the  country  and  the  towns 
which  were  not  strongly  fortified,  and  to  seek 
shelter  in  the  castles,  and  forts,  and  fortified 
cities.  They  were  commanded,  also,  to  lay 
waste  the  country  which  they  should  leave,  and 
destroy  all  the  property,  and  especially  all  the 
provisions,  which  they  could  not  take  to  their 
places  of  refuge.  This  being  done,  Fabius 
placed  himself  at  the  head  of  the  forces  which 
he  had  got  together,  and  moved  on,  cautiously 
and  with  great  circumspection,  in  search  of  his 
enemy. 

In  the  mean  time,  Hannibal  had  crossed  over 
to  the  eastern  side  of  Italy,  and  had  passed  down, 
conquering  and  ravaging  the  country  as  he  went, 
until  he  got  considerably  south  of  Rome.  He 
seems  to  have  thought  it  not  quite  prudent  to 
advance  to  the  actual  attack  of  the  city,  after 
the  battle  of  Lake  Thrasymene ;  for  the  vast 
oopulation  of  Rome  was  sufficient,  if  rendered 
desperate  by  his  actually  threatening  the  cap- 
ture and  pillage  of  the  city,  to  overwhelm  bis 


B.C.  216.]  The  Dictator  Fabius.        175 

Policy  of  Fabius.  He  declines  fighting 

army  entirely.  So  he  moved  to  the  eastward, 
and  advanced  on  that  side  until  he  had  passed 
the  city,  and  thus  it  happened  that  Fabius  had 
to  march  to  the  southward  and  eastward  in  or- 
der to  meet  him.  The  two  armies  came  in 
sight  of  each  other  quite  on  the  eastern  side  of 
Italy,  very  near  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  Sea. 

The  policy  which  Fabius  resolved  to  adopt 
was,  not  to  give  Hannibal  battle,  but  to  watch 
him,  and  wear  his  army  out  by  fatigue  and  de- 
lays. He  kept,  therefore,  near  him,  but  always 
posted  his  army  on  advantageous  ground,  which 
all  the  defiance  and  provocations  of  Hannibal 
could  not  induce  him  to  leave.  "When  Hanni- 
bal moved,  which  he  was  soon  compelled  to  do 
to  procure  provisions,  Fabius  would  move  too, 
but  only  to  post  and  intrench  himself  in  some 
place  of  security  as  before.  Hannibal  did  every 
thing  in  his  power  to  bring  Fabius  to  battle, 
but  "all  his  efforts  were  unavailing. 

In  fact,  he  himself  was  at  one  time  in  im- 
minent danger.  He  had  got  drawn,  by  Fabi- 
us's  good  management,  into  a  place  where  he 
was  surrounded  by  mountains,  upon  which  Fa- 
bius had  posted  his  troops,  and  there  was  only 
one  defile  which  offered  any  egress,  and  this, 
too,  Fabius  had  strongly  guarded.     Hannibal 


176 

Hannibal.             [B.C.  216. 

Hannibt 

il's  danger. 

Stratagem  of  the  fiery  oxen. 

resorted  to  his  usual  resource,  cunning  and 
stratagem,  for  means  of  escape.  He  collected 
a  herd  of  oxen.  He  tied  fagots  across  their 
horns,  filling  the  fagots  with  pitch,  so  as  to  make 
them  highly  combustible.  In  the  night  on  which 
he  was  going  to  attempt  to  pass  the  defile,  he 
ordered  his  army  to  be  ready  to  march  through , 
and  then  had  the  oxen  driven  up  the  hills 
around  on  the  further  side  of  the  Roman  de- 
tachment which  was  guarding  the  pass.  The 
fagots  were  then  lighted  on  the  horns  of  the 
oxen.  They  ran  about,  frightened  and  infuri- 
ated by  the  fire,  which  burned  their  horns  to 
the  quick,  and  blinded  them  with  the  sparks 
which  fell  from  it.  The  leaves  and  branches  of 
the  forests  were  set  on  fire.  A  great  commo- 
tion was  thus  made,  and  the  guards,  seeing  the 
moving  lights  and  hearing  the  tumult,  suppos- 
ed that  the  Carthaginian  army  were  upon  the 
heights,  and  were  coming  down  to  attack  them. 
They  turned  out  in  great  hurry  and  confusion 
to  meet  the  imaginary  foe,  leaving  the  pass  un- 
guarded, and,  while  they  were  pursuing  the 
bonfires  on  the  oxens'  heads  into  all  sorts  of  dan- 
gerous and  impracticable  places,  Hannibal  qui- 
etly marched  his  army  through  the  defile  and 
reached  a  place  of  safety. 


B.C.216.]  The   Dictator   Fabius.        177 

Unpopularity  of  Fabiua.  Hannibal's  sagacity 

Although  Fabius  kept  Hannibal  employed 
and  prevented  his  approaching  the  city,  still 
there  soon  began  to  be  felt  a  considerable  de- 
gree of  dissatisfaction  that  he  did  not  act  more 
decidedly,  fc  Minucius  was  continually  urging 
him  to  give  Hannibal  battle,  and,  not  being 
able  to  induce  him  to  do  so,  he  was  continually 
expressing  his  discontent  and  displeasure.  The 
army  sympathized  with  Minucius.  He  wrote 
home  to  Rome  too,  complaining  bitterly  .of  the 
dictator's  inefficiency.  Hannibal  learned  all 
this  by  means  of  his  spies,  and  other  sources  of 
information,  which  so  good  a  contriver  as  he 
has  always  at  command.  Hannibal  was,  of 
course,  very  much  pleased  to  hear  of  these  dis- 
sensions, and  of  the  unpopularity  of  Fabius. 
He  considered  such  an  enemy  as  he — so  pru- 
dent, cautious,  and  watchful — as  a  far  more 
dangerous  foe  than  such  bold  and  impetuous 
commanders  as  Flaminius  and  Minucius,  whom 
he  could  always  entice  into  difficulty,  and  then 
easily  conquer. 

Hannibal  thought  he  would  render  Minucius 
a  little  help  in  making  Fabius  unpopular.  He 
found  out  from  some  Roman  deserters  that 
the  dictator  possessed  a  valuable  farm  in  the 
country,  and  he  sent  a  detachment  of  his  troops 
M 


178  Hannibal.  [B.C.216 

Plots  against  Fabius.  He  goes  to  Rome, 

there,  with  orders  to  plunder  and  destroy  the 
property  all  around  it.  but  to  leave  the  farm  of 
Fabius  untouched  and  in  safety.  The  object 
was  to  give  to  the  enemies  of  Fabius  at  Rome 
occasion  to  say  that  there  was  secretly  a  good 
understanding  between  him  and  Hannibal,  and 
that  he  was  kept  back  from  acting  bolcjly  in 
defense  of  his  country  by  some  corrupt  bargain 
which  he  had  traitorously  made  with  the  enemy 

These  plans  succeeded.  Discontent  and  dis- 
satisfaction spread  rapidly,  both  in  the  camp 
and  in  the  city.  At  Rome  they  made  an  ur- 
gent demand  upon  Fabius  to  return,  ostensibly 
because  they  wished  him  to  take  part  in  some 
great  religious  ceremonies,  but  really  to  remove 
him  from  the  camp,  and  give  Minucius  an 
opportunity  to  attack  Hannibal.  They  aisc 
wished  to  devise  some  method,  if  possible,  of 
depriving  him  of  his  power.  He  had  been  ap- 
pointed for  six  months,  and  the  time  had  not 
yet  nearly  expired  ;  but  they  wished  to  shorten, 
or,  if  they  could  not  shorten,  to  limit  and  di- 
minish his  power. 

Fabius  went  to  Rome,  leaving  the  army  un- 
der the  orders  of  Minucius,  but  commanding 
him  positively  not  to  give  Hannibal  battle,  nor 
expose  his  troops  to  any  danger,  but  to  pursue 


JB.C.216.]  The   Dictator   Fabius.        179 

Minucius  risks  a  battle.  Speech  of  Fabius. 

steadily  the  same  policy  which  he  himself  had 
followed.  He  had,  however,  been  in  Rome  only 
a  short  time  before  tidings  came  that  Minucius 
had  fought  a  battle  and'gained  a  victory.  There 
were  boastful  and  ostentatious  letters  from  Mi- 
nucius to  the  Roman  senate,  lauding  the  ex- 
ploit which  he  had  performed. 

Fabius  examined  carefully  the  accounts.  He , 
compared  one  thing  with  another,  and  satisfied 
himself  of  what  afterward  proved  to  be  the  truth, 
that  Minucius  had  gained  no  victory  at  all.  He 
had  lost  five  or  six  thousand  men,  and  Hanni 
bal  had  lost  no  more,  and  Fabius  showed  that 
no  advantage  had  been  gained.  He  urged  upon 
the  senate  the  importance  of  adhering  to  the 
line  of  policy  he  had  pursued,  and  the  danger 
of  risking  every  thing,  as  Minucius  -had  done, 
on  the  fortunes  of  a  single  battle.  Besides>  he 
said,  Minucius  had  disobeyed  his  orders,  which 
were  distinct  and  positive,  and  he  deserved  to 
be  recalled. 

In  saying  these  things  Fabius  irritated  and 
exasperated  his  enemies  more  than  ever.  ' '  Here 
is  a  man,"  said  they,  "  who  will  not  only  not 
fight  the  enemies  whom  he  is  sent  against  him- 
self, but  fte  will  not  allow  any  body  else  to  fight 
them.     Even  at  this  distance,  when  his  second 


180  PIannibal.  [B.C.  216. 

Fabius  returns  to  the  arrny.  He  is  deprived  of  the  supreme  power 

in  command  has  obtained  a  victory,  he  will  not 
admit  it,  and  endeavors  to  curtail  the  advant- 
ages of  it.  He  wishes  to  protract  the  war,  that 
Lie  may  the  longer  continue  to  enjoy  the  su- 
preme and  unlimited  authority  with  which  we 
have  intrusted  him." 

The  hostility  to  Fabius  at  last  reached  such  a 
Ditch,  that  it  was  proposed  in  an  assembly  of  the 
people  to  make  Minucius  his  equal  in  command. 
Fabius,  having  finished  the  business  which  call- 
ed him  to  Rome,  did  not  wait  to  attend  to  the 
discussion  of  this  question,  but  left  the  city,  and 
was  proceeding  on  his  way  to  join  the  army  again, 
when  he  was  overtaken  with  a  messenger  bear- 
ing a  letter  informing  him  that  the  decree  had 
passed,  and  that  he  must  thenceforth  consider 
Minucius  as  his  colleague  and  equal.  Minu- 
cius was,  of  course,  extremely  elated  at  this  re- 
sult. "  Now,"  said  he,  "  we  will  see  if  some- 
thing can  not  be  done." 

The  first  question  was,  however,  to  decide  on 
what  principle  and  in  what  way  they  should 
share  their  power.  ' '  We  can  not  both  command 
at  once,"  said  Minucius.  "  Let  us  exercise  the 
power  ji  alternation,  each  one  being  in  author- 
ity for  a  day,  or  a  week,  or  a  month,  or  any 
other  period  that  you  prefer." 


B.C.216.]  The   Dictator   Fabius.        181 

Division  of  power.  Ambuscade  of  Hannibal 

"  No,"  replied  Fabius,  "  we  will  not  divide 
the  time,  we  will  divide  the  men.  There  are 
four  legions.  You  shall  take  two  of  them,  and 
the  other  two  shall  be  mine.  I  can  thus,  per- 
haps, save  half  the  army  from  the  dangers  in 
which  I  fear  your  impetuosity  will  plunge  all 
whom  you  have  under  your  command." 

This  plan  was  adopted.  The  army  was  di- 
vided, and  each  portion  went,  under  its  own  lead- 
er, to  its  separate  encampment.  The  result  was 
one  of  the  most  curious  and  extraordinary  oc- 
currences that  is  recorded  in  the  history  of  na- 
tions. Hannibal,  who  was  well  informed  of  all 
these  transactions,  immediately  felt  that  Minu- 
cius  was  in  his  power.  He  knew  that  he  was 
so  eager  for  battle  that  it  would  be  easy  to  en- 
tice him  into  it,  under  almost  any  circumstan- 
ces that  he  himself  might  choose  to  arrange. 
Accordingly,  he  watched  his  opportunity  when 
there  was  a  good  place  for  an  ambuscade  near 
Minucius's  camp,  and  lodged  five  thousand  men 
in  it  in  such  a  manner  that  they  were  concealed 
by  rocks  and  other  obstructions  to  the  view. 
There  was  a  hill  between  this  ground  and  the 
camp  of  Minucius.  When  the  ambuscade  was 
ready,  Hannibal  sent  up  a  small  force  to  take 
possession  of  the  top  of  the  hill,  anticipating 


L82  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

Hannibal's  success.  Fabius  comes  to  the  rescue. 

that  Minucius  would  at  once  send  up  a  strong- 
er force  to  drive  them  away.  He  did  so.  Han- 
nibal then  sent  up  mo're  as  a  re-enforcement. 
Minucius,  whose  spirit  and  pride  were  now 
aroused,  sent  up  more  still,  and  thus,  by  degrees, 
Hannibal  drew  out  his  enemy's  whole  force, 
and  then,  ordering  his  own  troops  to  retreat  be- 
fore them,  the  Romans  were  drawn  on,  down 
the  hill,  till  they  were  surrounded  by  the  am- 
buscade. These  hidden  troops  then  came  pour- 
ing out  upon  them,  and  in  a  short  time  the  Ro- 
mans were  thrown  into  utter  confusion,  flying 
in  all  directions  before  their  enemies,  and  en- 
tirely at  their  mercy. 

All  would  have  been  irretrievably  lost  had  it 
not  been  for  the  interposition  of  Fabius.  He 
received  intelligence  of  the  danger  at  his  own 
camp,  and  marched  out  at  once  with  all  his 
force,  and  arrived  upon  the  ground  so  oppor- 
tunely, and  acted  so  efficiently,  that  he  at  once 
completely  changed  the  fortune  of  the  day.  He 
saved  Minucius  and  his  half  of  the  army  from 
utter  destruction.  The  Carthaginians  retreat- 
ed in  their  turn,  Hannibal  being  entirely  over- 
whelmed with  disappointment  and  vexation  at 
being  thus  deprived  of  his  prey.  History  relates 
that  Minucius  had  the  candor  and  good  sense, 


B.C..216.]   The  Dictator  Fabius.        183 

Speech  of  Minucius.  The  Roman  army  again  united. 

after  this,  to  acknowledge  his  error,  and  yield  to 
the  guidance  and  direction  of  Fabius.  He  call- 
ed his  part  of  the  army  together  when  they 
reached  their  camp,  and  addressed  them  thus : 
"  Fellow-soldiers,  I  have  often  heard  it  said  that 
the  wisest  men  are  those  who  possess  wisdom 
and  sagacity  themselves,  and,  next  to  them, 
those  who  know  how  to  perceive  and  are  will- 
ing to  be  guided  by  the  wisdom  and  sagacity 
of  others  ;  while  they  are  fools  who  do  not  know 
how  to  conduct  themselves,  and  will  not  be 
guided  by  those  who  do.  We  will  not  belong 
to  this  last  class  ;  and  since  it  is  proved  that  we 
are  not  entitled  to  rank  with  the  first,  let  us 
join  the  second.  We  will  march  to  the  camp 
of  Fabius,  and  join  our  camp  with  his,  as  before. 
We  owe  to  him,  and  also  to  all  his  portion  of 
the  army,  our  eternal  gratitude  for  the  noble- 
ness of  spirit  which  he  manifested  in  coming  to 
our  deliverance,  when  he  might  so  justly  have 
left  us  to  ourselves." 

The  two  legions  repaired,  accordingly,  to  the 
camp  of  Fabius,  and  a  complete  and  permanent 
reconciliation  took  place  between  the  two  divis- 
ions of  the  army.  Fabius  rose  very  high  in  the 
general  esteem  by  this  transaction.  The  term 
of  his  dictatorship,  however,  expired  soon  aftei 


184  Hannibal.  [B.C.  216 

Character  of  Fabius.  Hia  integrity. 

this,  and  as  the  danger  from  Hannibal  was  now 
less  imminent,  the  office  was  not  renewed,  but 
consuls  were  chosen  as  before. 

The  character  of  Fabius  has  been  regarded 
with  the  highest  admiration  by  all  mankind. 
He  evinced  a  very  noble  spirit  in  all  that  he 
did.  One  of  his  last  acts  was  a  very  striking 
proof  of  this.  He  had  bargained  with  Hanni- 
bal to  pay  a  certain  sum  of  money  as  ransom 
for  a  number  of  prisoners  which  had  fallen  into 
his  hands,  and  whom  Hannibal,  on  the  faith  of 
that  promise,  had  released.  Fabius  believed 
that  the  Romans  would  readily  ratify  the  treaty 
and  pay  the  amount;  but  they  demurred,  be- 
ing displeased,  or  pretending  to  be  displeased, 
because  Fabius  had  not  consulted  them  before 
making  the  arrangement.  Fabius,  in  order  to 
preserve  his  own  and  his  country's  faith  unsul- 
lied, sold  his  farm  to  raise  the  money.  He  did 
thus  most  certainly  protect  and  vindicate  his 
own  honor,  but  he  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
saved  that  of  the  people  of  Rome. 


B.C.  215.]    Battle  of  Cannje.  18S 

Interest  excited  by  the  battle  of  Cannae.        Various  military  operations, 


Chapter   IX. 

The   Battle   of  Cannes: 

nPIHE  battle  of  Cannse  was  the  last  great  bai- 
-*-  tie  fought  by  Hannibal  in  Italy.  This  con- 
flict has  been  greatly  celebrated  in  history,  not 
only  for  its  magnitude,  and  the  terrible  despera- 
tion with  which  it  was  fought,  but  also  on  ac- 
count of  the  strong  dramatic  interest  which  the 
circumstances  attending  it  are  fitted  to  excite. 
This  interest  is  perhaps,  however,  quite  as  much 
due  to  the  peculiar  skill  of  the  ancient  historian 
who  narrates  the  story,  as  to  the.  events  them- 
selves which  he  records. 

It  was  about  a  year  after  the  close  of  the  dic- 
tatorship of  Fabius  that  this  battle  was  fought. 
That  interval  had  been  spent  by  the  Roman 
consuls  who  were  in  office  during  that  time  in 
various  military  operations,  which  did  not,  how- 
ever, lead  to  any  decisive  results.  In  the  mean 
time,  there  were  great  uneasiness,  discontent, 
and  dissatisfaction  at  Rome.  To  have  such  a 
dangerous  and  terrible  foe,  at  the  head  of  forty 
thousand  men,  infesting  the  vicinage  of  then 


186  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215. 

State  of  the  public  mind  at  Rome.  The  plebeians  and  patricians 

city,  ravaging  the  territories  of  their  friends  and 
allies,  and  threatening  continually  to  attack  the 
city  itself,  was  a  continual  source  of  anxiety 
and  vexation.  It  mortified  the  Roman  pride, 
too,  to  find  that  the  greatest  armies  they  could 
raise,  and  the  ablest  generals  they  could  choose 
and  commission,  proved  wholly  unable  to  cope 
with  the  foe.  The  most  sagacious  of  them,  in 
fact,  had  felt  it  necessary  to  decline  the  contes* 
with  him  altogether. 

This  state  of  things  produced  a  great  deal  of 
ill  humor  in  the  city.  Party  spirit  ran  very 
high ;  tumultuous  assemblies  were  held ;  dis- 
putes and  contentions  prevailed,  and  mutual 
criminations  and  recriminations  without  end. 
There  were  two  great  parties  formed :  that  of 
the  middling  classes  on  one  side,  and  the  aris- 
tocracy on  the  other.  The  former  were  called 
the  Plebeians,  the  latter  the  Patricians.  The 
division  between  these  two  classes  was  very 
great  and  very  strongly  marked.  There  was, 
in  consequence  of  it,  infinite  difficulty  in  the 
election  of  consuls.  At  last  the  consuls  were 
chosen,  one  from  each  party.  The  name  of  the 
patrician  was  Paulus  iEmilius.  The  name  of 
the  plebeian  was  Varro.  They  were  inducted 
into  office,  and  were  thus  put  jointly  into  pos- 


B.C. 215.]     Battle  of  Cannae.  187 

The  consuls  iEmilius  and'  Varro.  A  new  army  raised. 

session  of  a  vast  power,  to  wield  which  with 
any  efficiency  and  success  would  seem  to  re- 
quire union  and  harmony  in  those  who  held  it. 
and  yet  .ZEmilius  and  Varro  were  inveterate 
and  implacable  political  foes.  It  was  often  so 
in  the  Roman  government.  The  consulship 
was  a  double-headed  monster,  which  spent  half 
its  strength  in  bitter  contests  waged  between 
its  members. 

The  Romans  determined  now  to  make  an 
eifectual  effort  to  rid  themselves  of  their  foe. 
They  raised  an  enormous  army.  It  consisted 
of  eight  legions.  The  Roman  legion  was  an 
army  of  itself.  It  contained  ordinarily  four 
thousand  foot  soldiers,  and  a  troop  of  three 
hundred  horsemen.  It  was  very  unusual  to 
have  more  than  two  or  three  legions  in  the  field 
at  a  time.  The  Romans,  however,  on  this  oc- 
casion, increased  the  number  of  the  legions,  and 
also  augmented  their  size,  so  that  they  contain- 
ed, each,  five  thousand  infantry  and  four  hund- 
red cavalry.  They  were  determined  to  make 
a  great  and  last  effort  to  defend  their  city,  and 
save  the  commonwealth  from  ruin.  ^Emilius 
and  Varro  prepared  to  take  command  of  this 
great  force,  with  very  strong  determinations  to 
make  it  the  means  of  Hannibal's  destruction. 


188  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215 

Self-confidence  of  Varro.  Caution  of  jEmilius 

The  characters  of  the  two  commanders,  how- 
ever, as  well  as  their  political  connections,  were 
very  dissimilar,  and  they  soon  began  to  mani- 
fest a  very  different  spirit,  and  to  assume  a 
very  different  air  and  bearing,  each  from  the 
other.  iEmilius  was  a  friend  of  Fabius,  and 
approved  of  his  policy.  Varro  was  for  greater 
promptness  and  decision.  He  made  great  prom- 
ises, and  spoke  with  the  utmost  confidence  of 
being  able  to  annihilate  Hannibal  at  a  blow. 
He  condemned  the  policy  of  Fabius  in  attempt- 
ing to  wear  out  the  enemy  by  delays.  He  said 
it  was  a  plan  of  the  aristocratic  party  to  pro- 
tract the  war,  in  order  to  put  themselves  in 
high  offices,  and  perpetuate  their  importance 
and  influence.  The  war  might  have  been  end- 
ed long  ago,  he  said ;  and  he  would  promise  the 
people  that  he  would  now  end  it,  without  fail, 
the  very  day  that  he  came  in  sight  of  Hannibal. 

As  for  JEmilius,  he  assumed  a  very  different 
tone.  He  was  surprised,  he  said,  that  any  man 
could  pretend  to  decide  before  he  had  even  left 
the  city,  and  while  he  was,  of  course,  entirely 
ignorant,  both  of  the  condition  of  their  own 
army,  and  of  the  position,  and  designs,  and 
strength  of  the  enemy,  how  soon  and  under 
what  circumstances  it  would'  be  wise  to  give 


B.C.215.J     Battle   of   Cannae.  189 

Views  of  iEmilius.  Counsel  of  Fabius. 

him  battle.  Plans  must  be  formed  in  adaptation 
to  circumstances,  as  circumstances  can  not  be 
made  to  alter  to  suit  plans.  He  believed  that 
they  should  succeed  in  the  encounter  with 
Hannibal,  but  he  thought  that  their  only  hope 
of  success  must  be  based  on  the  exercise  of 
prudence,  caution,  and  sagacity;  he  was  sure 
that  rashness  and  folly  could  only  lead  in  fu- 
ture, as  they  had  always  done  in  the  past,  to 
discomfiture  and  ruin. 

It  is  said  that  Fabius,  the  former  dictator, 
conversed  with  iEmilius  before  his  departure 
for  the  army,  and  gave  him  such  counsel  as  his 
age  and  experience,  and  his  knowledge  of  the 
character  and  operations  of  Hannibal,  snggest- 
ed  to  his  mind.  "  If  you  had  a  colleague  like 
yourself,"  said  he,  "I  would  not  offer  you  any 
advice ;  you  would  not  need  it.  Or,  if  you 
were  yourself  like  your  colleague,  vain,  self- 
conceited,  and  presumptuous,  then  I  would  be 
silent;  counsel  would  be  thrown  away  upon 
you.  But  as  it  is,  while  you  have  great  judg- 
ment and  sagacity  to  guide  you,  you  are  to  be 
placed  in  a  situation  of  extreme  difficulty  and 
peril.  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty you  will  have  to  encounter  will  not  be  the 
open  enemy  you  are  going  to  meet  upon  the 


190  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215. 

Conversation  between  Fabius  and  iEmilius. 

field.  You  will  find,  1  think,  that  Varro  will 
give  you  quite  as  much  trouble  as  Hannibal 
He  will  be  presumptuous,  reckless,  and  head 
strong.  He  will  inspire  all  the  rash  and  ardent 
young  men  in  the  army  with  his  own  enthusi- 
astic folly,  and  we  shall  be  very  fortunate  if 
we  do  not  yet  see  the  terrible  and  bloody  scenes 
of  Lake  Thrasymene  acted  again.  I  am  sure 
that  the  true  policy  for  us  to  adopt  is  the  one 
which  I  marked  out.  That  is  always  the  proper 
course  for  the  invaded  to  pursue  with  invaders, 
where  there  is  the  least  doubt  of  the  success  of 
a  battle.  We  grow  strong  while  Hannibal 
grows  continually  weaker  by  delay.  He  can 
only  prosper  so  long  as  he  can  fight  battles  and 
perform  brilliant  exploits.  If  we  deprive  him 
of  this  power,  his  strength  will  be  continually 
wasting  away,  and  the  spirit  and  courage  of 
his  men  waning.  He  has  now  scarce  a  third 
part  of  the  army  which  he  had  when  he  crossed 
the  Iberus,  and  nothing  can  save  this  remnant 
from  destruction  if  we  are  wise." 

.ZEmilius  said,  in  reply  to  this,  that  he  went 
into  the  contest  with  very  little  of  encourage- 
ment or  hope.  If  Fabius  had  found  it  so  diffi- 
cult to  withstand  the  turbulent  influences  of 

P 
bis  master  of  horse,  who  was  his  subordinate 


B.C. 215.]    Battle   of   Cannae.  191 

Resolution  of  iEmilius.  The  consuls  join  the  army, 

officer,  and,  as  such,  under  his  command,  how 
could  he  expect  to  restrain  his  colleague,  who 
was  entitled,  by  his  office,  to  full  equality  with 
him.  But,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  which 
he  foresaw,  he  was  going  to  do  his  duty,  and 
abide  by  the  result ;  and  if  the  result  should  be 
unfavorable,  he  should  seek  for  death  in  the  con- 
flict, for  death  by  Carthaginian  spears  was  a  far 
lighter  evil,  in  his  view,  than  the  displeasure 
and  censures  of  his  countrymen. 

The  consuls  departed  from  Rome  to  join  the 
army,  iEmilius  attended  by  a  moderate  number 
of  men  of  rank  and  station,  and  Varro  by  a  much 
larger  train,  though  it  was  formed  of  people  of 
the  lower  classes  of  society.  The  army  was  or- 
ganized, and  the  arrangements  of  the  encamp- 
ments perfected.  One  ceremony  was  that  of  ad 
ministering  an  oath  to  the  soldiers,  as  was  usu 
al  in  the  Roman  armies  at  the  commencement 
of  a  campaign.  They  were  made  to  swear  that 
they  would  not  desert  the  army,  that  they  would 
never  abandon  the  post  at  which  they  were  sta- 
tioned in  fear  or  in  flight,  nor  leave  the  ranks  ex- 
cept for  the  purpose  of  taking  up  or  recovering 
a  weapon,  striking  an  enemy,  or  protecting  a 
friend.  These  and  other  arrangements  being 
completed,  the  army  was  ready  for  the  field. 


L92  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215 

Situation  of  Hannibal.  Scarcity  of  food. 

The  consuls  made  a  different  arrangement  in 
respect  to  the  division  of  their  power  from  that 
adopted  by  Fabius  and  Flaminius.  It  was 
agreed  between  them  that  they  would  exercise 
their  common  authority  alternately,  each  for  a 
day. 

In  the  mean  time,  Hannibal  began  to  find  him- 
self reduced  to  great  difficulty  in  obtaining  pro- 
visions for  his  men.  The  policy  of  Fabius  had 
been  so  far  successful  as  to  place  him  in  a  very 
embarrassing  situation,  and  one  growing  more 
and  more  embarrassing  every  day.  He  could 
obtain  no  food  except  what  he  got  by  plunder, 
and  there  was  now  very  little  opportunity  for 
that,  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  had  car- 
ried off  all  the  grain  and  deposited  it  in  strong- 
ly-fortified towns  ;  and  though  Hannibal  had 
great  confidence  in  his  power  to  cope  with  the 
Roman  army  in  a  regular  battle  on  an  open 
field,  he  had  not  strength  sufficient  to  reduce 
citadels  or  attack  fortified  camps.  His  stock 
of  provisions  had  become,  therefore,  more  and 
more  nearly  exhausted,  until  now  he  had  a  sup- 
ply for  only  ten  days,  and  he  saw  no  possible 
mode  of  increasing  it. 

His  great  object  was,  there/ore,  to  bring  on 
a  battle.     Varro  was  ready  and  willing  to  give 


B.0.215.]    Battle  op  Cannjj.  193 

Sufferings  of  Hannibal's  troops.  Defeat  of  a  foraging  party. 

him  battle,  but  iEmilius,  or,  to  call  him  by  his 
name  in  full,  Paulus  ^Emilius,  which  is  the  ap- 
pellation by  which  he  is  more  frequently  known, 
was  very  desirous  to  persevere  in  the  Fabian 
policy  till  the  ten  days  had  expired,  after  which 
he  knew  that  Hannibal  must  be  reduced  to  ex- 
treme distress,  and  might  have  to  surrender  at 
once  to  save  his  army  from  actual  famine.  In 
fact,  it  was  said  that  the  troops  were  on  such 
short  allowance  as  to  produce  great  discontent, 
and  that  a  large  body  of  Spaniards  were  pre- 
paring to  desert  and  go  over  together  to  the  Ro- 
man camp. 

Things  were  in  this  state,  when,  one  day, 
Hannibal  sent  out  a  party  from  his  camp  to  pro- 
cure food,  and  ^Emilius,  who  happened  to  hold 
the  command  that  day,  sent  out  a  strong  force 
to  intercept  them.  He  was  successful.  The 
Carthaginian  detachment  was  routed.  Nearly 
two  thousand  men  were  killed,  and  the  rest  fled, 
by  any  roads  they  could  find,  back  Jo  Hanni- 
bal's camp.  Varro  was  very  eager  to  follow 
them  there,  but  ^Emilius  ordered  his  men  to 
halt.  He  was  afraid  of  some  trick  or  treachery 
on  the  part  of  Hannibal,  and  was  disposed  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  victory  he  had  already  won. 

This  little  success,  however,  only  inflamed 
N 


L94  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215 

Hannibal's  pretended  abandonment  of  his  camp. 

Varro's  ardor  for  a  battle,  and  produced  a  gen« 
eral  enthusiasm  in  the  Roman  army  ;  and,  a  day 
or  two  afterward,  a  circumstance  occurred  which 
raised  this  excitement  to  the  highest  pitch. 
Some  reconnoiterers,  who  had  been  stationed 
within  sight  of  Hannibal's  camp  to  watch  the 
motions  and  indications  there,  sent  in  word  to 
the  consuls  that  the  Carthaginian  guards  around 
their  encampment  had  all  suddenly  disappeared, 
and  that  a  very  extraordinary  and  unusual  si 
lence  reigned  within.  Parties  of  the  Roman 
soldiers  went  up  gradually  and  cautiously  to 
the  Carthaginian  lines,  and  soon  found  that  the 
camp  was  deserted,  though  the  fires  were  still 
burning  and  the  tents  remained.  This  intelli- 
gence, of  course,  put  the  whole  Roman  army 
into  a  fever  of  excitement  and  agitation.  They 
crowded  around  the  consuls'  pavilions,  and  clam- 
orously insisted  on  being  led  on  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  camp,  and  to  pursue  the  enemy. 
"  He  has^fled,"  they  said,  "  and  with  such  pre- 
cipitation that  he  has  left  the  tents  standing  and 
his  fires  still  burning.  Lead  us  on  in  pursuit 
of  him." 

Varro  was  as  much  excited  as  the  rest.  He 
was  eager  for  action.  iEmilius  hesitated.  Ho 
made  particular  inquiries      He  said  they  ought 


B.(i215.]    Battle   of   Cannes.  IBh 


Mission  of  Statilius.  The  stratagem  discovered 

to  proceed  with  caution.  Finally,  he  called  up 
a  certain  prudent  and  sagacious  officer,  named 
Statilius,  and  ordered  him  to  take  a  small  body 
of  horsemen,  ride  over  to  the  Carthaginian  camp, 
ascertain  the  facts  exactly,  and  report  the  re- 
sult. Statilius  did  so.  "When  he  reached  the 
lines  he  ordered  his  troops  to  halt,  and  took 
with  him  two  horsemen  on  whose  courage  and 
strength  he  could  rely,  and  rode  in.  The  three 
horsemen  rode  around  the  camp  and  examined 
every  thing  with  a  view  of  ascertaining  whether 
Hannibal  had  really  abandoned  his  position  and 
fled,  or  whether  some  stratagem  was  intended. 
When  he  came  back  he  reported  to  the  army 
that,  in  his  opinion,  the  desertion  of  the  camp 
was  not  real,  but  a  trick  to  draw  the  Romans 
into  some  difficulty.  The  fires  were  the  larg- 
est on  the  side  toward  the  Romans,  which  indi- 
cated that  they  were  built  to  deceive.  He  saw 
money,  too,  and  other  valuables  strewed  about 
upon  the  ground,  which  appeared  to  him  much 
more  like  a  bait  set  in  a  trap,  than  like  property 
abandoned  by  fugitives  as  incumbrances  to  flight. 
Varro  was  not  convinced ;  and  the  army,  hear- 
ing of  the  money,  were  excited  to  a  greater  ea- 
gerness for  plunder.  They  could  hardly  be  re- 
strained.    Just  then,  however,  two  slaves  that 


196  Hannibal.  [B.C.^15 

Chagrin  of  Hannibal  and  the  Romans.  Apulia, 

had  been  taken  prisoners  by  the  Carthaginians 
some  time  before,  came  into  the  Roman  camp. 
They  told  the  consuls  that  the  whole  Cartha- 
ginian force  was  hid  in  ambush  very  near,  wait- 
ing for  the  Romans  to  enter  their  encampment, 
when  they  were  going  to  surround  them  and 
cut  them  to  pieces.  In  the  bustle  and  move- 
ment attendant  on  this  plan,  the  slaves  had  es- 
caped. Of  course,  the  Roman  army  were  now 
satisfied.  They  returned,  chagrined  and  dis- 
appointed, to  their  own  quarters,  and  Hannibal, 
still  more  chagrined  and  disappointed,  returned 
to  his. 

He  soon  found,  however,  that  he  could  not 
remain  any  longer  where  he  was.  His  provis- 
ions were  exhausted,  and  he  could  obtain  no 
more.  The  Romans  would  not  come  out  of 
their  encampment  to  give  him  battle  on  equal 
terms,  and  they  were  too  strongly  intrenched 
to  be  attacked  where  they  were.  He  determ- 
ined, therefore,  to  evacuate  that  part  of  the  coun- 
try, and  move,  by  a  sudden  march,  into  Apulia. 

Apulia  was  on  the  eastern  side  of  Italy.  The 
River  Aufidus  runs  through  it,  having  a  town 
named  CannsB  near  its  mouth.  The  region  of 
the  Aufidus  was  a  warm  and  sunny  valley, 
which  was  now  waving  with  ripening  grain 


B.C. 215.]    Battle   of   Cannae.  i(JT 

Hannibal  marches  into  Apulia.  The  Romans  follow  him. 

Being  further  south  than  the  place  where  he 
had  been,  and  more  exposed  to  the  influence  of 
the  sun,  Hannibal  thought  that  the  crops  would 
be  sooner  ripe,  and  that,  at  least,  he  should  have 
a  new  field  to  plunder. 

He  accordingly  decided  now  to  leave  his  camp 
in  earnest,  and  move  into  Apulia.  He  made 
the  same  arrangements  as  before,  when  his  de- 
parture was  a  mere  pretense.  He  left  tents 
pitched  and  fires  burning,  but  marched  hh 
army  off  the  ground  by  night  and  secretly,  so 
that  the  Romans  did  not  perceive  his  departure  ; 
and  the  next  day,  when  they  saw  the  appear- 
ances of  silence  and  solitude  about  the  camp, 
they  suspected  another  deception,  and  made  no 
move  themselves.  At  length,  however,  intel- 
ligence came  that  the  long  columns  of  Hanni- 
bal's army  had  been  seen  already  far  to  the 
eastward,  and  moving  on  as  fast  as  possible, 
with  all  their  baggage.  The  Romans,  after 
much  debate  and  uncertainty,  resolved  to  fol- 
low. The  eagles  of  the  Apennines  looked  down 
upon  the  two  great  moving  masses,  creeping 
slowly  along  through  the  forests  and  valleys, 
like  swarms  of  insects,  one  following  the  other, 
led  on  by  a  strange  but  strong  attraction,  draw- 
ing them  toward  each  other  when  at  a  distance, 


198  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215 

The  new  encampments.  Dissensions  between  the  consuls 

but  kept  asunder  by  a  still  stronger  repulsion 
when  near. 

The  Roman  army  came  up  with  that  of  Han- 
nibal on  the  River  Aufidus,  near  Cannae,  and 
the  two  vast  encampments  were  formed  with 
all  the  noise  and  excitement  attendant  on  the 
movements  of  two  great  armies  posting  them- 
selves on  the  eve  of  a  battle,  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  each  other.  In  the  Roman  camp,  the 
cwnfusion  was  greatly  aggravated  by  the  angry 
disputes  which  immediately  arose  between  the 
consuls  and  their  respective  adherents  as  to  the 
course  to  be  pursued.  Varro  insisted  on  giv- 
ing the  Carthaginians  immediate  battle.  ^Emil- 
ius  refused.  Varro  said  that  he  must  protest 
against  continuing  any  longer  these  inexcusa- 
ble delays,  and  insist  on  a  battle.  He  could 
not  consent  to  be  responsible  any  further  for 
allowing  Italy  to  lie  at  the  mercy  of  such  a 
scourge.  iEmilius  replied,  that  if  Varro  did 
precipitate  a  battle,  he  himself  protested  against 
his  rashness,  and  could  not  be,  in  any  degree, 
responsible  for  the  result.  The  various  officers 
took  sides,  some  with  one  consul  and  some  with 
the  other,  but  most  with  Varro.  The  dissension 
filled  the  camp  with  excitement,  agitation,  and 
ill  will. 


B.C.  215.]     Battle   of   Can-n^e.             199 
. » 

Flight  of  the  inhabitants.  Maneuveis. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country  into  which  these  two  vast  hordes  of 
ferocious,  though  restrained  and  organized  com- 
batants, had  made  such  a  sudden  irruption, 
were  flying  as  fast  as  they  could  from  the  aw- 
ful scene  which  they  expected  was  to  ensue. 
They  carried  from  their  villages  and  cabins 
what  little  property  could  be  saved,  and  took 
the  women  and  children  away  to  retreats  and 
fastnesses,  wherever  they  imagined  they  could 
find  temporary  concealment  or  protection.  The 
news  of  the  movement  of  the  two  armies  spread 
throughout  the  country,  carried  by  hundreds  ol 
refugees  and  messengers,  and  all  Italy,  looking 
on  with  suspense  and  anxiety,  awaited  the  result. 

The  armies  maneuvered  for  a  day  or  two, 
Varro,  during  his  term  of  command,  making 
arrangements  to  promote  and  favor  an  action, 
and  iEmilius,  on  the  following  day,  doing  every 
thing  in  his  power  to  prevent  it.  In  the  end, 
Varro  succeeded.  The  lines  were  formed  and 
the  battle  must  be  begun.  iEmilius  gave  up 
the  contest  now,  and  while  he  protested  earnest- 
ly against  the  course  which  Varro  pursued,  he 
prepared  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  a  de- 
feat, since  there  was  no  longer  a  possibility  of 
avoiding  a  collision. 


200  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215. 

£ , 

The  battle  of  Cannee.  Another  stratagem. 

The  battle  began,  and  the  reader  must  imag- 
ine the  scene,  since  no  pen  can  describe  it.  Fif- 
ty thousand  men  on  one  side  and  eighty  thou- 
sand on  the  other,  at  work  hard  and  steadily, 
for  six  hours,  killing  each  other  by  every  possi 
ble  means  of  destruction — stabs,  blows,  strug- 
gles, outcries,  shouts  of  anger  and  defiance,  and 
screams  of  terror  and  agony,  all  mingled  to- 
gether, in  one  general  din,  which  covered  the 
whole  country  for  an  extent  of  many  miles,  all 
together  constituted  a  scene  of  horror  of  which 
none  but  those  who  have  witnessed  great  battles 
can  form  any  adequate  idea. 

It  seems  as  if  Hannibal  could  do  nothing 
without  stratagem.  In  the  early  part  of  this 
conflict  he  sent  a  large  body  of  his  troops  over 
to  the  Romans  as  deserters.  They  threw  down 
their  spears  and  bucklers,  as  they  reached  the 
Roman  lines,  in  token  of  surrender.  The  Ro- 
mans received  them,  opened  a  passage  for  them 
through  into  the  rear,  and  ordered  them  to  re- 
main there.  As  they  were  apparently  unarm- 
ed, they  left  only  a  very  small  guard  to  keep 
them  in  custody.  The  men  had,  however.,  dag- 
gers concealed  about  their  dress,  and,  watching 
a  favorable  moment,  in  the  midst  of  the  battle, 
they  sprang  to  their  feet,  drew  out  their  woap- 


B.C.215.]     Battle  of  Cannjj.  201 

Defeat  of  the  Romans.  JEmilius  wounded. 

ons,  broke  away  from  their  guard,  and  attacked 
the  Romans  in  the  rear  at  a  moment  when  they 
were  so  pressed  by  the  enemy  in  front  that  they 
could  scarcely  maintain  their  ground. 

It  was  evident  before  many  hours  that  the 
Roman  forces  were  every  where  yielding.  From 
slowly  and  reluctantly  yielding  they  soon  began 
to  fly.  In  the  flight,  the  weak  and  the  wound- 
ed were  trampled  under  foot  by  the  throng  who 
were  pressing  on  befiind  them,  or  were  dispatch- 
ed by  wanton  blows  from  enemies  as  they  pass- 
ed in  pursuit  of  those  who  were  still  able  to  fly. 
In  the  midst  of  this  scene,  a  Roman  officer  nam- 
ed Lentulus,  as  he  was  riding  away,  saw  before 
him  at  the  road-side  another  officer  wounded, 
sitting  upon  a  stone,  faint  and  bleeding.  He 
stopped  when  he  reached  him,  and  found  that  it 
was  the  consul  .ZEmilius.  He  had  been  wound- 
ed in  the  head  with  a  sling,  and  his  strength 
was  almost  gone.  Lentulus  offered  him  his 
horse,  and  urged  him  to  take  it  and  fly.  iEmil- 
ius  declined  the  offer.  He  said  it  was  too  late 
for  his  life  to  be  saved,  and  that,  besides,  he  had 
no  wish  to  save  it.  "  Go  on,  therefore,  your- 
self," said  he,  "  as  fast  as  you  can.  Make  the 
best  of  your  way  to  Rome.  Tell  the  authorities 
there,  from  me,  that  a]l  is  lost,  and  they  must 


202  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215 

Death  of  jEmilius.  Escape  of  Varro 

do  whatever  they  can  themselves  for  the  defense 
of  the  city.  Make  all  the  speed  you  can,  or 
Hannibal  will  be  at  the  gates  before  you." 

^Emilius  sent  also  a  message  to  Fabius,  de- 
claring to  him  that  it  was  not  his  fault  that  a 
battle  had  been  risked  with  Hannibal.  He  had 
done  all  in  his  power,  he  said,  to  prevent  it,  and 
had  adhered  to  the  policy  which  Fabius  hfn 
recommended  to  the  last.  Lentulus  having^re- 
ceived  these  messages,  and  perceiving  that  the 
Carthaginians  were  close  upon  him  in  pursuit, 
rode  away,  leaving  the  consul  to  his  fate.  The 
Carthaginians  came  on,  and,  on  seeing  the 
wounded  man,  they  thrust  their  spears  into  his 
body,  one  after  another,  as  they  passed,  until 
his  limbs  ceased  to  quiver.  As  for  the  other 
consul,  Varro,  he  escaped  with  his  life.  At- 
tended by  about  seventy  horseman,  he  made  his 
way  to  a  fortified  town  not  very  remote  from 
the  battle-field,  where  he  halted  with  his  horse- 
men, and  determined  that  he  would  attempt  to 
rally  there  the  remains  of  the  army. 

The  Carthaginians,  when  they  found  the  vic- 
tory complete,  abandoned  the  pursuit  of  the  en- 
emy, returned  to  their  camp,  spent  some  hours 
in  feasting  and  rejoicing,  and  then  laid  down  to 
sleep.     They  were,  of  course,  well  exhausted 


B.C.  215.]     Battle  of  Cannae.  203 

Condition  of  the  battle-field.  The  wounded  and  dying. 

by  the  intense  exertions  of  the  day.  On  the 
field  where  the  battle  had  been  fought,  the 
wounded  lay  all  night  mingled  with  the  dead, 
filling  the  air  with  cries  and  groans,  and  writh- 
ing in  their  agony. 

Early  the  next  morning  the  Carthaginians 
oarae  back  to  the  field  to  plunder  the  dead  bod- 
ies rf  the  Romans.  The  whole  field  presented 
a  mo^t  shocking  spectacle  to  the  view.  The 
bodies  of  horses  and  men  lay  mingled  in  dread- 
ful confusion,  as  they  had  fallen,  some  dead,  oth- 
ers still  alive,  the  men  moaning,  crying  for  wa- 
ter, and  feebly  struggling  from  time  to  time  to 
disentangle  themselves  from  the  heaps  of  car- 
casses under  which  they  were  buried.  The  dead- 
ly and  inextinguishable  hate  which  the  Cartha- 
ginians felt  for  their  foes  not  having  been  ap- 
peased by  the  slaughter  of  forty  thousand  of 
them,  they  beat  down  and  stabbed  these  wretch- 
ed lingerers  wherever  they  found  them,  as  a  sort 
of  morning  pastime  after  the  severer  labors  of 
the  preceding  day.  This  slaughter,  however, 
could  hardly  be  considered  a  cruelty  to  the 
wretched  victims  of  it,  for  many  of  them  bared 
their  breasts  to  their  assailants,  and  begged  for 
the  blow  which  was  to  put  an  end  to  their  pain. 
fn  exploring  the  field,  one  Carthaginian  soldier 


204  Hannibal  [B.C.  215 

The  Roman  and  Carthaginian  soldier.  Immense  plunder 

was  found  still  alive,  but  imprisoned  by  the  dead 
body  of  his  Roman  enemy  lying  upon  him.  The 
Carthaginian's  face  and  ears  were  shockingly 
mangled.  The  Roman,  having  fallen  upon  him 
when  both  were  mortally  wounded,  had  contin- 
ued the  combat  with  his  teeth  when  he  could 
no  longer  use  his  weapon,  and  had  died  at  last, 
binding  down  his  exhausted  enemy  with  his  own 
dead  body. 

The  Carthaginians  secured  a  vast  amount  of 

o 

plunder.  The  Roman  army  was  full  of  officers 
and  soldiers  from  the  aristocratic  ranks  of  soci- 
ety, and  their  arms  and  their  dress  were  very 
valuable.  The  Carthaginians  obtained  some 
bushels  of  gold  rings  from  their  fingers,  which 
Hannibal  sent  to  Carthage  as  a  trophy  of  his 
victory. 


B.C.215.J  Scipio.  205 

Keason  of  Hannibal's  success.  The  Scipios. 


Chapter  X. 

Scipio 

Ftp  HE  true  reason  why  Hannibal  could  not 
-*-  be  arrested  in  his  triumphant  career  seems 
not  to  have  been  because  the  Romans  did  not 
pursue  the  right  kind  of  policy  toward  him,  but 
because,  thus  far,  they  had  no  general  who  was 
his  equal.  Whoever  was  sent  against  him  soon 
proved  to  be  his  inferior.  Hannibal  could  out- 
maneuver  them  all  in  stratagem,  and  could  con- 
quer them  on  the  field.  There  was,  however, 
now  destined  to  appear  a  man  capable  of  coping 
with  Hannibal.  It  was  young  Scipio,  the  one 
who  saved  the  life  of  his  father  at  the  battle  of 
Ticinus.  This  Scipio,  though  the  son  of  Han- 
nibal's first  great  antagonist  of  that  name,  is 
commonly  called,  in  history,  the  elder  Scipio  ; 
for  there  was  another  of  his  name  after  him, 
who  was  greatly  celebrated  for  his  wars  against 
the  Carthaginians  in  Africa.  These  last  two 
received  from  the  Roman  people  the  surname 
of  Africanus,  in  honor  of  their  African  victories, 
and  the  one  who  now  comes  upon  the  stage  was 


206  Hannibal.  [B.C.  215. 

Fragments  of  the  Roman  army.  Scipio  elected  commander 

called  Scipio  Africanus  the  elder,  or  sometimes 
simply  the  elder  Scipio.  The  deeds  of  the  Scipio 
who  attempted  to  stop  Hannibal  at  the  Rhone 
and  upon  the  Po  were  so  wholly  eclipsed  by 
his  son,  and  by  the  other  Scipio  who  followed 
him,  that  the  former  is  left  out  of  view  and 
forgotten  in  designating  and  distinguishing  the 
others. 

Our  present  Scipio  first  appears  upon  the 
stage,  in  the  exercise  of  military  command,  aft- 
er the  battle  of  Cannse.  He  was  a  subordinate 
officer-  and  on  the  day  following  the  battle  he 
found  himseif  at  a  place  called  Canusium,  which 
was  at  a  short  distance  from  Cannse,  on  the  way 
toward  Rome,  with  a  number  of  other  officers 
of  his  own  rank,  and  with  broken  masses  and 
detachments  of  the  army  coming  in  from  time 
to  time,  faint,  exhausted,  and  in  despair.  The 
rumor  was  that  both  consuls  were  killed.  These 
fragments  of  the  army  had,  therefore,  no  one  to 
command  them.  The  officers  met  together,  and 
unanimously  agreed  to  make  Scipio  their  com- 
mander in  the  emergency,  until  some  superior 
officer  should  arrive,  or  they  should  get  orders 
from  Rome. 

An  incident  here  occurred  which  showed,  in 
a  striking  point  of  view,  the  boldness  and  energy 


B.C.  215.]  Scipio,  207 

Scipio's  energy.  Case  of  Meteltna 

of  the  young  Scipio's  character.  At  the  very 
meeting  in  which  he  was  place  I  in  command, 
and  when  they  were  overwhelmed  with  perplex- 
ity and  care,  an  officer  came  in,  and  reported 
that  in  another  part  of  the  camp  there  was  an 
assembly  of  officers  and  young  men  of  rank, 
headed  by  a  certain  Metellus,  who  had  decided 
to  give  up  the  cause  of  their  country  in  despair, 
and  that  they  were  making  arrangements  to 
proceed  immediately  to  the  sea-coast,  obtain 
ships,  and  sail  away  to  seek  a  new  home  in 
some  foreign  lands,  considering  their  cause  in 
Italy  as  utterly  lost  and  ruined.  The  officer 
proposed  that  they  should  call  a  council  and  de- 
liberate what  was  best  to  do. 

"  Deliberate !"  said  Scipio ;  "  this  is  not  a 
case  for  deliberation,  but  for  action.  Draw  your 
swords  and  follow  me."  So  saying,  he  pressed 
forward  at  the  head  of  the  party  to  the  quarters 
of  Metellus.  They  marched  boldly  into  the 
apartment  where  he  and  his  friends  were  in  con- 
sultation. Scipio  held  up  his  sword,  and  in  a 
very  solemn  manner  pronounced  an  oath,  bind- 
ing himself  not  to  abandon  his  country  in  this 
the  hour  of  her  distress,  nor  to  allow  any  other 
Roman  citizen  to  abandon  her.  If  he  should  be 
guilty  of  such  treason,  he  called  upon  Jupiter,  bv 


208  Hannibal.  [B.C..  215. 

Metellus  yields.  Consternation  at  Rome 

the  most  dreadful  imprecations,  to  destroy  him 
utterly,  house,  family,  fortune,  soul,  and  body. 

"  And  now,  Metellus,  I  call  upon  you,"  said 
he,  "  and  all  who  are  with  you,  to  take  the 
same  oath.  You  must  do  it,  otherwise  you 
have  got  to  defend  yourselves  against  these 
swords  of  ours,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Cartha- 
ginians." Metellus  and  his  party  yielded.  Nor 
was  it  wholly  to  fear  that  they  yielded.  It  was 
to  the  influence  of  hope  quite  as  much  as  to 
that  of  fear.  The  courage,  the  energy,  and  the 
martial  ardor  which  Scipio's  conduct  evinced, 
awakened  a  similar  spirit  in  them,  and  made 
them  hope  again  that  possibly  their  country 
might  yet  be  saved. 

The  news  of  the  awful  defeat  and  destruction 
of  the  Roman  army  flew  swiftly  to  Rome,  and 
produced  universal  consternation.  The  whole 
city  was  in  an  uproar.  There  were  soldiers  in 
the  army  from  almost  every  family,  so  that  ev- 
ery woman  and  child  throughout  the  city  was 
distracted  by  the  double  agitation  of  inconsola- 
ble grief  at  the  death  of  their  husband  or  their 
father,  slain  in  the  battle,  and  of  terrible  fear 
that  Hannibal  and  his  raging  followers  were 
about  to  burst  in  through  the  gates  of  the  city 
to  murder  them.     The  streets  of  the  city,  and 


B.C.  215.]  Scipio.  209 

The  senate  adjourns.  Hannibal  refuses  to  march  to  Rome. 

especially  the  Forum,  were  thronged  with  vast 
crowds  of  men,  women,  and  children,  who  filled 
the  air  with  loud  lamentations,  and  with  cries 
of  terror  and  despair. 

The  magistrates  were  not  able,  to  restore  or- 
der. The  senate  actually  adjourned,  that  the 
members  of  it  might  go  about  the  city,  and  use 
their  influence  and  their  power  to  produce  si- 
lence at  least,  if  they  could  not  restore  compos- 
ure. The  streets  were  finally  cleared.  The 
women  and  children  were  ordered  to  remain  at 
home.  Armed  patrols  were  put  on  guard  to 
prevent  tumultuous  assemblies  forming.  Men 
were  sent  off  on  horseback  on  the  road  to  Canu- 
sium  and  Cannae,  to  get  more  accurate  intelli- 
gence, and  then  the  senate  assembled  again,  and 
began  to  consider,  with  as  much  of  calmness  as 
they  could  command,  what  was  to  be  done. 

The  panic  at  Rome  was,  however,  in  some 
rieasure,  a  false  alarm,  for  Hannibal,  contrary 
to  the  expectation  of  all  Italy,  did  not  go  to 
Rome.  His  generals  urged  him  very  strongly 
to  do  so.  Nothing  could  prevent,  they  said,  his 
gaining  immediate  possession  of  the  city.  Bat 
Hannibal  refused  to  do  this.  Rome  was  strongly 
fortified,  and  had  an  immense  population.  His 
army,  too,  was  much  weakened  by  the  battle  of 
O 


210  Hannibal.  [B  C.  214. 

Hannibal  mafcps  his  head-quarters  at  Capo*. 

Cannae,  and  he  seems  to  have  thought  it  most 
prudent  not  to  attempt  the  reduction  of  Rome 
until  he  should  have  received  re-enforcements 
from  home.  It  was  now  so  late  in  the  season 
that  he  could  not  expect  such  re-enforcements 
immediately,  and  he  accordingly  determined  to 
select  some  place  more  accessible  than  Rome, 
and  make  it  his  head-quarters  for  the  winter 
He  decided  in  favor  of  Capua,  which  was  a 
large  and  powerful  city  one  or  two  hundred 
miles  southeast  of  Rome. 

Hannibal,  in  fact,  conceived  the  design  of  re- 
gaining possession  of  Italy  and  of  making  Capua 
the  capital  of  the  country,  leaving  Rome  to  it- 
self, to  decline,  as  under  such  circumstances  it 
inevitably  must,  to  the  rank  of  a  second  city. 
Perhaps  he  was  tired  of  the  fatigues  and  haz- 
ards of  war,  and  having  narrowly  escaped  ruin 
before  the  battle  of  Cannse,  he  now  resolved  that 
he  would  not  rashly  incur  any  new  dangers. 
It  was  a  great  question  with  him  whether  he 
should  go  forward  to  Rome,  or  attempt  to  build 
up  a  new  capital  of  his  own  at  Capua.  The 
question  which  of  these  two  he  ought  to  have 
done  was  a  matter  of  great  debate  then,  and  it 
has  been  discussed  a  great  deal  by  military  men 
>n  every  age  since  his  day.     Right  or  wrong, 


B.C.  214.]  Scipio.  21A 

JIannibal  sends  Mago  to  Carthage.  Mago's  speech 

Hannibal  decided  to  establish  his  own  capital 
at  Capua,  and  to  leave  Rome,  for  the  present, 
undisturbed. 

He,  however,  sent  immediately  to  Carthage 
for  re-enforcements.  The  messenger  whom  he 
sent  was  one  of  his  generals  named  Mago. 
Mago  made  the  best  of  his  way  to  Carthage 
with  his  tidings  of  victory  and  his  bushel  of 
rings,  collected,  as  has  been  already  said,  from 
the  field  of  Cannse.  The  city  of  Carthage  was 
greatly  excited  by  the  news  which  he  brought. 
The  friends  and  patrons  of  Hannibal  were  elat- 
ed with  enthusiasm  and  pride,  and  they  taunt- 
ed and  reproached  his  enemies  with  the  opposi- 
tion to  him  they  had  manifested  when  he  was 
originally  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  ar- 
my of  Spain. 

Mago  met  the  Carthaginian  senate,  and  in  a 
very  spirited  and  eloquent  speech  he  told  them 
how  many  glorious  battles  Hannibal  had  fought, 
and  how  many  victories  he  had  won.  He  had 
contended  with  the  greatest  generals  that  the 
Romans  could  bring  against  him,  and  had  con- 
quered them  all.  He  had  slain,  he  said,  in  all, 
over  two  hundred  thousand  men.  All  Italy  was 
now  subject  to  his  power  ;  Capua  was  his  capi- 
tal,  and  Rome  'had  fallen.     He  concluded  by 


212  Hannibal.  [B.C.  214. 

The  bag  of  rings.  Debate  in  the  Carthaginian  senate. 

saying  that  Hannibal  was  in  need  of  considera- 
ble additional  supplies  of  men,  and  money,  and 
provisions,  which  he  did  not  doubt  the  Cartha- 
ginians would  send  without  any  unnecessary 
delay.  He  then  produced  before  the  senate  the 
great  bag  of  rings  which  he  had  brought,  and 
poured  them  upon  the  pavement  of  the  senate- 
house  as  a  trophy  of  the  victories  which  he  had 
been  announcing. 

This  would,  perhaps,  have  all  been  very  well 
for  Hannibal  if  his  friends  had  been  contented 
to  have  left  the  case  where  Mago  left  it;  but 
some  of  them  could  not  resist  the  temptation  of 
taunting  his  enemies,  and  especially  Hanno, 
who,  as  will  be  recollected,  originally  opposed 
his  being  sent  to  Spain.  They  turned  to  him, 
and  asked  him  triumphantly  what  he  thought 
now  of  his  factious  opposition  to  so  brave  a 
warrior.  Hanno  rose.  The  senate  looked  to- 
ward him  and  were  profoundly  silent,  wonder- 
ing what  he  would  have  co  reply.  Hanno, 
with  an  air  of  perfect  ease  and  composure, 
spoke  somewhat  as  follows : 

"  I  should  have  said  nothing,  but  should  have 
allowed  the  senate  to  take  what  action  they 
pleased  on  Mago's  proposition  if  I  had  not  been 
particularly  addressed.     As  it  is.  I  will  say  that 


BC.214.J  Scipio.  213 

The  speech  of  Hanno  in  the  Carthaginian  senate. 

I  think  now  just  as  I  always  have  thought. 
We  are  plunged  into  a  most  costly  and  most 
useless  war,  and  are,  as  I  conceive,  no  nearer 
the  end  of  it  now  than  ever,  notwithstanding 
all  these  boasted  successes.  The  emptiness  of 
them  is  clearly  shown  by  the  inconsistency  of 
Hannibal's  pretensions  as  to  what  he  has  done, 
with  the  demands  that  he  makes  in  respect  to 
what  he  wishes  us  to  do.  He  says  he  has  con- 
quered all  his  enemies,  and  yet  he  wants  us  to 
send  him  more  soldiers.  He  has  reduced  all 
Italy — the  most  fertile  country  in  the  world — 
to  subjection,  and  reigns  over  it  at  Capua,  and 
yet  he  calls  upon  us  for  corn.  And  then,  to 
crown  all,  he  sends  us  bushels  of  gold  rings  as 
a  specimen  of  the  riches  he  has  obtained  by 
plunder,  and  accompanies  the  offering  with  a 
demand  for  new  supplies  of  money.  In  my 
opinion,  his  success  is  all  illusive  and  hollow. 
There  seems  to  be  nothing  substantial  in  his 
situation  except  his  necessities,  and  the  heavy 
burdens  upon  the  state  which  these  necessities 
impose." 

Notwithstanding  Hanno' s  sarcasms,  the  Car- 
thaginians resolved  to  sustain  Hannibal,  and  to 
send  him  the  supplies  that  he  needed.  They 
were,  however,  long  in  reaching  him.     Various 


214  Hannibal.  [B.C. 214. 

Progress  of  the  war.  Enervation  of  Hannibal's  army 

difficulties  and  delays  occurred.  The  Romans, 
though  they  could  not  dispossess  Hannibal  from 
his  position  in  Italy,  raised  armies  in  different 
countries,  and  waged  extended  wars  with  the 
Carthaginians  and  their  allies,  in  various  parts 
of  the  world,  both  by  sea  and  land. 

The  result  was,  that  Hannibal  remained  fif- 
teen or  sixteen  years  in  Italy,  engaged,  during 
all  this  time,  in  a  lingering  struggle  with  the 
Roman  power,  without  ever  being  able  to  ac- 
complish any  decisive  measures.  During  this 
period  he  was  sometimes  successful  and  victori- 
ous, and  sometimes  he  was  very  hard  pressed 
by  his  enemies.  It  is  said  that  his  army  was 
very  much  enervated  and  enfeebled  by  the  com- 
forts and  luxuries  they  enjoyed  at  Capua.  Cap- 
ua was  a  very  rich  and  beautiful  city,  and  the 
inhabitants  of  it  had  opened  their  gates  to  Han- 
nibal of  their  own  accord,  preferring,  as  they 
said,  his  alliance  to  that  of  the  Romans.  The 
officers — as  the  officers  of  an  army  almost  al- 
ways do,  when  they  find  themselves  established 
in  a  rich  and  powerful  city,  after  the  fatigues 
of  a  long  and  honorable  campaign — gave  them- 
selves up  to  festivities  and  rejoicing,  to  games, 
shows,  and  entertainments  of  every  kind,  which 
they  soon  learned  infinitely  to  prefer  to  the  toil 
and  dansrfr  of  marches  and  battjps.      m 


B.C.  2 14]  Scipio.  215 

Decline  of  the  Carthaginian  power.  Marccllus. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  there  is 
no  question  about  the  fact  that,  from  the  time 
Hannibal  and  his  army  got  possession  of  their 
comfortable  quarters  in  Capua,  the  Carthagin- 
ian power  began  gradually  to  decline.  As  Han- 
nibal determined  to  make  that  city  the  Italian 
capital  instead  of  Rome,  he,  of  course,  when  es- 
tablished there,  felt  in  some  degree  settled  and 
at  home,  and  was  less  interested  than  he  had 
been  in  plans  for  attacking  the  ancient  capital. 
Still,  the  war  went  on;  many  battles  were 
fought,  many  cities  were  besieged,  the  Roman 
power  gaining  ground  all  the  time,  though  not, 
however,  by  any  very  decisive  victories. 

In  these  contests  there  appeared,  at  length,  a 
new  Roman  general  named  Marcellus,  and,  ei- 
ther on  account  of  his  possessing  a  bolder  and 
more  active  temperament,  or  else  in  consequence 
of  the  change  in  the  relative  strength  of  the  two 
contending  powers,  he  pursued  a  more  aggress- 
ive policy  thag.  Fabius  had  thought  it  prudent 
to  attempt  Marcellus  was,  however,  cautious 
and  wary  in  his  enterprises,  and  he  laid  his 
plans  with  so  much  sagacity  and  skill  that  he 
was  almost  always  successful.  The  Romans 
applauded  very  highly  his  activity  and  ardor, 
without,  however,  forgetting  their  obligations 


•21(3  Hannibal.  [B.C.  214. 

Suet  ess  of  the  Romans.  Siege  of  Capua. 

to  Fabius  for  his  caution  and  defensive  reserve. 
They  said  that  Marcellus  was  the  sword  of 
their  commonwealth,  as  Fabius  had  been  its 
shield. 

The  Romans  continued  to  prosecute  this  sort 
of  warfare,  being  more  and  more  successful  the 
longer  they  continued  it,  until,  at  last,  they  ad- 
vanced to  the  very  walls,  of  Capua,  and  threat- 
ened it  with  a  siege.  Hannibal's  intrenchments 
and  fortifications  were  too  strong  for  them  to 
attempt  to  carry  the  city  by  a  sudden  assault, 
nor  were  the  Romans  even  powerful  enough  to 
invest  the  place  entirely,  so  as  completely  to 
shut  their  enemies  in.  They,  however,  en- 
camped with  a  large  army  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, and  assumed  so  threatening  an  attitude 
as  to  keep  Hannibal's  forces  within  in  a  state 
of  continual  alarm.  And,  besides  the  alarm,  it 
was  very  humiliating  and  mortifying  to  Car- 
thaginian pride  to  find  the  very  seat  of  their 
power,  as  it  were,  shut  up  and  overawed  by  an 
enemy  over  whom  they  had  been  triumphing 
themselves  so  short  a  time  before,  by  a  contin- 
ued series  of  victories. 

Hannibal  was  not  himself  in  Capua  at  the 
time  that  the  Romans  came  to  attack  it.  He 
marched,  however,  immediately  to  its  relief,  and, 


B.C.  214.]  Scipio.  217 

Hannibal's  attack  on  the  Roman  camp.  He  marches  to  Rome. 

attacking  the  Romans  in  his  turn,  endeavored 
to  compel  them  to  raise  the  siege,  as  it  is  tech- 
nically termed,  and  retire.  They  had,  however, 
so  intrenched  themselves  in  the  positions  that 
they  had  taken,  and  the  assaults  with  which  he 
encountered  them  had  lost  so  much  of  their 
former  force,  that  he  could  accomplish  nothing 
decisive.  He  then  left  the  ground  with  his 
army,  and  marched  himself  toward  Rome.  He 
encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  the  city,  and  threat- 
ened to  attack  it ;  but  the  walls,  and  castles, 
and  towers  with  which  Rome,  as  well  as  Capua, 
was  defended,  were  too  formidable,  and  the 
preparations  for  defense  too  complete,  to  make 
it  prudent  for  him  really  to  assail  the  city.  His 
objeot  was  to  alarm  the  Romans,  and  compel 
them  to  withdraw  their  forces  from  his  capital 
that  they  might  defend  their  own. 

There  was,  in  fact,  some  degree  of  alarm 
awakened,  and  in  the  discussions  which  took 
place  among  the  Roman  authorities,  the  with- 
drawal of  their  troops  from  Capua  was  propos- 
ed ;  but  this  proposal  was  overruled ;  even  Fa- 
bius  was  against  it.  Hannibal  was  no  longer 
to  be  feared.  They  ordered  back  a  small  de- 
tachment from  Capua,  and  added  to  it  such 
forces  as  they  could  raise  within  the  city,  and 


218  Hannibal.  [B.C.  214. 

Preparations  for  a  battle.  Prevented  by  storma 

then  advanced  to  give  Hannibal  battle.  The 
preparations  were  all  made,  it  is  said,  for  an  en- 
gagement, but  a  violent  storm  came  on,  so  vio- 
lent as  to  drive  the  combatants  back  to  their 
respective  camps.  This  happened,  the  great 
Roman  historian  gravely  says,  two  or  three 
times  in  succession ;  the  weather  immediately 
becoming  serene  again,  each  time,  as  soon  as 
the  respective  generals  had  withdrawn  their 
troops  from  the  intended  fight.  Something  like 
this  may  perhaps  have  occurred,  though  the 
fact  doubtless  was  that  both  parties  were 
afraid,  each  of  the  other,  and  were  disposed  to 
avail  themselves  of  any  excuse  to  postpone  a 
decisive  conflict.  There  was  a  time  when  Han- 
nibal had  not  been  deterred  from  attacking  the 
Romans  even  by  the  most  tempestuous  storms 
Thus,  though  Hannibal  did,  in  fact,  in  the 
end,  get  to  the  walls  of  Rome,  he  did  nothing 
but  threaten  when  he  was  there,  and  his  en- 
campment near  the  city  can  only  be  considered 
as  a  bravado.  His  presence  seems  to  have  ex- 
cited very  little  apprehension  within  the  city. 
The  Romans  had,  in  fact,  before  this  time,  lost 
their  terror  of  the  Carthaginian  arms.  To  show 
their  contempt  of  Hannibal,  they  sold,  at  public 
auction,  the  land  on  which  he  was  encamped, 


U.L    K)6.;  Scipio.  219 


Bales  at  .jtctiov.  Hasdrubal  ci-osses  the  Alps. 


while  he  was  upon  it  besieging  the  city,  and  it 
brought  the  usual  price.  The  bidders  were, 
perhaps,  influenced  somewhat  by  a  patriotic 
spirit,  and  by  a  desire  to  taunt  Hannibal  with 
in  expression  of  their  opinion  that  his  occupa- 
tion of  the  land  would  be  a  very  temporary  en- 
cumbrance. Hannibal,  to  revenge  himself  for 
this  taunt,  put  up  for  sale  at  auction,  in  his  own 
camp,  the  shops  of  one  of  the  principal  streets 
of  Rome,  and  they  were  bought  by  his  officers 
with  great  spirit.  It  showed  that  a  great  change 
had  taken  place  in  the  nature  of  the  contest  be- 
tween Carthage  and  Rome,  to  find  these  vast 
powers,  which  were  a  few  years  before  grap- 
pling each  other  with  such  destructive  and  ter- 
rible fury  on  the  Po  and  at  Cannse,  now  satis- 
fying their  declining  animosity  with  such  squib- 
bing  as  this. 

'When  the  other  modes  by  which  Hannibal 
attempted  to  obtain  re-enforcements  failed,  he 
made  an  attempt  to  have  a  second  army  brought 
over  the  Alps  under  the  command  of  his  broth- 
er Hasdrubal.  It  was  a  large  army,  and  in  their 
march  they  experienced  the  same  difficulties, 
though  in  a  much  lighter  degree,  that  Hannibal 
had  himself  encountered.  And  yet,  of  the  whole 
mighty  mass  which  set  out  from  Spain,  noth- 


220  Hannibal.  [B.C.  206 

Livius  and  Nero.  Division  of  the  provinces 

iiTg  readied  Hannibal  except  his  brother's  head. 
The  circumstances  of  the  unfortunate  termina- 
tion of  Hasdrubal's  attempt  were  as  follows: 

When  Hasdrubal  descended  from  the  Alps, 
rejoicing  in  the  successful  manner  in  which  ho 
had  surmounted  those  formidable  barriers,  he 
imagined  that  all  his  difficulties  were  over.  He 
dispatched  couriers  to  his  brother  Hannibal,  in- 
forming him  that  he  had  scaled  the  mountains, 
and  that  he  was  coming  on  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble to  his  aid. 

The  two  consuls  in  office  at  this  time  were 
named,  the  one  Nero,  and  the  other  Livius. 
To  each  of  these,  as  was  usual  with  the  Roman 
consuls,  was  assigned  a  particular  province,  and 
a  certain  portion  of  the  army  to  defend  it,  and 
the  laws  enjoined  it  upon  them  very  strictly  not 
to  leave  their  respective  provinces,  on  any  pre- 
text whatever,  without  authority  from  the  Ro- 
man Legislature.  In  this  instance  Livius  had 
been  assigned  to  the  northern  part  of  Italy,  and 
Nero  to  the  southern.  It  devolved  upon  Livius, 
therefore,  to  meet  and  give  battle  to  Hasdrubal 
on  his  descent  from  the  Alps,  and  to  Nero  to 
remain  in  the  vicinity  of  Hannibal,  to  thwart 
his  plans,  oppose  his  progress,  and,  if  possible, 
conquer  and  destroy  him,  while  his  colleague 


B.C.SOo.j  cJcipio.  221 

The  intercepted  letters.  Nero's  perplexity 

prevented  his  receiving  the  expected  re-enforce- 
ments  from  Spain. 

Things  being  in  this  state,  the  couriers  whom 
Hasdrubal  sent  with  his  letters  had  the  vigi- 
lance of  both  consuls  to  elude  before  they  could 
deliver  them  into  Hannibal's  hands.  They  did 
succeed  in  passing  Livius,  but  they  were  inter- 
cepted by  Nero.  '  The  patrols  who  seized  these 
messengers  brought  them  to  Nero's  tent.  Nero 
opened  and  read  the  letters.  All  Hasdrubal's 
plans  and  arrangements  were  detailed  in  them 
very  fully,  so  that  Nero  perceived  that,  if  he 
were  at  once  to  proceed  to  the  northward  with 
a  strong  force,  he  could  render  his  colleague  such 
aid  as,  with  the  knowledge  of  Hasdrubal's  plans, 
which  he  had  obtained  from  the  letters,  would 
probably  enable  them  to  defeat  him ;  whereas, 
if  he  were  to  leave  Livius  in  ignorance  and 
alone,  he  feared  that  Hasdrubal  would  be  suc- 
cessful in  breaking  his  way  through,  and  in  ulti- 
mately effecting  his  junction  with  Hannibal. 
Under  these  circumstances,  he  was,  of  course, 
very  earnestly  desirous  of  going  northward  to 
render  the  necessary  aid,  but  he  was  strictly  for- 
bidden by  law  to  leave  his  own  province  to  enter 
that  of  his  colleague  without  an  authority  from 
Rome,  which  there  was  not  now  time  to  obtain. 


222  HifrNiBAL.  [B.C.  206, 

Laws  of  military  discipline.  Their  strictness  and  severity. 

The  laws  of  military  discipline  are  very  strict 
and  imperious,  and  in  theory  they  are  never  to 
be  disobeyed.  Officers  and  soldiers,  of  all  ranks 
and  gradations,  must  obey  the  orders  which  they 
receive  from  the  authority  above  them,  without 
looking  at  the  consequences,  or  deviating  from 
the  line  marked  out  on  any  pretext  whatever. 
It  is,  in  fact,  the  very  essence  of  military  sub- 
ordination and  efficiency,  that  a  command,  once 
given,  suspends  all  exercise  of  judgment  or  dis- 
cretion on  the  part  of  the  one  to  whom  it  is  ad 
dressed ;  and  a  good  general  or  a  good  govern 
ment  would  prefer  generally  that  harm  shoulo1 
be  done  by  a  strict  obedience  to  commands, 
rather  than  a  benefit  secured  by  an  unauthor- 
ized deviation  from  them.  It  is  a  good  prin- 
ciple, not  only  in  war,  but  in  all  those  cases  in 
social  life  where  men  have  to  act  in  concert,  and 
yet  wish  to  secure  efficiency  in  action.. 

And  yet  there  are  cases  of  exception — cases 
where  the  necessity  is  so  urgent,  or  the  advant- 
ages to  be  derived  are  so  great ;  where  the  in- 
terests involved  are  so  momentous,  and  the  suc- 
cess so  sure,  that  a  commander  concludes  to 
disobey  and  take  the  responsibility.  The  re- 
sponsibility is,  however,  very  great,  and  the 
danger  in  assuming  it  extreme.     He  who  in- 


B.C.  206.1  Scipio.  223 


Danger  of  violating  discipline.  An  illustration. 


curs  it  makes  himself  liable  to  the  severest 
penalties,  from  which  nothing  but  clear  proof 
of  the  most  imperious  necessity,  and,  in  addi- 
tion to  it,  the  most  triumphant  success,  can  save*, 
him.  There  is  somewhere  in  English  history 
a  story  of  a  naval  commander,  in  the  service  of 
an  English  queen,  who  disobeyed  the  orders  of 
his  superiors  at  one  time,  in  a  case  of  great 
emergency  at  sea,  and  gained  by  so  doing  a  very 
important  victory.  Immediately  afterward  he 
placed  himself  under  arrest,  and  went  into  port 
as  a  prisoner  accused  of  crime  instead  of  a  com- 
mander triumphing  in  his  victory.  He  sur- 
rendered himself  to  the  queen's  officers  of  jus- 
tice, and  sent  word  to  the  oueen  herself  that  he 
knew  very  well  that  death  was  the  penalty  for 
his  offense,  but  that  he  was  willing  to  sacrifice 
his  life  in  any  ivay  in  the  service  of  her  majesty. 
He  was  pardoned ! 

Nero,  after  much  anxious  deliberation,  con- 
cluded that  the  emergency  in  which  he  found 
himself  placed  was  one  requiring  him  to  take 
the  responsibility  of  disobedience.  He  did  not, 
however,  dare  to  go  northward  with  all  his  for- 
ces, for  that  would  be  to  leave  southern  Italy 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  Hannibal.  He  selected, 
therefore,  from  his  whole  force,  which  consisted 


224  Hannibal.  [B.C.  206 

Plans  of  Nero.  A  niglit  march. 


of  forty  thousand  men,  seven  or  eight  thousand 
of  the  most  efficient  and  trustworthy  ;  the  men 
on  whom  he  could  most  securely  rely,  both  in 
respect  to  their  ability  to  bear  the  fatigues  of 
a  rapid  march,  and  the  courage  and  energy  with 
which  they  would  meet  Hasdrubal's  forces  in 
battle  at  the  end  of  it.  He  was,  at  the  time 
when  Hasdrubal's  letters  were  intercepted,  oc- 
cupying a  spacious  and  well-situated  camp. 
This  he  enlarged  and  strengthened,  so  that 
Hannibal  might  not  suspect  that  he  intended 
any  diminution  of  the  forces  within.  All  this 
was  done  very  promptly,  so  that,  in  a  few  hours 
after  he  received  the  intelligence  on  which  he 
was  acting,  he  was  drawing  off  secretly,  at 
night,  a  column  of  six  or  eight  thousand  men, 
none  of  whom  knew  at  all  where  they  were  going. 

He  proceeded  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  tho 
northward,  and,  when  he  arrived  in  the  north- 
ern province,  he  contrived  to  get  into  the  camp 
of  Livius  as  secretly  as  he  had  got  out  from  his 
own.  Thus,  of  the  two  armies,  the  one  where 
an  accession  of  force  was  required  was  greatly 
strengthened  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  with- 
out either  of  the  Carthaginian  generals  having 
suspected  the  change. 

Livius  was  rejoiced  to  get  so  opportune  a  re- 


B.C.  206.]  Scipio.  •       225 

Livius  and  Nero  attack  Hasdrubal.  Hasdrubal  orders  a  retreat 

enforcement.  He  recommended  that  the  troops 
should  all  remain  quietly  in  camp  for  a  short 
time,  until  the  newly-arrived  troops  could  rest 
and  recruit  themselves  a  little  after  their  rapid 
and  fatiguing  march ;  but  Nero  opposed  this 
plan,  and  recommended  an  immediate  battle. 
He  knew  the  character  of  the  men  that  he  had 
brought,  and  he  was,  besides,  unwilling  to  risk 
the  dangers  which  might  arise  in  his  own  camp, 
in  southern  Italy,  by  too  long  an  absence  from 
it.  It  was  decided,  accordingly,  to  attack  Has- 
drubal at  once,  and  the  signal  for  battle  was 
given. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  Hasdrubal  would 
have  been  beaten  by  Livius  alone,  but  the  ad- 
ditional force  which  Nero  had  brought  made 
the  Romans  altogether  too  strong  for  him.  Be- 
sides, from  his  position  in  the  front  of  the  bat- 
tle, he  perceived,  from  some  indications  that  his 
watchful  eye  observed,  that  a  part  of  the  troops 
attacking  him  were  from  the  southward;  and 
he  inferred  from  this  that  Hannibal  had  been 
defeated,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  this,  the 
whole  united  force  of  the  Roman  army  was  ar- 
rayed against  him.  He  was  disheartened  and 
discouraged,  and  soon  ordered  a  retreat.  He 
was  pursued  by  the  various  divisions  of  the  Ro- 
P 


226  Hannibal.  [B.C.  206 

Butchery  of  HasdrubaPs  army.  Hasdrubal'a  death. 

man  army,  and  the  retreating  columns  of  the 
Carthaginians  were  soon  thrown  into  complete 
confusion.  They  became  entangled  among  riv* 
ers  and  lakes ;  and  the  guides  who  had  under- 
taken to  conduct  the  army,  finding  that  all  was 
lost,  abandoned  them  and  fled,  anxious  only  to 
save  their  own  lives.  The  Carthaginians  were 
soon  pent  up  in  a  position  where  they  could  not 
defend  themselves,  and  from  which  they  could 
not  escape.  The  Romans  showed  them  no  mer- 
cy, but  went  on  killing  their  wretched  and  de- 
spairing victims  until  the  whole  army  was  al- 
most totally  destroyed.  They  cut  off  Hasdru- 
baPs head,  and  Nero  sat  out  the  very  night  after 
the  battle  to  return  with  it  in  triumph  to  his  own 
encampment.  When  he  arrived,  he  sent  a  troop 
of  horse  to  throw  the  head  over  into  Hannibal's 
camp,  a  ghastly. and  horrid  trophy  of  his  victory 

Hannibal  was  overwhelmed  with  disappoint 
ment  and  sorrow  at  the  loss  of  his  army,  bring 
ing  with  it,  as  it  did,  the  destruction  of  all  hk 
hopes.  "  My  fate  is  sealed,"  said  he  :  "  all  is  lost. 
I  shall  send  no  more  news  of  victory  to  Car- 
thage. In  losing  Hasdrubal  my  last  hope  is  gone." 

While  Hannibal  was  in  this  condition  in  Ita- 
ly, the  Roman  armies,  aided  by  their  allies,  were 
gaining  gradually  against  the  Carthaginians  in 


B.C.  204.]  Scipio.  229 

Progress  of  the  Roman  arms.  Successes  of  Scipio 

various  parts  of  the  world,  under  the  different 
generals  who  had  been  placed  in  command  by 
the  Roman  senate.  The  news  of  these  victories 
came  continually  home  to  Italy,  and  encouraged 
and  animated  the  Romans,  while  Hannibal  and 
his  army,  as  well  as  the  people  who  were  in  al 
liance  with  him,  were  disheartened  and  depress 
ed  by  them.  Scipio  was  one  of  these  general} 
commanding  in  foreign  lands.  Hio  province  was. 
Spain.  The  news  which  came  home  from  his 
army  became  more  and  more  exciting,  as  he 
advanced  from  conquest  to  conquest,  until  it 
seemed  that  the  whole  country  was  going  to  be 
reduced  to  subjection.  .  He  overcame  one  Car- 
thaginian general  after  another  until  he  reached 
New  Carthage,  which  he  besieged  and  conquer- 
ed, and  the  Roman  authority  was  established 
fully' over  the  whole  land. 

Scipio  then  returned  in  triumph  to  Rome. 
The  people  received  him  with  acclamations 
At  the  next  election  they  chose  him  consul. 
On  the  allotment  of  provinces,  Sicily  fell  to  him, 
with  power  to  cross  into  Africa  if  he  pleased. 
It  devolved  on  the  other  consul  to  carry  on  the 
war  in  Italy  more  directly  against  Hannibal. 
Scipio  levied  his  army,  equipped  his  fleet,  and 
sailed  for  Sicily*. 


230  Hannibal.  [B.C.  204 

Scipio  in  Africa.  Carthage  threatened. 

The  first  thing  that  he  did  on  his  arrival  in 
his  province  was  to  project  an  expedition  into 
Africa  itself.  He  could  not,  as  he  wished,  face 
Hannibal  directly,  by  marching  his  troops  into 
the  south  of  Italy,  for  this  was  the  work  allotted 
to  his  colleague.  He  could,  however,  make  an 
incursion  into  Africa,  and  even  threaten  Car- 
thage itself,  and  this,  with  the  boldness  and  ardor 
which  marked  his  character,  he  resolved  to  do. 

He  was  triumphantly  successful  in  all  his 
plans.  His  army,  imbibing  the  spirit  of  enthu- 
siasm which  animated  their  commander,  and 
confident  of  success,  went  on,  as  his  forces  in 
Spain  had  done,  from  victory  to  victory.  They 
conquered  cities,  they  overran  provinces,  they 
defeated  and  drove  back  all  the  armies  which 
the  Carthaginians  could  bring  against  them, 
and  finally  they  awakened  in  the  streets  and 
dwellings  of  Carthage  the  same  panic  and  con- 
sternation which  Hannibal's  victorious  progress 
had  produced  in  Rome. 

The  Carthaginians  being  now,  in  their  turn, 
reduced  to  despair,  sent  embassadors  to  Scipio 
to  beg  for  peace,  and  to  ask  on  what  terms  he 
would  grant  it  and  withdraw  from  the  country. 
Scipio  replied  that  he  could  not  make  peace 
Tt  rested  with  the  Roman  senate,  whose  servant 


B.C. 204.]  .  Scipio.  231 

A  truce.  Hannibal  recalled. 

he  was.  He  specified,  however,  certain  terms 
which  he  was  willing  to  have  proposed  to  the 
senate,  and,  if  the  Carthaginians  would  agree 
to  them,  he  would  grant  them  a  truce,  that  is, 
a  temporary  suspension  of  hostilities,  until  the 
answer  of  the  Roman  senate  could  be  returned. 

The  Carthaginians  agreed  to  the  terms.  They 
were  very  onerous.  The  Romans  say  that  they 
did  not  really  mean  to  abide  by  them,  but  ac- 
ceded for  the  moment  in  order  to  gain  time  to 
send  for  Hannibal.  They  had  great  confidence 
in  his  resources  and  military  power,  and  thought 
that,  if  he  were  in  Africa,  he  could  save  them. 
At  the  same  time,  therefore,  that  they  sent  their 
embassadors  to  Rome  with  their  propositions  for 
peace,  they  dispatched  expresses  to  Hannibal, 
ordering  him  to  embark  his  troops  as  soon  as 
possible,  and,  abandoning  Italy,  to  hasten  home, 
to  save,  if  it  was  not  already  too  late,  his  native 
city  from  destruction. 

"When  Hannibal  received  these  messages,  he 
was  overwhelmed  with  disappointment  and  sor- 
row. He  spent  hours  in  extreme  agitation, 
sometimes  in  a  moody  silence,  interrupted  now 
and  then  by  groans  of  despair,  and  sometimes 
uttering  loud  and  angry  curses,  prompted  by 
the  exasperation  of  his  feelings.     He.  however. 


232  Hannibal.  [B.C.  204. 

Hannibal  raises  a  new  army.  The  Romans  capture  his  spies 

could  not  resist.  He  made  the  best  of  his  way 
to  Carthage.  The  Roman  senate,  at  the  same 
time,  instead  of  deciding  on  the  question  of 
peace  or  war,  which  Scipio  had  submitted  to 
them,  referred  the  question  back  to  him.  They 
sent  commissioners  to  Scipio,  authorizing  him 
to  act  for  them,  and  to  decide  himself  alone 
whether  the  war  should  be  continued  or  closed, 
and  if  to  be  closed,  on  what  conditions. 

Hannibal  raised  a  large  force  at  Carthage, 
joining  with  it  such  remains  of  former  armies 
as  had  been  left  after  Scipio's  battles,  and  he 
went  forth  at  the  head  of  these  troops  to  meet 
his  enemy.  He  marched  five  day$,  going,  per- 
haps, seventy-five  or  one  hundred  miles  from 
Carthage,  when  he  found  himself  approaching 
Scipio's  camp.  He  sent  out  spies  to  reconnoi- 
ter.  The  patrols  of  Scipio's  army  seized  these 
spies,  and  brought  them  to  the  general's  tent, 
as  they  supposed,  for  execution.  Instead  of 
punishing  them,  Scipio  ordered  them  to  be  led 
around  his  camp,  and  to  be  allowed  to  see  every 
thing  they  desired.  He  then  dismissed  them, 
that  they  might  return  to  Hannibal  with  the  in- 
formation they  had  obtained. 

Of  course,  the  report  whicli  they  brought  in 
respect  to  the  strength  and  resources  of  Scipio's 


B.C.  201.]  Scipio.  23^ 

Negotiations.  Interview  between  Hannibal  and  Scipio, 

army  was  very  formidable  to  Hannibal.  He 
thought  it  best  to  make  an  attempt  to  negoti- 
ate a  peace  rather  than  to  risk  a  battle,  and  he 
accordingly  sent  word  to  Scipio  requesting  a 
personal  interview.  Scipio  acceded  to  this  re- 
quest, and  a  place  was  appointed  for  the  meet- 
ing between  the  two  encampments.  To  this 
spot  the  two  generals  repaired  at  the  proper 
time,  with  great  pomp  and  parade,  and  with 
msny  attendants.  They  were  the  two  greatest 
generals  of  the  age  in  which  they  lived,  having 
been  engaged  for  fifteen  or  twenty  years  in  per- 
forming, at  the  head  of  vast  armies,  exploits 
which  had  filled  the  world  with  their  fame. 
Their  fields  of  action  had,  however,  been  wide- 
ly distant,  and  they  met  personally  now  for  the 
first  time.  When  introduced  into  each  other's 
presence,  they  stood  for  some  time  in  silence, 
gazing  upon  and  examining  one  another  with 
intense  interest  and  curiosity,  but  not  speaking 
a  word. 

At  length,  however,  the  negotiation  was  open- 
ed. Hannibal  made  Scipio  proposals  for  peace. 
They  were  very  favorable  to  the  Romans,  but 
Scipio  was  not  satisfied  with  them,  He  de- 
manded still  greater  sacrifices  than  Hannibal 
was  willing  to  make.     The  result,  after  a  long 


234  Hannibal.  [B.C.  201. 

The  last  battle.  Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians 

and  fruitless  negotiation,  was,  that  eacli  general 
returned  to  his  camp  and  prepared  for  battle. 

In  military  campaigns,  it  is  generally  easy 
for  those  who  have  been  conquering  to  go  on  to 
conquer :  so  much  depends  upon  the  expectations 
with  which  the  contending  armies  go  into  bat- 
tle. Scipio  and  his  troops  expected  to  conquer. 
The  Carthaginians  expected  to  be  beaten.  The 
result  corresponded.  At  the  close  of  the  day 
on  which  the  battle  was  fought,  forty  thousand 
Carthaginians  were  dead  and  dying  upon  the 
ground,  as  many  more  were  prisoners  in  the  Ro- 
man camp,  and  the  rest,  in  broken  masses,  were 
flying  from  the  field  in  confusion  and  terror,  on 
all  the  roads  which  led  to  Carthage.  Hannibal 
arrived  at  the  city  with  the  rest,  went  to  the 
senate,  announced  his  defeat,  and  said  that  he 
could  do  no  .more.'  "  The  fortune  which  once 
attended  me,"  said  he,  "  is  lost  forever,  and 
nothing  is  left  to  us  but  to  make  peace  with 
our  enemies  on  any  terms  that  they  may  think 
fit  to  impose." 


B.C. 200.]    Hannibal  an  Exile.  225 

Hannibal's  conquests.  Peaceful  pursuits. 


i  Chapter   XL 

Hannibal  a  Fugitive  and  an  Exile. 

FTANNIBAL'S  life  was  like  an  April  day. 
-*--■-  Its  brightest  glory  was  in  the  morning. 
The  setting  of  his  sun  was  darkened  by  clouds 
and  showers.  Although  for  fifteen  years  the 
Roman  people  could  find  no  general  capable  of 
maintaining  the  field  against  him,  Scipio  con- 
quered him  at  last,  and  all  his  brilliant  con- 
quests ended,  as  Hanno  had  predicted,  only  in 
placing  his  country  in  a  far  worse  condition 
than  before.  - 

In  fact,  as  long  as  the  Carthaginians  confined 
their  energies  to  useful  industry,  and  to  the  pur- 
suits of  commerce  and  peace,  they  were  pros 
perous,  and  they  increased  in  wealth,  and  in- 
fluence, and  honor  every  year.  Their  ships 
went  every  where,  and  were  every  where  wel- 
come. All  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  were 
visited  by  their  merchants,  and  the  comforts  and 
the  happiness  of  many  nations  and  tribes  were 
promoted  by  the  very  means  which  they  took 
to  swell  their  own  riches  and  fame.     All  might 


236  Hanniba:,.  [B.C.  200. 

The  danger  of  a  spirit  of  ambition  and  conquest. 

have  gone  on  so  for  centuries  longer,  had  no* 
military  heroes  arisen  with  appetites  for  a  more 
piquant  sort  of  glory.  Hannibal's  father  was 
one  of  the  foremost  of  these.  He  began  by  con- 
quests in  Spain  and  encroachments  on  the  Ro- 
man jurisdiction.  He  inculcated  the  same  feel- 
ings of  ambition  and  hate  in  Hannibal's  mind 
which  burned  in  his  own.  For  many  years,  the 
policy  which  they  led  their  countrymen  to  pur- 
sue was  successful.  From  being  useful  and 
welcome  visitors  to  all  the  world,  they  became 
the  masters  and  the  curse  of  a  part  of  it.  So 
long  as  Hannibal  remained  superior  to  any  Ro- 
man general  that  could  be  brought  against  him, 
he  went  on  conquering.  But  at  last  Scipio 
arose,  a  greater  than  Hannibal.  The  tide  was 
then  turned,  and  all  the  vast  conquests  of  half 
a  century  were  wrested  away  by  the  same  vio- 
lence, bloodshed,  and  misery  with  which  they 
had  been  acquired. 

We  have  described  the  exploits  of  Hannibal, 
in  making  these  conquests,  in  detail,  while  those 
of  Scipio,  in  wresting  them  away,  have  been 
passed  over  very  briefly,  as  this  is  intended  as 
a  history  of  Hannibal,  and  not  of  Scipio.  Still, 
Scipio's  conquests  were  made  by  slow  degrees, 
and  they  consumed  a  long  period  of  time.     He 


B.C.  200.]    Hannibal  an  Exile.  237 

Gradual  progress  of  Scipio's  victories. 

was  but  about  eighteen  years  of  age  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Cannae,  soon  after  which  his  campaigns 
began,  and  he  was  thirty  when  he  was  made 
consul,  just  before  his  going  into  Africa.  He 
was  thus  fifteen  or  eighteen  years  in  taking 
down  the  vast  superstructure  .of  power  which 
Hannibal  had  raised,  working  in  regions  away 
from  Hannibal  and  Carthage  during  all  this 
time,  as  if  leaving  the  great  general  and  the 
great  city  for  the  last.  He  was,  however,  so 
successful  in  what  he  did,  that  when,  at  length, 
he  advanced  to  the  attack  of  Carthage,  every 
thing  else  was  gone.  The  Carthaginian  power 
had  become  a  mere  hollow  shell,  empty  and 
vain,  which  required  only  one  great  final  blow 
to  effect  its  absolute  demolition.  In  fact,  so  far 
spent  and  gone  were  all  the  Carthaginian  re- 
sources, that  the  great  city  had  to  summon  the 
great  general  to  its  aid  the  moment  it  was 
threatened,  and  Scipio  destroyed  them  both  to- 
gether. 

And  yet  Scipio  did  not  proceed  so  far  as  lit- 
erally and  actually  to  destroy  them.  He  spared 
Hannibal's  life,  and  he  allowed  the  city  to  stand ; 
but  the  terms  and  conditions  of  peace  which  he 
exacted  were  such  as  to  put  an  absolute  ana 
perpetual  end  to  Carthaginian  dominion.     By 


233  Hannibal.  [B.C.  200 

Severe  conditions  of  peace  exacted  by  Scipio. 

these  conditions,  the  Carthaginian  state  was  al- 
owed  to  continue  free  and  independent,  and 
3ven  to  retain  the  government  of  such  territo- 
ries in  Africa  as  they  possessed  before  the  war  ; 
but  all  their  foreign  possessions  were  taken 
away ;  and  even  in  respect  to  Africa,  their  ju- 
risdiction was  limited  and  curtailed  by  very  hard 
restrictions.  Their  whole  navy  was  to  be  given 
to  the  Romans  except  ten  small  ships  of  three 
banks  of  oars,  which  Scipio  thought  the  govern- 
ment would  need  for  the  purposes  of  civil  ad- 
ministration. These  they  were  allowed  to  re- 
tain. Scipio  did  not  say  what  he  should  do  with 
the  remainder  of  the  fleet :  it  was  to  be  uncon- 
ditionally surrendered  to  him.  Their  elephants 
of  war  were  also  to  be  all  given  up,  and  they 
were  to  be  bound  not  to  train  any  more.  They 
were  not  to  appear  at  all  as  a  military  power 
in  any  other  quarter  of  the  world  but  Africa, 
and  they  were  not  to  make  war  in  Africa  ex- 
cept by  previously  making  known  the  occasion 
for  it  to  the  Roman  people,  and  obtaining  their 
permission.  They  were  also  to  pay  to  the  Ro- 
mans a  very  large  annual  tribute  for  fifty  years. 
There  was  great  distress  and  perplexity  in 
the  Carthaginian  councils  while  they  were  de- 
bating these  cruel  terms.     Hannibal  was  in  fa 


B.C.200.1. Hannibal   an   Exile.  239 


Debates  in  the  Carthaginian  senate. 


vor  of  accepting  them.  Others  opposed.  They 
thought  it  would  be  better  still  to  continue  the 
struggle,  hopeless  as  it  was,  than  to  submit  to 
terms  so  ignominious  and  fatal. 

Hannibal  was  present  at  these  debates,  but 
he  found  himself  now  in  a  very  different  posi- 
tion from  that  which  he  had  been  occupying  for 
thirty  years  as  a  victorious  general  at  the  head 
of  his  army.  He  had  been  accustomed  there  to 
control  and  direct  every  thing.  In  his  councils 
of  war,  no  one  spoke  but  at  his  invitation,  and 
no  opinion  was  expressed  but  such  as  he  wa,s 
willing  to  hear.  In  the  Carthaginian  senate, 
however,  he  found  the  case  very  different 
There,  opinions  were  freely  expressed,  as  in  a 
debate  among  equals,  Hannibal  taking  his  place 
among  the  rest,  and  counting  only  as  one.  And 
yet  the  spirit  of  authority  and  command  which 
he  had  been  so  long  accustomed  to  exercise,  lin- 
gered still,  and  made  him  very  impatient  and 
uneasy  under  contradiction.  In  fact,  as  one  of 
the  speakers  in  the  senate  was  rising  to  animad- 
vert upon  and  oppose  Hannibal's  views,  he  un- 
dertook to  pull  him  down  and  silence  him  by 
force.  This  proceeding  awakened  immediately 
such  expressions  of  dissatisfaction  and  displeas-' 
tire  in  the  assembly  as  to  show  him  very  clearly 


240  Hannibal.  [B.C.  200. 

Terms  of  peace  complied  with.      Surrender  of  the  elephants  and  ships. 

that  the  time  for  such  domineering  was  gone. 
He  had,  however,  the  good  sense  to  express  the 
regret  he  soon  felt  at  having  so  far  forgotten  the 
duties  of  his  new  position,  and  to  make  an  am- 
ple apology. 

The  Carthaginians  decided  at  length  to  ac- 
cede to  Scipio's  terms  of  peace.  The  first  in- 
stalment of  the  tribute  was  paid.  The  elephants 
and  the  ships  were  surrendered.  After  a  few 
days,  Scipio  announced  his  determination  not  to 
take  the  ships  away  with  him,  but  to  destroy 
them  there.  Perhaps  this  was  because  he 
thought  the  ships  would  be  of  little  value  to  the 
Romans,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  manning 
them.  Ships,  of  course,  are  useless  without  sea- 
men, and  many  nations  in  modern  times,  who 
could  easily  build  a  navy,  are  debarred  from 
doing  it,  because  their  population  does  not  fur- 
nish sailors  in  sufficient  numbers  to  man  and 
navigate  it.  It  was  probably,  in  part,  on  this 
account  that  Scipio  decided  not  to  take  the  Car- 
thaginian ships  away,  and  perhaps  he  also  want- 
ed to  show  to  Carthage  and  to  the  world  that  his 
object  in  taking  possession  of  the  national  prop- 
erty of  his  foes  was  not  to  enrich  his  own  coun- 
try by  plunder,  but  only  to  doprivo  ambitious 
soldiers  of  the  power  to  compromise  any  longer 


Y      ' 

B.C.200.]  Hannibal  an  Exile  243 

Scipio  burns  the  Carthaginian  fleet.  Feelings  of  the  spectator  3, 

the  peace  and  happiness  of  mankind  by  expe- 
ditions for  conquest  and  power.  However  this 
may  be,  Scipio  determined  to  destroy  the  Car- 
thaginian fleet,  and  not  to  convey  it  away. 

On  a  given  day,  therefore,  he  ordered  all  the 
galleys  to  be  got  together  in  the  bay  opposite 
to  the  city  of  Carthage,  and  to  be  burned. 
There  were  five  hundred  of  them,  so  that  they 
constituted  a  large  fleet,  and  covered  a  large  ex- 
panse of  the  water.  A.  vast  concourse  of  peo- 
ple assembled  upon  the  shores  to  witness  the 
grand  conflagration.  The  emotion  which  such 
a  spectacle  was  of  itself  calculated  to  excite 
was  greatly  heightened  by  the  deep  but  stifled 
feelings  of  resentment  and  hate  which  agitated 
every  Carthaginian  breast.  The  Romans,  too, 
as  they  gazed  upon  the  scene  from  their  en- 
campment on  the  shore,  were  agitated  as  well, 
though  with  different  emotions.  Their  faces 
beamed  with  an  expression  of  exultation  and 
triumph  as  they  saw  the  vast  masses  of  flame 
and  columns  of  smoke  ascending  from  the  sea, 
proclaiming  the  total  and  irretrievable  ruin  of 
Carthaginian  pride  and  power. 

Having  thus  fully  accomplished  his  work, 
Scipio  set  sail  for  Rome.  All  Italy  had  been 
rilled  with  the  fame  of  his  exploits  in  thus  de- 


244  Hannibal.  [B.C.  2U0 

Scipio  sails  to  Rome.  His  reception. 

stroying  the  ascendency  of  Hannibal.  The  city 
of  Rome  had  now  nothing  more  to  fear  from  its 
great  enemy.  He  was  shut  up,  disarmed,  and 
helpless,  in  his  own  native  state,  and  the  terror 
which  his  presence  in  Italy  had  inspired  had 
passed  forever  away.  The  whole  population  of 
Rome,  remembering  the  awful  scenes  of  con- 
sternation and  terror  which  the  city  had  so  of- 
ten  endured,  regarded  Scipio  as  a  great  deliverer 
They  were  eager  to  receive  and  welcome  him 
on  his  arrival.  When  the  time  came  and  he 
approached  the  city,  vast  throngs  went  out  to 
meet  him.  The  authorities  formed  civic  pro- 
cessions to  welcome  him.  They  brought  crowns, 
and  garlands,  and  flowers,  and  hailed  his  ap- 
proach with  loud  and  prolonged  acclamations  of 
triumph  and  joy.  They  gave  him  the  name  of 
Africanus,  in  honor  of  his  victories.  This  was 
a  new  honor — giving  to  a  conqueror  the  name  of 
the  country  that  he  had  subdued;  it  was  in- 
vented specially  as  Scipio's  reward,  the  deliv- 
erer who  had  saved  the  empire  from  the  great- 
est and  most  terrible  danger  by  which  it  had 
ever  been  assailed. 

Hannibal,  though  fallen,  retained  still  in  Car- 
thage some  portion  of  his  former  power.  The 
glory  of  his  past  exploits  still  invested  his  char- 


B.C.  192.]  Hannibal  -it  Exile.  245 

Hannibal's  position  and  standing  at  Carthage. 

acter  with  a  sort  of  halo,  which  made  him  an 
object  of  general  regard,  and  he  still  had  great 
and  powerful  friends.  He  was  elevated  to  high 
office,  and  exerted  himself  to  regulate  and  im- 
prove the  internal  affairs  of  the  state.  In  these 
efforts  he  was  not,  however,  very  successful. 
The  historians  say  that  the  objects  which  he 
aimed  to  accomplish  were  good,  and  that  the 
measures  for  effecting  them  were,  in  themselves, 
judicious ;  but,  accustomed  as  he  was  to  the 
authoritative  and  arbitrary  action  of  a  military 
commander  in  camp,  he  found  it  hard  to  prac- 
tice that  caution  and  forbearance,  and  that 
deference  for  the  opinion  of  others,  which  are 
so  essential  as  means  of  influencing  men  in  the 
management  of  the  civil  affairs  of  a  common- 
wealth. He  made  a  great  many  enemies,  who 
did  every  thing  in  their  power,  by  plots  and  in- 
trigues, as  well  as  by  open  hostility,  to  accom- 
plish his  ruin. 

His  pride,  too,  was  extremely  mortified  and 
humbled  by  an  occurrence  which  took  place 
very  soon  after  Scipio's  return  to  Rome.  There 
was  some  occasion  of  war  with  a  neighboring 
African  tribe,  and  Hannibal  headed,  some  forces 
which  were  raised  in  the  city  for  the  purpose, 
and  went  out  to  prosecute  it.     The  Romans. 


V*'«! 


246  B>    mibal.      •       [B.C.  192 

Orders  from  Rome.  Hannibal's  mortification 

who  took  care  to  have  agents  in  Carthage  to 
keep  them  acquainted  with  all  that  occurred, 
heard  of  this,  and  sent  word  to  Carthage  to 
warn  the  Carthaginians  that  this  was  contrary, 
to  the  treaty,  and  could  not  be  allowed.  The 
government,  not  willing  to  incur  the  risk  of 
another  visit  from  Scipio,  sent  orders  to  Han- 
nibal to  abandon  the  war  and  return  to  the  city. 
Hannibal  was  compelled  to  submit;  but  after 
having  been  accustomed,  as  he  had  been,  for 
many  years,  to  bid  defiance  to  all  the  armies 
and  fleets  which  Roman  power  could,  with  their* 
utmost  exertion,  bring  against  him,  it  must 
have  been  very  hard  for  such  a  spirit  as  his  to 
find  itself  stopped  and  conquered  now  by  a  word. 
All  the  force  they  could  command  against  him, 
even  at  the  very  gates  of  their  own  city,  was 
once  impotent  and  vain.  Now,  a  mere  message 
and  threat,  coming  across  the  distant  sea,  seeks 
him  out  in  the  remote  deserts  of  Africa,  and  in 
a  moment  deprives  him  of  all  his  power. 

Years  passed  away,  and  Hannibal,  though 
compelled  outwardly  to  submit  to  his  fate,  was 
restless  and  ill  at  ease.  His  scheming  spirit, 
spurred  on  now  by  the  double  stimulus  of  re- 
sentment and  ambition,  was  always  busy,  vainly 
endeavoring  to  discover  some  plan  by  which  he 


B.C.  192.]  Hannibal  an  Exile.  247 

Syria  and  Phoenicia.  King  Antiochus. 

might  again  renew  the  struggle  with  his  ancient 
foe. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  Carthage  was  orig- 
inally a  commercial  colony  from  Tyre,  a  city 
on  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea. 
The  countries  of  Syria  and  Phoenicia  were  in 
the  vicinity  of  Tyre.  They  were  powerful  com- 
mercial communities,  and  they  had  always  re- 
tained very  friendly  relations  with  the  Cartha- 
ginian commonwealth.  Ships  passed  continu- 
ally to  and  fro,  and  always,  in  case  of  calami- 
ties or  disasters  threatening  one  of  these  regions, 
the  inhabitants  naturally  looked  to  the  other 
for  refuge  and  protection,  Carthage  looking 
upon  Phoenicia  as  its  mother,  and  Phoenicia  re- 
garding Carthage  as  her  child.  Now  there  was, 
at  this  time,  a  very  powerful  monarch  on  the 
throne  in  Syria  and  Phoenicia,  named  Antiochus. 
His  capital  was  Damascus.  He  was  wealthy 
and  powerful,  and  was  involved  in  some  diffi- 
culties with  the  Romans.  Their  conquests, 
gradually  extending  eastward,  had  approached 
the  confines  of  Antiochus's  realms,  and  the  twc 
nations  were  on  the  brink  of  war. 

Things  being  in  this  state,  the  enemies  of 
Hannibal  at  Carthage  sent  information  to  the 
Roman  senate  that  he  was  negotiating  and  plot- 


248  Hannibal.  [B.C.  192. 

Hannibal's  intrigues  with  Antiochus.  Embassy  from  Rome. 

ting  with  Antiochus  to  combine  the  Syrian  and 
Carthaginian  forces  against  them,  and  thus 
plunge  the  world  into  another  general  war. 
The  Romans  accordingly  determined  to  send  an 
embassage  to  the  Carthaginian  government,  and 
to  demand  that  Hannibal  should  be  deposed 
from  his  office,  and  given  up  to  them  a  prisoner, 
in  order  that  he  might  be  tried  on  this  charge. 

These  commissioners  came,  accordingly,  to 
Carthage,  keeping,  however,  the  object  of  theii 
mission  a  profound  secret,  since  they  knew  very 
well  that,  if  Hannibal  should  suspect  it,  he 
would  make  his  escape  before  the  Carthaginian 
senate  could  decide  upon  the  question  of  sur- 
rendering him.  Hannibal  was,  however,  too 
wary  for  them.  He  contrived  to  learn  their 
object,  and  immediately  resolved  on  making  his 
escape.  He  knew  that  his  enemies  in  Carthage 
were  numerous  and -powerful,  and  that  the  ani- 
mosity against  him  was  growing  stronger  and 
stronger.  He  did  not  dare,  therefore,  to  trust 
to  the  result  of  the  discussion  in  the  senate,  but 
determined  to  fly. 

He  had  a  small  castle  or  tower  on  the  coast, 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  southeast  of 
Carthage.  He  sent  there  by  an  express,  order- 
ing a  vessel  to  be  ready  to  take  him  to  sea.    Ho 


B.C  192.]    Hannibal  an  Exile.  249 

Flight  of  nannibal.-  Island  of  Cercina 

also  made  arrangements  to  have  horsemen  ready 
at  one  of  the  gates  of  the  city  at  nightfall. 
During  the  day  he  appeared  freely  in  the  public 
streets,  walking  with  an  unconcerned  air,  as  if 
his  mind  was  at  ease,  and  giving  to  the  Roman 
embassadors,  who  were  watching  his  move- 
ments, the  impression  that  he  was  not  medi- 
tating an  escape.  Toward  the  close  of  the  day, 
however,  after  walking  leisurely  home,  he  im- 
mediately made  preparations  for  his  journey. 
As  soon  as  it  was  dark  he  went  to  the  gate  of 
the  city,  mounted  the  horse  which  was  provided 
for  him,  and  fled  across  the  country  to  his  cas- 
tle. Here  he  found  the  vessel  ready  which  he 
had  ordered.     He  embarked,  and  put  to  sea. 

There  is  a  small  island  called  Cercina  at  a 
little  distance  from  the  coast.  Hannibal  reach- 
ed this  island  on  the  same  day  that  he  left  his 
tower.  There  was  a  harbor  here,  where  mer- 
chant ships  were  accustomed  to  come  in.  He 
found  several  Phoenician  vessels  in  the  port, 
some  bound  to  Carthage.  Hannibal's  arrival 
produced  a  strong  sensation  here,  and,  to  ac- 
count for  his  appearance  among  them,  he  said 
he  was  going  on  an  embassy  from  the  Cartha- 
ginian government  to  Tyre. 

He  was  now  afraid  that  some  of  these  vessels 


250  H  A  N  N  I  B  A  L.  [B.C.  192 

Stratagem  of  Hannibal.  He  sails  for  Syria 

that  were  about  setting  sail  for  Carthage  might 
carry  the  news  back  of  his  having  being  seen  at 
Cercina,  and,  to  prevent  this,  he  contrived,  with 
his  characteristic  cunning,  the  following  plan : 
He  sent  around  to  all  the  ship-masters  in  the 
port,  inviting  them  to  a  great  entertainment 
which  he  was  to  give,  and  asked,  at  the  same 
time,  that  they  would  lend  him  the  main-sails 
of  their  ships,  to  make  a  great  awning  with,  to 
shelter  the  guests  from  the  dews  of  the  night 
The  ship-masters,  eager  to  witness  and  enjoy 
the  convivial  scene  which  Hannibal's  proposal 
promised  them,  accepted  the  invitation,  and  or- 
dered their  main-sails  to  be  taken  down.  Of 
course,  this  confined  all  their  vessels  to  port.  In 
the  evening,  the  company  assembled  under  the 
vast  tent,  made  by  the  main-sails,  on  the  shore. 
Hannibal  met  them,  and  remained  with  them 
for  a  time.  In  the  course  of  the  night,  how- 
ever, when  they  were  all  in  the  midst  of  their 
carousing,  he  stole  away,  embarked  on  board  a 
ship,  and  set  sail,  and,  before  the  ship-masters 
could  awake  from  the  deep  and  prolonged  slum- 
bers which  followed  their  wine,  and  rig  their 
main-sails  to  the  masts  again,  Hannibal  was  far 
out  of  reach  on  his  way  to  Syria. 

In  the  mean  time,  there  was  a  great  excite 


B.C.  192.]     Hannibal  an  Exile.  251 

Excitement  at  Carthage.  Hannibal  safe  at  Ephesus. 

ment  produced  at  Carthage  by  the  news  which 
spread  every  where  over  the  city,  the  day  after 
his  departure,  that  he  was  not  to  be  found 
Great  crowds  assembled  before  his  house.  Wild 
and  strange  rumors  circulated  in  explanation 
of  his  disappearance,  but  they  were  contradic- 
tory and  impossible,  and  only  added  to  the  uni- 
versal excitement.  This  excitement  continued 
until  the 'vessels  at  last  arrived  from  Cercina, 
and  made  the  truth  known.  Hannibal  was 
himself,  however,  by  this  time,  safe  beyond  the 
reach  of  all  possible  pursuit.  He  was  sailing 
prosperously,  so  far  as  outward  circumstances 
were  concerned,  but  dejected  and  wretched  in 
heart,  toward  Tyre.  He  landed  there  in  safe- 
ty, and  was  kindly  received.  In  a  few  days  he 
went  into  the  interior,  and,  after  various  wan- 
derings, reached  Ephesus,  where  he  found  Anti- 
ochus,  the  Syrian  king. 

As  soon  as  the  escape  of  Hannibal  was  made 
known  at  Carthage,  the  people  of  the  city  im- 
mediately began  to  fear  that  the  Romans  would 
consider  them  responsible  for  it,  and  that  they 
should  thus  incur  a  rqpewal  of  Roman  hostility. 
In  order  to  avert  this  danger,  they  immediately 
sent  a  deputation  to  Rome,  to  make  known  the 
fact  of  Hannibal's  flight,  and  to  express  the  re- 


252  Hannibal-  [B.C.  192. 

Carthaginian  deputies.  The  change  of  fortune. 

gret  they  felt  on  account  of  it,  in  hopes  thus  to 
save  themselves  from  the  displeasure  of  their 
formidable  foes.  It  may  at  first  view  seem  very 
ungenerous  and  ungrateful  in  the  Carthaginians 
to  abandon  their  general  in  this  manner,  in  the 
hour  of  his  misfortune  and  calamity,  and  to  take 
part  against  him  with  enemies  whose  displeas- 
ure he  had  incurred  only  in  their  service  and 
in  executing  their  will.  And  this  conduct  of 
the  Carthaginians  would  have  to  be  considered 
as  not  only  ungenerous,  but  extremely  incon- 
sistent, if  it  had  been  the  same  individuals  that 
acted  in  the  two  cases.  But  it  was  not.  The 
men  and  the  influences  which  now  opposed 
Hannibal's  projects  and  plans  had  opposed  them 
always  and  from  the  beginning ;  only,  so  long  as 
he  went  on  successfully  and  well,  they  were  in 
the  minority,  and  Hannibal's  adherents  and 
friends  controlled  all  the  public  action  of  the 
city.  But,  now  that  the  bitter  fruits  of  his  am- 
bition and  of  his  totally  unjustifiable  encroach- 
ments on  the  Roman  territories  and  Roman 
rights  began  to  be  realized,  the  party  of  his 
friends  was  overturned,  #ie  power  reverted  to 
the  hands  of  those  who  had  always  opposed  him, 
and  in  trying  to  keep  him  down  when  he  was 
once   fallen,   their  action,  whether   political!) 


B.C.  192.]     Hannibal  an  Exile.  253 

Hannibal's  unconquerable  spirit.  His  new  plans 

right  or  wrong,  was  consistent  with  itself,  and 
can  not  be  considered  as  at  all  subjecting  them 
to  the  charge  of  ingratitude  or  treachery. 

One  might  have  supposed  that  all  Hannibal's 
hopes  and  expectations  of  ever  again  coping  with 
his  great  Roman  enemy  would  have  been  now 
effectually  and  finally  destroyed,  and  that  hence 
forth  he  would  have  given  up  his  active  hostility 
and  would  have  contented  himself  with  seekin* 
some  refuge  where  he  could  spend  the  remain 
der  of  his  days  in  peace,  satisfied  with  securing, 
after  such  dangers  and  escapes,  his  own  person- 
al protection  from  the  vengeance  of  his  enemies. 
But  it  is  hard  to  quell  and  subdue  such  indomit- 
able perseverance  and  energy  as  his.  He  was 
very  little  inclined  yet  to  submit  to  his  fate 
As  soon  as  he  found  himself  at  the  court  of  An- 
tiochus,  he  began  to  form  new  plans  for  making 
war  against  Rome.  He  proposed  to  the  Syrian 
monarch  to  raise  a  naval  force  and  put  it  under 
his  charge.  He  said  that  if  Antiochus  would 
give  him  a  hundred  ships  and  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  men,  he  would  take  the  command  of 
the  expedition  in  person,  and  he  did  not  doubt 
that  he  should  be  able  to  recover  his  lost  ground, 
and  once  more  humble  his  ancient  and  formida- 
ble enemy.     He  would  go  first,  he  said,  with 


>54  Hannibal.  [B.C.  190 

Hanniljal  sends  a  secret  messenger- to  Carthage. 

his  force  to  Carthage,  to  get  the  co-operation 
and  aid  of  his  countrymen  there  in  his  new 
plans.  Then  he  would  make  a  descent  upon 
Italy,  and  he  had  no  doubt  that  he  should  soon 
regain  the  ascendency  there  which  he  had  for- 
merly held. 

Hannibal's  design  of  going  first  to  Carthage 
with  his  Syrian  army  was  doubtless  induced 
by  his  desire  to  put  down  the  party  of  his  ene- 
mies there,  and  to  restore  the  power  to  his  ad- 
herents, and  partisans.  In  order  to  prepare  the 
way  the  more  effectually  for  this,  he  sent  a  se- 
cret messenger  to  Carthage,  while  his  negotia- 
tions with  Antiochus  were  going  on,  to  make 
known  to  his  friends  there  the  new  hopes  which 
he  began  to  cherish,  and  the  new  designs  which 
he  had  formed.  He  knew  that  his  enemies  in 
Carthage  would  be  watching  very  carefully  for 
any  such  communication ;  he  therefore  wrote  no 
letters,  and  committed  nothing  to  paper  which, 
on  being  discovered,  might  betray  him.  He  ex- 
plained, however,  all  his  plans  very  fully  to  his 
messenger,  and  gave  him  minute  and  careful 
instructions  as  to  his  manner  of  communicating 
them. 

The  Carthaginian  authorities  were  indeed 
watching  very  vigilantly,  and  intelligence  was 


B.C.  190.]  Hannibal  an   Exile.  255 

The  Placards.  Excitement  produced  by  them 

brought  to  them,  by  their  spies,  of  the  arrival 
of  this  stranger.  They  immediately  took  meas- 
ures for  arresting  him.  The  messenger,  who 
was  himself  as  vigilant  as  they,  got  intelligence 
of  this  in  his  secret  lurking-place  in  the  city, 
and  determined  immediately  to  fly.  He,  how- 
ever, first  prepared  some  papers  and  placards, 
which  he  posted  up  in  public  places,  in  which 
he  proclaimed  that  Hannibal  was  far  from  con- 
sidering himself  finally  conquered ;  that  he  was, 
on  the  contrary,  forming  new  plans  for  putting 
down  his  enemies  in  Carthage,  resuming  his 
former  ascendency  there,  and  carrying  fire  and 
sword  again  into  the  Roman  territories;  and,  in 
the  mean  time,  he  urged  the  friends  of  Hanni- 
bal in  Carthage  to  remain  faithful  and  true  to 
his  cause 

The  messenger,  after  posting  his  placards, 
fled  from  the  city  in  the  night,  and  went  back 
to  Hannibal.  Of  course,  the  occurrence  pro- 
duced considerable  excitement  in  the  city.  It 
aroused  the  anger  and  resentment  of  Hannibal's 
enemies,  and  awakened  new  encouragement  and 
hope  in  the  hearts  of  his  friends.  Further  than 
this,  however,  it  led  to  no  immediate  results. 
The  power  of  the  party  which  was  opposed  to 
Hann:bal  was  too  firmly  established  at  Carthaga 


256  Hannibal.  [B.C.  J90. 

Roman  commissioners.  Supposed  interview  of  Hannibal  and  Scipio. 

to  be  very  easily  shaken.  They  sent  informa- 
tion to  Rome  of  the  coming  of  Hannibal's  emis- 
sary to  Carthage,  and  of  the  result  of  his  mis- 
sion, and  then  every  thing  went  on  as  before. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Romans,  when  they 
learned  where  Hannibal  had  gone,  sent  two  or 
three  commissioners  there  to  confer  with  the 
Syrian  government  in  respect  to  their  intentions 
and  plans,  and  watch  the  movements  of  Hanni- 
bal. It  was  said  that  Scipio  himself  was  joined 
to  this  embassy,  and  that  he  actually  met  Han- 
nibal at  Ephesus,  and  had  several  personal  in- 
terviews and  conversations  with  him  there. 
Some  ancient  historian  gives  a  particular  ac- 
count of  one  of  these  interviews,  in  which  the 
conversation  turned,  as  it  naturally  would  do 
between  two  such  distinguished  commanders, 
on  military  greatness  and  glory.  Scipio  asked 
Hannibal  whom  he  considered  the  greatest  mil- 
itary hero  that  had  ever  lived.  Hannibal  gave 
the  palm  to  Alexander  the  Great,  because  he 
had  penetrated,  with  comparatively  a  very  small 
number  of  Macedonian  troops,  into  such  re- 
mote regions,  conquered  such  vast  armies,  and 
brought  so  boundless  an  empire  under  his  sway. 
Scipio  then  asked  him  who  he  was  inclined  to 
place  next  to  Alexander.     He   said  Pyrrhus. 


B.C.  190.]  Hannibal  an  Exile.  257 

Hannibal's  opinion  of  Alexander  and  Pyrrhus.  Anecdotes. 

Pyrrhus  was  a  Grecian,  who  crossed  the  Adri- 
atic Sea,  and  made  war,  with  great  success, 
igainst  the  Romans.  Hannibal  said  that  he 
gave  the  second  rank  to  Pyrrhus  because  he 
systematized  and  perfected  the  art  of  war,  and 
ilso  because  he  had  the  power  of  awakening 
i  feeling  of  personal  attachment  to  himself  on 
the  part  of  all  his  soldiers,  and  even  of  the  in- 
habitants of  the  countries  that  he  conquered, 
beyond  any  other  general  that  ever  lived.  Scip- 
10  then  asked  Hannibal  who  came  next  in  or- 
ler,  and  he  replied  that  he  should  give  the  third 
rank  to  himself.  "  And  if,"  added  he,  "I  had 
conquered  Scipio,  I  should  consider  myself  as 
standing  above  Alexander,  Pyrrhus,  and  all  the 
generals  that  the  world  ever  produced." 

Various  other  anecdotes  are  related  of  Han- 
nibal during  the  time  of  his  first  appearance  in 
Syria,  all  indicating  the  very  high  degree  of 
estimation  in  which  he  was  held,  and  the  curi- 
osity and  interest  that  were  every  where  felt  to 
see  him.  On  one  occasion,  it  happened  that  a 
vain  and  self-conceited  orator,  who  knew  little 
of  war  but  from  his  own  theoretic  speculations, 
was  haranguing  an  assembly  where  Hannibal 
was  present,  being  greatly  pleased  with  the  op- 
portunity of  displaying  his  powers  before  so  dig- 
it 


258  Hannibal.  [B.C.  190 

Hannibal's  efforts  prove  vain.  Antiochus  agrees  to  give  him  up 

tinguished  an  auditor.  When  the  discourse 
was  finished,  they  asked  Hannibal  what  he 
thought  of  it.  "I  have  heard,"  said  he,  in  reply, 
"  many  old  dotards  in  the  course  of  my  life,  but 
this  is,  verily,  the.  greatest  dotard  of  them  all." 

Hannibal  failed,  notwithstanding  all  his  per- 
severance, in  obtaining  the  means  to  attack  the 
Romans  again.  He  was  unwearied  in  his  ef- 
forts, but,  though  the  king  sometimes  encour- 
aged his  hopes,  nothing  was  ever  done.  He  re- 
mained in  this  part  of  the  world  for  ten  years, 
striving  continually  to  accomplish  his  aims,  but 
every  year  he  found  himself  further  from  the 
attainment  of  them  than  ever.  The  hour  of 
his  good  fortune  and  of  his  prosperity  were  ob- 
viously gone.  His  plans  all  failed,  his  influence 
ieclined,  his  name  and  renown  were  fast  pass- 
ing away.  At  last,  after  long  and  fruitless 
contests  with  the  Romans,  Antiochus  made  a 
treaty  of  peace  with  them,  and,  among  the  art- 
icles of  this  treaty,  was  one  agreeing  to  give  up 
Hannibal  into  their  power. 

Hannibal  resolved  to  fly.  The  place  of  refuge 
which  he  chose  was  the  island  of  Crete.  He 
found  that  he  could  not  long  remain  here.  He 
had,  however,  brought  with  him  a  large  amount 
of  treasure,  and  when  about  leaving  Crete  again, 


B.C.  190.]  Hannibal  an  Exile.  2d1) 

Hannibal's  treasures.  His  plan  for  securing  them. 

he  was  uneasy  about  this  treasure,  as  he  had 
some  reason  to  fear  that  the  Cretans  were  in- 
tending to  seize  it.  He  must  contrive,  then, 
some  stratagem  to  enable  him  to  get  this  gold 
away.     The  plan  he  adopted  was  this : 

He  filled  a  number  of  earthen  jars  with  lead, 
covering  the  tops  of  them  with  gold  and  silver  - 
These  he  carried,  with  great  appearance  of  cau 
tion  and  solicitude,  to  the  Temple  of  Diana,  a 
very  sacred  edifice,  and  deposited  them  there, 
under  very  special  guardianship  of  the  Cretans, 
to  whom,  as  he  said,  he  intrusted  all  his  treas- 
ures. They  received  their  false  deposit  with 
many  promises  to  keep  it  safely,  and  then  Han- 
nibal went  away  with  his  real  gold  cast  in  the 
center  of  hollow  statues  of  brass,  which  he  car- 
ried with  him,  without  suspicion,  as  objects  of 
art  of  very  little  value. 

Hannibal  fled  from  kingdom  to  kingdom,  and 
from  province  to  province,  until  life  became  a 
miserable  burden.  The  determined  hostility  of' 
the  Roman  senate  followed  him  every  where, 
harassing  him  with  continual  anxiety  and  fear, 
and  destroying  all  hope  of  comfort  and  peace. 
His  mind  was  a  prey  to  bitter  recollections  of 
the  past,  and  still  more  dreadful  forebodings  foi 
the  future.     He  had  spent  all  the  morning  of 


260  Hannibal  [B.C.  182 

Hannibal's  unhappy  condition.  The  potion  of  poison 

his  life  in  inflicting  the  most  terrible  injuries  on 
the  objects  of  his  implacable  animosity  and  hate, 
although  they  had  never  injured  him,  and  now, 
in  the  evening  of  his  days,  it  became  his  des- 
tiny to  feel  the  pressure  of  the  same  terror  and 
suffering  inflicted  upon  him.  The  hostility 
which  he  had  to  fear  was  equally  merciless  with 
that  which  he  had  exercised ;  perhaps  it  was 
made  still  more  intense  by  being  mingled  with 
what  they  who  felt  it  probably  considered  a  just 
resentment  and  revenge. 

When  at  length  Hannibal  found  that  the  Ro- 
mans were  hemming  him  in  more  and  more 
closely,  and  that  the  danger  increased  of  his  fall- 
ing at  last  into  their  power,  he  had  a  potion  of 
poison  prepared,  and  kept  it  always  in  readiness, 
determined  to  die  by  his  own  hand  rather  than 
to  submit  to  be  given  up  to  his  enemies.  The 
time  for  taking  the  poison  at  last  arrived.  The 
wretched  fugitive  was  then  in  Bithynia,  a  king* 
dom  of  Asia  Minor.  The  King  of  Bithynia 
sheltered  him  for  a  time,  but  at  length  agreed 
to  give  him  up  to  the  Romans.  Hannibal, 
learning  this,  prepared  for  flight.  But  he  found, 
on  attempting  his  escape,  that  all  the  modes  of 
exit  from  the  palace  which  he  occupied,  even 
the  secret  ones  which  he  had  expressly  contriv- 


B.C.182.]     Hannibal  an  Exile.  261 

Hannibal  fails  in  his  attempt  to  escape.  He  poisons  himself. 

ed  to  aid  his  flight,  were  taken  possession  of  and 
guarded.  Escape  was,  therefore,  no  longer  pos- 
sible, and  Hannibal  went  to  his  apartment  and 
sent  for  the  poison.  He  was  now  an  old  man, 
nearly  seventy  years  of  age,  and  he  was  worn 
down  and  exhausted  by  his  protracted  anxieties 
and  sufferings.  He  was  glad  to  die.  He  drank 
the  poison,  and  in  a  few  hours  ceased  to  breathe 


62   Carthage  Destroyed.  [B.C.  148 

Destruction  of  Carthage.  The  third  Punic  war. 


Chapter  XII. 

The  Destruction  of  Carthage. 

rilHE  consequences  of  Hannibal's  reckless 
f-  ambition,  and  of  his  wholly  unjustifiable 
aggression  on  Roman  rights  to  gratify  it,  did 
not  end  with  his  own  personal  ruin.  The  flame 
which  he  had  kindled  continued  to  burn  until 
at  last  it  accomplished  the  entire  and  irretriev- 
able destruction  of  Carthage.  This  was  effect- 
ed in  a  third  and  final  war  between  the  Cartha- 
ginians and  the  Romans,  which  is  known  in 
history  as  the  third  Punic  war.  With  a  narra- 
tive of  the  events  of  this  war,  ending,  as  it  did, 
in  the  total  destruction  of  the  city,  we  shall 
close  this  history  of  Hannibal. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  war  which 
Hannibal  himself  waged  against  Rome  was  the 
second  in  the  series,  the  contest  in  which  Reg- 
ulus  figured  so  prominently  having  been  the 
first.  The  one  whose  history  is  now  to  be  giv- 
en is  the  third.  The  reader  will  distinctly  un- 
derstand the  chronological  relations  of  these 
contests  by  the  following  table : 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage    Destroyed. 


26* 


Chronological  table  of  the  Punic  wars. 


TABLE. 


Bate. 
B.C. 


Punic  Wars. 


264 

262 


241 


217 
218 
216 


148 
145 


War  commenced  in  Sicily    .    .    . 
Naval  battles  in  the  Mediterranean 
Regulus  sent  prisoner  to  Rome 
Peace  concluded 


Peace  for  24  years. 


Hannibal  attacks  Saguntum 
Crosses  the  Alps   .... 
Battle  of  Cannae    .... 
Is  conquered  by  Scipio 
Peace  concluded  .    . 


Peace  for  52  years. 


War  declared 
Carthage  destroyed 


I. 

24  years. 


II. 

17  years. 


III. 
3  years. 


These  three  Panic  wars  extended,  as  the  ta- 
W •■»  shows,  over  a  period  of  more  than  a  hund- 


264  Hannibal.  [B.C.  148 

Character  ot  the  Punic  wars.  Intervals  between  them. 

red  years.  Each  successive  contest  in  the  se- 
ries was  shorter,  but  more  violent  and  desper- 
ate than  its  predecessor,  while  the  intervals  of 
peace  were  longer.  Thus  the  first  Punic  wai 
continued  for  twenty-four  years,  the  second- 
about  seventeen,  and  the  third  only  three  01 
four.  The  interval,  too,  between  the  first  and 
second  was  twenty-four  years,  while  between 
the  second  and  third  there  was  a  sort  of  peace 
for  about  fifty  years.  These  differences  were 
caused,  indeed,  in  some  degree,  by  the  accident- 
al circumstances  on  which  the  successive  rup- 
tures depended,  but  they  were  not  entirely  ow- 
ing to  that  cause.  The  longer  these  belligerent 
relations  between  the  two  countries  continued, 
and  the  more  they  both  experienced  the  awful 
effects  and  consequences  of  their  quarrels,  the 
less  disposed  they  were  to  renew  such  dreadful 
struggles,  and  yet,  when  they  did  renew  them, 
they  engaged  in  them  with  redoubled  energy 
of  determination  and  fresh  intensity  of  hate. 
Thus  the  wars  followed  each  other  at  greater 
intervals,  but  the  conflicts,  when  they  came, 
though  shorter  in  duration,  were  more  and  more 
desperate  and  merciless  in  character. 

We  have  said  that,  after  the  close  of  the  second 
Punic  war,  there  was  a  sort  of  peace  for  about 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.       265 

Animosities  and  dissensions.  Numiilia 

fifty  years.  Of  course,  during  this  time,  one  gen- 
eration after  another  of  public  men  arose,  both 
in  Rome  and  Carthage,  each  successive  group, 
on  both  sides,  inheriting  the  suppressed  animos- 
ity and  hatred  which  had  been  cherished  by  their 
predecessors.  Of  course,  as  long  as  Hannibal 
had  lived,  and  had  continued  his  plots  and 
schemes  in  Syria,  he  was  the  means  of  keeping 
up  a  continual  irritation  among  the  people  of 
Home  against  the  Carthaginian  name.  It  is 
true  that  the  government  at  Carthage  disavowed 
his  acts,  and  professed  to  be  wholly  opposed  to 
his  designs ;  but  then  it  was,  of  course,  very 
well  known  at  Rome  that  this  was  only  because 
they  thought  he  was  not  able  to  execute  them. 
They  had  no  confidence  whatever  in  Carthagin- 
ian faith  or  honesty,  and,  of  course,  there  could 
be  no  real  harmony  or  stable  peace. 

There  arose  gradually,  also,  another  source 
of  dissension.  By  referring  to  the  map,  the  read- 
er will  perceive  that  there  lies,  to  the  westward 
of  Carthage,  a  country  called  Numidia.  This 
country  was  a  hundred  miles  or  more  in  breadth, 
and  extended  back  several  hundred  miles  into 
the  interior.  It  was  a  very  rich  and  fertile  re- 
gion, and  contained  many  powerful  and  wealthy 
cities.     The  inhabitants  were  warlike,  too,  and 


266  Hannibal.  IB.C.  148. 

Numidian  horsemen.  Masinissa 

were  particularly  celebrated  for  their  cavalry. 
The  ancient  historians  say  that  they  used  to 
ride  their  horses  into  the  field  without  saddles, 
and  often  without  bridles,  guiding  and  controll- 
ing them  by  their  voices,  and  keeping  their 
seats  securely  by  the  exercise  of  great  personal 
strength  and  consummate  skill.  These  Ni* 
midian  horsemen  are  often  alluded  to  in  th<s 
narratives  of  Hannibal's  campaigns,  and,  in  fact, 
in  all  the  military  histories  of  the  times. 

Among  the  kings  who  reigned  in  Numidia 
was  one  who  had  taken  sides  with  the  Romans 
in  the  second  Punic  war.  His  name  was  Mas- 
inissa. He  became  involved  in  some  struggle 
for  power  with  a  neighboring  monarch  named 
Syphax,  and  while  he,  that  is,  Masinissa,  had  al- 
lied himself  to  the  Romans,  Syphax  had  joined 
the  Carthaginians,  each  chieftain  hoping,  by 
this  means,  to  gain  assistance  from  his  allies 
in  conquering  the  other.  Masinissa's  patrons 
proved  to  be  the  strongest,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
second  Punic  war,  when  the  conditions  of  peace 
were  made,  Masinissa's  dominions  were  en- 
larged, and  the  undisturbed  possession  of  them 
confirmed  to  him,  the  Carthaginians  being  bound 
by  express  stipulations  not  to  molest  him  in  any 
way. 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.    26? 

parties  at  Rome  and  Carthage.  Their  differences 

In  commonwealths  like  those  of  Rome  and 
Carthage,  there  will  always  be  two  great  par- 
ties struggling  against  each  other  for  the  pos- 
session of  power.  Each  wishes  to  avail  itself 
of  every  opportunity  to  oppose  and  thwart  the 
other,  and  they  consequently  almost  always  take 
different  sides  in  all"  the  great  questions  of  pub- 
lic policy  that  arise.  There  were  two  such  par- 
ties at  Rome,  and  they  disagreed  in  respect  to 
the  course  which  should  be  pursued  in  regard 
to  Carthage,  one  being  generally  in  favor  of 
peace,  the  other  perpetually  calling  for  war. 
In  the  same  manner  there  was  at  Carthage  a 
similar  dissension,  the  one  side  in  the  contest 
being  desirous  to  propitiate  the  Romans  and 
avoid  collisions  with  them,  while  the  other  par- 
ty were  very  restless  and  uneasy  under  the 
pressure  of  the  Roman  power  upon  them,  and 
were  endeavoring  continually  to  foment  feelings 
of  hostility  against  their  ancient  enemies,  as  if 
they  wished  that  war  should  break  out  again. 
The  latter  party  were  not  strong  enough  to 
bring  the  Carthaginian  state  into  an  open  rup- 
ture with  Rome  itself,  but  they  succeeded  at 
last  in  getting  their  government  involved  in  a 
dispute  with  Masinissa,  and  in  leading  out  an 
army  to  give  him  battle. 


268  Hannibal.  [B.C.  148 

Masinissa  prepares  for  war.  Hasdrubal 

Fifty  years  had  passed  away,  as  has  already 
been  remarked,  since  the  close  of  Hannibal's 
war.  During  this  time,  Scipio — that  is,  the 
Scipio  who  conquered  Hannibal — had  disappear- 
ed from  the  stage.  Masinissa  himself  was  very 
far  advanced  in  life,  being  over  eighty  years  of 
age.  He,  however,  still  retained  the  strength 
and  energy  which  had  characterized  him  in  his 
prime.  He  drew  together  an  immense  army, 
and  mounting,  like  his  soldiers,  bare-back  upon 
his  horse,  he  rode  from  rank  to  rank,  gave  the 
necessary  commands,  and  matured  the  arrange- 
ments for  battle. 

The  name  of  the  Carthaginian  general  on 
this  occasion  was  Hasdrubal.  This  was  a  very 
common  name  at  Carthage,  especially  among 
the  friends  and  family  of  Hannibal.  The  bear- 
er of  it,  in  this  case,  may  possibly  have  receiv- 
ed it  from  his  parents  in  commemoration  of  the 
brother  of  Hannibal,  who  lost  his  head  in  de- 
scending into  Italy  from  the  Alps,  inasmuch  as 
during  the  fifty  years  of  peace  which  had  elaps- 
ed, there  was  ample  time  for  a  child  born  after 
that  event  to  grow  up  to  full  maturity.  At  any 
rate,  the  new  Hasdrubal  inherited  the  inveter- 
ate hatred  to  Rome  which  characterized  his 
namesake,  and  he  and  his  party  had  contrived 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        ^69 

Carthage  declares  war.  Parallel  between  Hannibal  and  Hasdrubal. 

to  gain  a  temporary  ascendency  in  Carthage, 
and  they  availed  themselves  of  their  brief  pos- 
session of  power  to  renew,  indirectly  at  least, 
the  contest  with  Rome.  They  sent  the  rival 
leaders  into  banishment,  raised  an  army,  and 
Hasdrubal  himself  taking  the  command  of  it, 
they  went  forth  in  great  force  to  encounter 
Masinissa. 

It  was  in  a  way  very  similar  to  this  that 
Hannibal  had  commenced  his  war  with  Rome, 
by  seeking  first  a  quarrel  with  a  Roman  ally. 
Hannibal,  it  is  true,  had  commenced  his  ag- 
gressions at  Saguntum,  in  Spain.  Hasdrubal 
begins  in  Numidia,  in  Africa,  but,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  difference  of  geographical  locality, 
all  seems  the  same,  and  Hasdrubal  very  proba- 
bly supposed  that  he  was  about  to  enter  him- 
self upon  the  same  glorious  career  which  had 
immortalized  his  great  ancestor's  name. 

There  was  another  analogy  between  the  two 
cases,  viz.,  that  both  Hannibal  and  Hasdrubal 
had  strong  parties  opposed  to  them  in  Carthage 
in  the  incipient  stages  of  their  undertakings. 
In  the  present  instance,  the  opposition  had  been 
violently  suppressed,  and  the  leaders  of  it  sent 
into  banishment ;  but  still  the  elemp'^ts  remain- 
ed, ready,  in  case  of  any  disaster  to  Hasdrnbal^ 


270  Hannibal.  [B.C.  14S 

battle  with  Masinissa.  Defeat  of  the  Carthaginians 

arms,  or  any  other  occurrence  tending  to  dimin- 
ish his  power,  to  rise  at  once  and  put  him  down. 
Hasdrubal  had  therefore  a  double  enemy  to  con- 
tend against :  one  before  him,  on  the  battle- 
field, and  the  other,  perhaps  still  more  formida- 
ble, in  the  city  behind  him. 

The  parallel,  however,  ends  here.  Hannibal 
conquered  at  Saguntum,  but  Hasdrubal  was 
entirely  defeated  in  the  battle  in  Nnmidia.  The 
battle  was  fought  long  and  desperately  on  both 
sides,  but  the  Carthaginians  were  obliged  to 
yield,  and  they  retreated  at  length  in  confusion 
to  seek  shelter  in  their  camp.  The  battle  was 
witnessed  by  a  Roman  officer  who  stood  upon 
a  neighboring  hill,  and  looked  down  upon  the 
scene  with  intense  interest  all  the  day.  It  was 
Scipio — the  younger  Scipio — who  became  after- 
ward the  principal  actor  in  the  terrible  scenes 
which  were  enacted  in  the  war  which  followed. 
He  was  then  a  distinguished  officer  in  the  Ro- 
man army,  and  was  on  duty  in  Spain.  His 
commanding  general  there  had  sent  him  to  Af- 
rica to  procure  some  elephants  from  Masinissa 
for  the  use  of  the  army.  He  came  to  Numidia, 
accordingly,  for  this  purpose,  and  as  the  battle 
between  Masinissa  and  Hasdrubal  came  i  n 
while  he  was  there3  he  remained  to  witness  *L 


B.C.  148.]  Carthaue  Destroyed.         27 1 

The  younger  Scipio.  A  spectator  of  the  battle. 

This  second  Scipio  was  not,  by  blood,  any- 
relative  of  the  other,  but  he  had  been  adopted 
by  the  elder  Scipio's  son,  and  thas  received  his 
name ;  so  that  he  was,  by  adoption,  a  grand- 
son. He  was,  even  at  this  time,  a  man  of  high 
consideration  among  all  who  knew  him,  for  his 
great  energy  and  efficiency  of  character,  as  well 
as  for  his  sound  judgment  and  practical  good 
sense.  He  occupied  a  very  singular  position  at 
the  time  of  this  battle,  such  as  very  few  great 
commanders  have  ever  been  placed  in  ;  for,  as 
he  himself  was  attached  to  a  Roman  army  in 
Spain,  having  been  sent  merely  as  a  military 
messenger  to  Numidia,  he  was  a  neutral  in  this 
contest,  and  could  not,  properly,  take  part  on 
either  side.  He  had,  accordingly,  only  to  take 
his  place  upon  the  hill,  and  look  down  upon  the 
awful  scene  as  upon  a  spectacle  arranged  for 
his  special  gratification.  He  speaks  of  it  as  if 
he  were  highly  gratified  with  the  opportunity 
he  enjoyed,  saying  that  only  two  such  cases  had 
ever  occurred  before,  where  a  general  coul<! 
look  down,  in  such  a  way,  upon  a  great  battle- 
field, and  witness  the  whole  progress  of  the  fight, 
nimself  a  cool  and  disinterested  spectator.  He 
was  greatly  excited  by  the  scene,  and  he  speaks 
particularly  of  the  appearance  of  the  veteran 


272  Hannibal.  '  [JB.C.  148 

Negotiations  for  peace.  Scipio  made  umpire 

Masinissa,  then  eighty-four  years  old,  who  rode 
all  day  from  rank  to  rank,  on  a  wild  and  impet- 
uous charger,  without  a  saddle,  to  give  his  orders 
to  his  men,  and  to  encourage  and  animate  them 
by  his  voice  and  his  example. 

Hasdrubal  retreated  with  his  forces  to  his 
camp  as  soon  as  the  battle  was  over,  and  in- 
trenched himself  there,  while  Masinissa  advanc- 
ed with  his  army,  surrounded  the  encampment, 
and  hemmed  the  imprisoned  fugitives  in.  Find- 
ing himself  in  extreme  and  imminent  danger, 
Hasdrubal  sent  to  Masinissa  to  open  negotiations 
for  peace,  and  he  proposed  that  Scipio  should 
act  as  a  sort  of  umpire  or  mediator  between  the 
two  parties,  to  arrange  the  terms.  Scipio  was 
not  likely  to  be  a  very  impartial  umpire ;  but 
still,  his  interposition  would  afford  him,  as  Has- 
drubal thought,  some  protection  against  any 
excessive  and  extreme  exorbitancy  on  the  part 
of  his  conqueror.  The  plan,  however,  did  not 
succeed.  Even  Scipio's  terms  were  found  by 
Hasdrubal  to  be  inadmissible.  He  required 
that  the  Carthaginians  should  accord  to  Masi- 
nissa a  certain  extension  of  territory.  Hasdru- 
bal was  willing  to  assent  to  this.  They  were 
to  pay  him,  also,  a  large  sum  of  money.  He 
agreed,  also,  to  this.     They  were,  moreover,  to 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        273 

Hasdrubal  surrenders.  Terms  imposed  by  Masinissa. 

allow  Hasdrubal's  banished  opponents  to  return 
to  Carthage.  This,  by  putting  the  party  op- 
posed to  Hasdrubal  once  more  into  power  in 
Carthage,  would  have  been  followed  by  his  own 
fall  and  ruin  ;  he  could  not  consent  to  it.  He 
remained,  therefore,  shut  up  in  his  camp,  and 
Scipio,  giving  up  the  hope  of  effecting  an  ac- 
commodation, took  the  elephants  which  had 
been  provided  for  him,  and  returned  across  the 
Mediterranean  to  Spain. 

Soon  after  this,  Hasdrubal's  army,  worn  out 
with  hunger  and  misery  in  their  camp,  com- 
pelled him  to  surrender  on  Masinissa's  own 
terms.  The  men  were  allowed  to  go  free,  but 
most  of  them  perished  on  the  way  to  Carthage. 
Hasdrubal  himself  succeeded  in  reaching  some 
place  of  safety,  but  the  influence  of  his  party 
was  destroyed  by  the  disastrous  result  of  his 
enterprise,  and  his  exiled  enemies  being  recall- 
ed in  accordance  with  the  treaty  of  surrender, 
the  opposing  party  were  immediately  restored 
to  power. 

Under  these  new  councils,  the  first  measure 
of  the  Carthaginians  was  to  impeach  Hasdrubal 
on  a  charge  of  treason,  for  having  involved  his 
country  in  these  difficulties,  and  the  next  was 
to  send  a  solemn  embassy  to  Rome,  to  acknowl- 
S 


274  Hannibal.  [B.C.  148 

Carthaginian  embassy  to  Rome.  Their  mission  fruitless 

edge  the  fault  of  which  their  nation  had  been 
guilty,  to  offer  to  surrender  Hasdrubal  into 
their  hands,  as  the  principal  author  of  the  deed, 
and  to  ask  what  further  satisfaction  the  Romans 
demanded. 

In  the  mean  time,  before  these  messengers 
arrived,  the  Romans  had  been  deliberating  what 
to  do.  The  strongest  party  were  in  favor  of 
urging  on  the  quarrel  with  Carthage  and  de- 
claring war.  They  had  not,  however,  come  to 
any  positive  decision.  They  received  the  depu- 
tation, therefore,  very  coolly  >  and  made  them  no 
direct  reply.  As  to  the  satisfaction  which  the 
Carthaginians  ought  to  render  to  the  Romans 
for  having  made  war  upon  their  ally  contrary 
to  the  solemn  covenants  of  the  treaty,  they  said 
that  that  was  a  question  for  the  Carthaginians 
themselves  to  consider.  They  had  nothing  at 
present  to  say  upon  the  subject.  The  deputies 
returned  to  Carthage  with  this  reply,  which,  of 
course,  produced  great  uneasiness  and  anxiety. 

The  Carthaginians  were  more  and  more  de- 
sirous now  to  do  every  thing  in  their  power  to 
avert  the  threatened  danger  of  Roman  hostility 
They  sent  a  new  embassy  to  Rome,  with  still 
more  humble  professions  than  before.  The  em- 
bassy set  sail  from  Carthage  with  very  little 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        275 

Another  embassy.  The  Romans  declare  war. 

hope,  however,  of  accomplishing  the  object  of 
their  mission.  They  were  authorized,  never- 
theless, to  make  the  most  unlimited  conces- 
sions, and  to  submit  to  any  conditions  what- 
ever to  avert  the  calamity  of  another  war. 

But  the  Romans  had  been  furnished  with  a 
pretext  for  commencing  hostilities  again,  and 
there  was  a  very  strong  party  among  them  now 
who  were  determined  to  avail  themselves  of  this 
opportunity  to  extinguish  entirely  the  Cartha- 
ginian power.  War  had,  accordingly,  been  de- 
clared by  the  Roman  senate  very  soon  after  the 
first  embassy  had  returned,  a  fleet  and  army 
had  been  raised  and  equipped,  and  the  expedi- 
tion had  sailed.  When,  therefore,  the  embassy 
arrived  in  Rome,  they  found  that  the  war,  which 
it  was  the  object  of  their  mission  to  avert,  had 
been  declared. 

The  Romans,  however,  gave  them  audience. 
The  embassadors  expressed  their  willingness  to 
submit  to  any  terms  that  the  senate  might  pro- 
pose for  arresting  the  war.  The  senate  replied 
that  they  were  willing  to  make  a  treaty  with 
the  Carthaginians,  on  condition  that  the  latter 
were  to  surrender  themselves  entirely  to  the 
Roman  power,  and  bind  themselves  to  obey  such 
orders  as  the  consuls,  on  their  arrival  in  Africa 


276  Hannibal.  [B.C.  148 

Negotiations  for  peace.  The  Romans  demand  hostages 

with  the  army,  should  issue ;  the  Romans,  on 
their  part,  guarantying  that  they  should  con- 
tinue in  the  enjoyment  of  their  liberty,  of  their 
territorial  possessions,  and  of  their  laws.  As 
proof,  however,  of  the  Carthaginian  honesty  of 
purpose  in  making  the  treaty,  and  security  for 
their  future  submission,  they  were  required  to 
give  up  to  the  Romans  three  hundred  hostages. 
These  hostages  were  to  be  young  persons  from 
the  first  families  in  Carthage,  the  sons  of  the 
men  who  were  most  prominent  in  society  there, 
and  whose  influence  might  be  supposed  to  con- 
trol the  action  of  the  nation. 

The  embassadors  could  not  but  consider  these 
as  very  onerous  terms.  They  did  not  know  what 
orders  the  consuls  would  give  them  on  their  ar- 
rival in  Africa^  and  they  were  required  to  put 
the  commonwealth  wholly  into  their  power. 
Besides,  in  the  guarantee  which  the  Romans 
offered  them,  their  territories  and  their  laws 
were  to  be  protected,  but  nothing  was'  said  of 
their  cities,  their  ships,  or  their  arms  and  mu- 
nitions of  war.  The  agreement  there,  if  execu- 
ted, would  put  the  Carthaginian  commonwealth 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  their  masters,  in  respect 
to  all  those  things  which  were  in  those  days 
most  valuable  to  a  nation  as  elements  of  power 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        211 

Cruelty  of  the  hostage  system.  Return  of  the  embassadors 

Still,  the  embassadors  had  been  instructed  to 
make  peace  with  the  Romans  on  any  terms,  and 
they  accordingly  acceded  to  these,  though  with 
great  reluctance.  They  were  especially  averse 
to  the  agreement  in  respect  to  the  hostages. 

This  system,  which  prevailed  universally  in 
ancient  times,  of  having  the  government  of  one  . 
nation  surrender  the  children  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished citizens  to  that  of  another,  as  secu- 
rity for  the  fulfillment  of  its  treaty  stipulations, 
was  a  very  cruel  hardship  to  those  who  had  to 
suffer  the  separation ;  but  it  would  seem  that 
there  was  no  other  security  strong  enough  to 
hold  such  lawless  powers  as  governments  were 
in  those  days,  to  their  word.  Stern  and  rough 
as  the  men  of  those  warlike  nations  often  were, 
mothers  were  the  same  then  as  now,  and  they 
suffered  quite  as  keenly  in  seeing  their  children 
sent  away  from  them,  to  pine  in  a  foreign  land, 
in  hopeless  exile,  for  many  years ;  in  danger,  too, 
continually,  of  the  most  cruel  treatment,  and 
even  of  death  itself,  to  revenge  some  alleged 
governmental  wrong. 

Of  course,  the  embassadors  knew,  when  they 
returned  to  Carthage  with  these  terms,  that 
they  were  bringing  heavy  tidings.  The  news, 
in  fact,  when  it  came,  threw  the  community 


278  Hannibal.  [B.C.  14S 

Consternation  in  Carthage.  Its  deplorable  condition. 

into  the  most  extreme  distress.  It  is  said  that 
the  whole  city  was  rilled  with  cries  and  lamen- 
tations. The  mothers,  who  felt  that  they  were, 
about  to  be  bereaved,  beat  their  breasts,  and 
tore  their  hair,  and  manifested  by  every  other 
sign  their  extreme  and  unmitigated  woe.  They 
begged  and  entreated  their  husbands  and  fathers 
not  to  consent  to  such  cruel  and  intolerable  con- 
ditions. They  could  not,  and  they  would  not 
give  up  their  children. 

The  husbands  and  the  fathers,  however,  felt 
compelled  to  resist  all  these  entreaties.  They 
could  not  now  undertake  to  resist  the  Roman 
will.  Their  army  had  been  well-nigh  destroy- 
ed in  the  battle  with  Masinissa  ;  their  city  was 
consequently  defenseless,  and  the  Roman  fleet 
had  already  reached  its  African  port,  and  the 
troops  were  landed.  There  was  no  possible 
way,  it  appeared,  of  saving  themselves  and  their 
city  from  absolute  destruction,  but  entire  sub- 
mission to  the  terms  which  their  stern  conquer- 
ors had  imposed  upon  them. 

The  hostages  were  required  to  be  sent,  with- 
in thirty  days,  to  the  island  of  Sicily,  to  a  port 
on  the  western  extremity  of  the  island,  called 
Lilybaeum.  Lilybseum  was  the  port  in  Sicily 
nearest  to  Carthage,  being  perhaps  at  a  distance 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        27i> 

Selecting  the  hostages.  The  hour  of  parting. 

of  a  hundred  miles  across  the  waters  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea.  A  Roman  escort  was  to 
be  ready  to  receive  them  there  and  conduct 
them  to  Rome.  Although  thirty  days  were  al- 
lowed to  the  Carthaginians  to  select  and  send 
forward  the  hostages,  they  determined  not  to 
avail  themselves  of  this  offered  delay,  but  to 
send  the  unhappy  children  forward  at  once,  that 
they  might  testify  to  the  Roman  senate,  by  this 
their  promptness,  that  they  were  very  earnestly 
desirous  to  propitiate  their  favor. 

The  children  were  accordingly  designated, 
one  from  each  of  the  leading  families  in  the 
city,  and  three  hundred  in  all.  The  reader 
must  imagine  the  heart-rending  scenes  of  suf- 
fering which  must  have  desolated  these  three 
hundred  families  and  homes,  when  the  stern 
and  inexorable  edict  came  to  each  of  them  that 
one  loved  member  of  the  household  must  be  se- 
lected to  go.  And  when,  at  last,  the  hour  ar- 
rived for  their  departure,,  and  they  assembled 
upon  the  pier,  the  picture  was  one  of  intense 
and  unmingled  suffering.  The  poor  exiles  stood 
bewildered  with  terror  and  grief,  about  to  part 
with  all  that  they  ever  held  dear — their  parents, 
their  brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  native  land 
— to  go  thev  knew  not  whither,  under  the  care 


ZSO  Hannibal.  [B.C.  14^. 

The  parting  scene.  Grief  and  despair. 

of  iron-hearted  soldiers,  who  seemed  to  know 
no  feelings  of  tenderness  or  compassion  for  their 
woes.  Their  disconsolate  mothers  wept  and 
groaned  aloud,  clasping  the  loved  ones  who 
were  about  to  be  torn  forever  from  them  in  theii 
arms,  in  a  delirium  of  maternal  affection  and 
irrepressible  grief;  their  brothers  and  sisters, 
and  their  youthful  friends  stood  by,  some  almost 
frantic  with  emotions  which  they  did  not  at- 
tempt to  suppress,  others  mute  and  motionless 
in  their  sorrow,  shedding  bitter  tears  of  anguish, 
or  gazing  wildly  on  the  scene  with  looks  of  de- 
spair ;  while  the  fathers,  whose  stern  duty  il 
was  to  pass  through  this  scene  unmoved,  walk- 
ed to  and  fro  restlessly,  in  deep  but  silent  dis= 
tress,  spoke  in  broken  and  incoherent  words  tc 
one  another,  and  finally  aided,  by  a  mixture  of 
persuasion  and  gentle  force,  in  drawing  the 
children  away  from  their  mothers'  arms,  and 
getting  them  on  board  the  vessels  which  were 
to  convey  them  away.  The  vessels  made  sail, 
and  passed  off  slowly  from  the  shore.  The 
mothers  watched  them  till  they  could  no  longei 
be  seen,  and  then  returned,  disconsolate  and 
wretched,  to  their  homes ;  and  then  the  grief 
and  agitation  of  this  parting  scene  was  succeed- 
ed by  the  anxious  suspense  which  now  pervad 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        28] 

Advance  of  the  Roman  army.  Surrender  of  Utics 

ed  the  whole  city  to  learn  what  new  dangers 
and  indignities  they  were  to  suffer  from  the  ap- 
proaching Roman  army,  which  they  knew  must 
now  be  well  on  its  way. 

The  Roman  army  landed  at  Utica.  Utica 
was  a  large  city  to  the  north  of  Carthage,  not 
far  from  it,  and  upon  the  same  bay.  When 
the  people  of  Utica  found  that  another  serious 
collision  was  to  take  place  between  Rome  and 
Carthage,  they  had  foreseen  what  would  prob- 
ably be  the  end  of  the  contest,  and  they  had  de- 
cided that,  in  order  to  save  themselves  from  the 
ruin  which  was  plainly  impending  over  the  sis- 
ter city,  they  must  abandon  her  to  her  fate,  and 
make  common  cause  with  Rome.  They  had, 
accordingly,  sent  deputies  to  the  Roman  senate, 
offering  to  surrender  Utica  to  their  power.  The 
Romans  had  accepted  the  submission,  and  had 
made  this  city,  in  consequence,  the  port  of  de- 
barkation for  their  army. 

As  soon  as  the  news  arrived  at  Carthage 
that  the  Roman  army  had  landed  at  Utica,  the 
people  sent  deputies  to  inquire  what  were  the 
orders  of  the  consuls,  for  it  will  be  recollected 
they  had  bound  themselves  by  the  treaty  to 
obey  the  orders  which  the  consuls  were  to  bring. 
They  found,  when  they  arrived  there,  that  the 


282  Hannibal.  [B.C.  14^.. 

Demnuds  of  the  Romans.  The  Carthaginians  comply 

bay  was  covered  with  the  Roman  shipping. 
There  were  fifty  vessels  of  war,  of  three  banks 
of  oars  each,  and  a  vast  number  of  transports 
besides.  There  was,  too,  in  the  camp  upon  the 
shore,  a  force  of  eighty  thousand  foot  soldiers 
and  four  thousand  horse,  all  armed  and  equipped 
in  the  most  perfect  manner. 

The  deputies  were  convinced  that  this  was  a 
force  which  it  was  in  vain  for  their  countrymen 
to  think  of  resisting.  They  asked,  trembling, 
for  the  consuls'  orders.  ■  The  consuls  informed 
them  that  the  orders  of  the  Roman  senate  were, 
first,  that  the  Carthaginians  should  furnish  them 
with  a  supply  of  corn  for  the  subsistence  of  their 
troops.  The  deputies  went  back  to  Carthage 
with  the  demand. 

The  Carthaginians  resolved  to  comply.  They 
were  bound  by  their  treaty  and  by  the  hostages 
they  had  given,  as  well  as  intimidated  by  the 
presence  of  the  Roman  force.  They  furnished 
the  corn. 

The  consuls,  soon  after  this,  made  another 
demand  of  the  Carthaginians.  It  was,  that  they 
should  surrender  to  them  all  their  vessels  of 
war.  They  were  more  unwilling  to  comply 
with  this  requisition  than  with  the  other ;  but. 
they  assented  at  last.     They  hoped  that  the  de- 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.         283 

rhe  Romans  demand  all  the  munitions  of  war.         Their  great  number. 

mands  of  their  enemies  would  stop  here,  and 
that,  satisfied  with  having  weakened  them  thus 
far,  they  would  go  away  and  leave  them ;  they 
oould  then  build  new  ships  again  when  better 
times  should  return. 

But  the  Romans  were  not  satisfied  yet.  They 
sent  a  third  order,  that  the  Carthaginians  should 
deliver  up  all  their  arms,  military  stores,  and 
warlike  machines  of  every  kind,  by  sending  them 
into  the  Roman  camp.  The  Carthaginians  were 
rendered  almost  desperate  by  this  requisition. 
Many  were  determined  that  they  would  not 
submit  to  it,  but  would  resist  at  all  hazards. 
Others  despaired  of  all  possibility  of  resisting 
now,  and  gave  up  all  as  lost ;  while  the  three 
hundred  families  from  which  the  hostages  had 
gone,  trembled  for  the  safety  of  the  captive 
children,  and  urged  compliance  with  the  de- 
mand. The  advocates  for  submission  finally 
gained  the  day.  The  arms  were  collected,  and 
carried  in  an  immensely  long  train  of  wagons 
to  the  Roman  camp. .  There  were  two  hundred 
thousand  complete  suits  of  armor,  with  darts 
and  javelins  without  number,  and  two  thousand 
military  engines  for  hurling  beams  of  wood  and 
stones.     Thus  Carthage  was  disarmed. 

All  these    demands,   however    unreasonable 


284  Hannibal.  [B.C.  148 

Brutal  demands  of  the  Romans.  Carthage  to  be  destroyed 

and  cruel  as  the  Carthaginians  deemed  them, 
were  only  preliminary  to  the  great  final  determ- 
ination, the  announcement  of  which  the  con- 
suls had  reserved  for  the  end.  When  the  arms 
had  all  been  delivered,  the  consuls  announced 
to  their  now  defenseless  victims  that  the  Roman 
senate  had  come  to  the  determination  that  Car- 
thage was  to  be  destroyed.  They  gave  orders, 
accordingly,  that  the  inhabitants  should  all  leave 
the  city,  which,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  thus  vacat- 
ed, was  to  be  burned.  They  might  take  with 
them  such  property  as  they  could  carry ;  and 
they  were  at  liberty  to  build,  in  lieu  of  this  their 
fortified  sea-port,  an  inland  town,  not  less  than 
ten  miles'  distance  from  the  sea,  only  it  must 
have  no  walls  or  fortifications  of  any  kind.  As 
soon  as  the  inhabitants  were  gone,  Carthage, 
the  consuls  said,  was  to  be  destroyed. 

The  announcement  of  this  entirely  unparal 
leled  and  intolerable  requisition  threw  the  whole 
city  into  a  phrensy  of  desperation.  They  could 
not,  and  would  not  submit  to  this.  The  en- 
treaties and  remonstrances  of  the  friends  of  the 
hostages  were  all  silenced  or  overborne  in  the 
burst  of  indignation  and  anger  which  arose  from 
the  whole  city.  The  gates  were  closed.  The 
pavements  of  the  streets  were  torn   up,  and 


B.C.  148.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        285 

Desperation  of  the  people.  Preparations  for  defense. 

buildings  demolished  to  obtain  stones,  which 
were  carried  up  upon  the  ramparts  to  serve  in- 
stead of  weapons.  The  slaves  were  all  liberat- 
ed, and  stationed  on  the  walls  to  aid  in  the  de- 
fense. Every  body  that  could  work  at  a  forge 
was  employed  in  fabricating  swords,  spear- 
heads, pikes,  and  such  other  weapons  as  could 
be  formed  with  the  greatest  facility  and  dis- 
patch. They  used  all  the  iron  and  brass  that 
could  be  obtained,  and  then  melted  down  vases 
and  statues  of  the  precious  metals,  and  tipped 
their  spears  with  an  inferior  pointing  of  silver 
and  gold.  In  the  same  manner,  when  the  sup- 
plies of  flax  and  hempen  twine  for  cordage  for 
their  bows  failed,  the  beautiful  sisters  and  moth- 
ers of  the  hostages  cut  off  their  long  hair,  and 
twisted  and  braided  it  into  cords  to  be  used  as 
bow-strings  for  propelling  the  arrows  which 
their  husbands  and  brothers  made.  In  a  word, 
the  wretched  Carthaginians  had  been  pushed 
beyond  the  last  limit  of  human  endurance,  and 
had  aroused  themselves  to  a  hopeless  resistance 
in  a  sort  of  phrensy  of  despair. 

The  reader  will  recollect  that,  after  the  bat- 
tle with  Masinissa,  Hasdrubal  lost  all  his  influ- 
ence in  Carthage,  and  was,  to  all  appearance, 
hopelessly  ruined.     He  had  not,  however,  then 


286  Hannibal.  [B.C.  14( 

Hasdrubal.  Destruction  of  the  Roman  flee 


given  up  the  struggle.  He  had  contrived  to  as- 
semble the  remnant  of  his  army  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Carthage.  His  forces  had  been  grad- 
ually increasing  during  these  transactions,  as 
those  who  were  opposed  to  these  concessions  to 
the  Romans  naturally  gathered  around  him. 
He  was  now  in  his  camp,  not  far  from  the  city, 
at  the  head  of  twenty  thousand  men.  Finding 
themselves  in  so  desperate  an  emergency,  the 
Carthaginians  sent  to  him  to  come  to  their  sue- 
cor.  He  very  gladly  obeyed  the  summons.  He 
sent  around  to  all  the  territories  still  subject  to 
Carthage,  and  gathered  fresh  troops,  and  col- 
lected supplies  of  arms  and  of  food.  He  ad- 
vanced to  the  relief  of  the  city.  He  compelled 
the  Romans,  who  were  equally  astonished  at 
the  resistance  they  met  with  from  within  the 
walls,  and  at  this  formidable  onset  from  with- 
out, to  retire  a  little,  and  intrench  themselves 
in  their  camp,  in  order  to  secure  their  own  safe- 
ty. He  sent  supplies  of  food  into  the  city.  He 
also  contrived  to  fit  up,  secretly,  a  great  many 
fire-ships  in  the  harbor,  and,  setting  them  in 
flames,  let  them  drift  down  upon  the  Roman 
fleet,  which  was  anchored  in  supposed  security 
in  the  bay.  The  plan  was  so  skillfully  man- 
aged that  the  Roman  ships  were  almost  all  de- 


B.C.  146.]  Carthage   Destroyed.        287 

Horrors  of  the  siege.  Heroic  vnlor  oi  the  Carthaginians, 

stroyecl.  Thus  the  face  of  affairs  was  changed. 
The  Romans  found  themselves  disappointed  for 
the  present  of  their  prey.  They  confined  them- 
selves to  their  encampment,  and  sent  home  to 
the  Roman  senate  for  new  re-enforcements  and 
supplies. 

In  a  word,  the  Romans  found  that,  instead 
of  having  only  to  effect,  unresisted,  the  simple 
destruction  of  a  city,  they  were  involved  in  what 
would,  perhaps,  prove  a  serious  and  a  protract- 
ed war.  '  The  war  dtd,  in  fact,  continue  for  two 
or  three  years — a  horrible  war,  almost  of  exterm 
ination,  on  both  sides.  Scipio  came  with  the 
Roman  army,  at  first  as  a  subordinate  officer ; 
but  his  bravery,  his  sagacity,  and  the  success 
of  some  of  his  almost  romantic  exploits,  soon 
made  him  an  object  of  universal  regard.  At 
one  time,  a  detachment  of  the  army,  which  he 
succeeded  in  releasing  from  a  situation  of  great 
peril  in  which  they  had  been  placed,  testified 
their  gratitude  by  platting  a  crown  of  grass,  and 
placing  it  upon  his  brow  with  great  ceremon} 
and  loud  acclamations. 

The  Carthaginians  did  every  thing  in  th3 
prosecution  of  this  war  that  the  most  desperate 
valor  could  do ;  but  Scipio's  cool,  steady,  and 
well-calculated  plans  made  irresistible  progress. 


288  Hannibal.  [B.C.  145. 

Battering  engines.  Attempt  to  destroy  them 

and  hemmed  them  in  at  last,  within  narrower 
and  narrower  limits,  by  a  steadily-increasing 
pressure,  from  which  they  found  it  impossible 
to  break  away. 

Scipio  had  erected  a  sort  of  mole  or  pier  upon 
the  water  near  the  city,  on  which  he  had  erect- 
ed many  large  and  powerful  engines  to  assault 
the  walls.  One  night  a  large  company  of  Car- 
thaginians took  torches,  not  lighted,  in  their 
hands,  together  with  some  sort  of  apparatus  for 
striking  fire,  and  partly  by  wading  and  partly 
by  swimming,  they  made  their  way  through 
the  water  of  the  harbor  toward  these  machines. 
When  they  were  sufficiently  near,  they  struck 
their  lights  and  set  their  torches  on  fire.  The 
Roman  soldiers  who  had  been  stationed  to  guard 
the  machines  were  seized  with  terror  at  seeing 
all  these  flashing  fires  burst  out  suddenly  over 
the  surface  of  the  water,  and  fled  in  dismay. 
The. Carthaginians  set  the  abandoned  engines 
on  fire,  and  then,  throwing  their  now  useless 
torches  into  the  flames,  plunged  into'  the  water 
again,  and  swam  back  in  safety.  But  all  this 
desperate  bravery  did  very  little  good.  Scipio 
quietly  repaired  the  engines,  and  the  siege  went 
on  as  before. 

But  we  can  not  describe  in  detail  all  the  par- 


B.C.  145.]  Carthage   Destroyed.        289 

The  city  stormed.  A  desperate  struggle 

ticulars  of  this  protracted  and  terrible  struggle. 
We  must  pass  on  to  the  closing  scene,  which, 
as  related  by  the  historians  of  the  day,  is  an  al- 
most incredible  series  of  horrors.  After  an  im- 
mense number  had  been  killed  in  the  assaults 
which  had  been  made  upon  the  city,  besides  the 
thousands  and  thousands  which  had  died  of  fam- 
ine, and  of  the  exposures  and  hardships  incident 
to  such  a  siege,  the  army  of  Scipio  succeeded 
in  breaking  their  way  through  the  gates,  and 
gaining  admission  to  the  city.  Some  of  the  in- 
habitants were  now  disposed  to  contend  no  long- 
er, but  to  cast  themselves  at  the  mercy  of  the 
conqueror.  Others,  furious  in  their  despair,  were 
determined  to  fight  to  the  last,  not  willing  to 
give  up  the  pleasure  of  killing  all  they  could  of 
their  hated  enemies,  even  to  save  their  lives. 
They  fought,  therefore,  from  street  to  street, 
retreating  gradually  as  the  Romans  advanced, 
till  they  found  refuge  in  the  citadel.  One  band 
of  Scipio's  soldiers  mounted  to  the  tops  of  the 
houses,  the  roofs  being  flat,  and  fought  their 
way  there,  while  another  column  advanced  in 
the  same  manner  in  the  streets  below.  No  im- 
agination can  conceive  the  uproar  and  din  of 
such  an  assault  upon  a  populous  city — a  horrid 
mingling  of  the  vociferated  commands  of  the 
T 


290  Hannibal.  [B.C.  145 

The  people  retreat  to  the  citadel.  The  city  fired 

officers,  and  of  the  shouts  of  the  advancing  and 
victorious  assailants,  with  the  screams  of  terroi 
from  affrighted  women  and  children,  and  dread 
ful  groans  and  imprecations  from  men  dying 
maddened  with  unsatisfied  revenge,  and  biting 
the  dust  in  ah  agony  of  pain. 

The  more  determined  of  the  combatants,  with 
Hasdrubal  at  their  head,  took  possession  of  the 
citadel,  which  was  a  quarter  of  the  city  situ- 
ated upon  an  eminence,  and  strongly  fortified. 
Scipio  advanced  to  the  walls  of  this  fortifica- 
tion, and  set  that  part  of  the  city  on  fire  which 
lay  nearest  to  it.  The  fire  burned  for  six  days, 
and  opened  a  large  area,  which  afforded  the  Ro- 
man troops  room  to  act.  When  the  troops  were 
brought  up  to  the  area  thus  left  vacant  by  the 
fire,  and  the  people  within  the  citadel  saw  that 
their  condition  was  hopeless,  there  arose,  as 
there  always  does  in  such  cases,  the  desperate 
struggle  within  the  walls  whether  to  persist  in 
resistance  or  to  surrender  in  despair.  There 
was  an  immense  mass,  not  far  from  sixty  thou- 
sand, half  women  and  children,  who  were  de- 
termined on  going  out  to  surrender  themselves 
to  Scipio's  mercy,  and  beg  for  their  lives.  Has- 
drubal's  wife,  leading  her  two  children  by  her 
side,  earnestly  entreated  her  husband  to  allow 


B.C.  145.]  Carthage  Destroyed.        291 

Hasdrubal's  wife.  Hasdrubal  surrendera 

her  to  go  with  them.  But  he  refused.  There 
was  a  body  of  deserters  from  the  "Roman  camp 
in  the  citadel,  who,  having  no  possible  hope  of 
escaping  destruction  except  by  desperate  re- 
sistance to  the  last,  Hasdrubal  supposed  would 
never  yield.  He  committed  his  wife  and  chil- 
dren, therefore,  to  their  charge,  and  these  de- 
serters, seeking  refuge  in  a  great  temple  with- 
in the  citadel,  bore  the  frantic  mother  with  them 
to  share  their  fate. 

Hasdrubal's  determination,  however,  to  resist 
the  Romans  to  the  last,  soon  after  this  gave 
way,  and  he  determined  to  surrender.  He  is 
accused  of  the  most  atrocious  treachery  in  at- 
tempting thus  to  save  himself,  after  excluding 
his  wife  and  children  from  all  possibility  of  es- 
caping destruction.  But  the  confusion  and  din 
of  such  a  scene,  the  suddenness  and  violence 
with  which  the  events  succeed  each  other,  and 
the  tumultuous  and  uncontrollable  mental  agi- 
tation to  which  they  give  rise,  deprive  a  man 
who  is  called  to  act  in  it  of  all  sense  and  rea- 
son, and  exonerate  him,  almost  as  much,  from 
moral  responsibility  for  what  he  does,  as  if  he 
were  insane.  At  any  rate,.  Hasdrubal,  after 
shutting  up  his  wife  and  children  with  a  furi- 
ous gang  of  desperadoes  who  could  not  possibly 


292  Hannibal.  [B.C.  145 

The  citadel  fired.  Resentment  and  despair  of  Hasdrubal's  wife. 

surrender,  surrendered  himself,  perhaps  hoping 
that  he  might  save  them  after  all. 

The  Carthaginian  soldiers,  following  Hasdru- 
bal's  example,  opened  the  gates  of  the  citadel, 
and  let  the  conqueror  in.  The  deserters  were 
now  made  absolutely  desperate  by  their  danger, 
and  some  of  them,  more  furious  than  the  rest, 
preferring  to  die  by  their  own  hands  rather  than 
to  give  their  hated  enemies  the  pleasure  of  kill- 
ing them,  set  the  building  in  which  they  were 
shut  up  in  on  fire.  The  miserable  inmates  ran 
to  and  fro,  half  suffocated  by  the  smoke  and 
scorched  by  the  flames.  Many  of  them  reached 
the  roof.  Hasdrubal's  wife  and  children  were 
among  the  number.  She  looked  down  from 
this  elevation,  the  volumes  of  smoke  and  flame 
rolling  up  around  her,  and  saw  her  husband 
standing  below  with  the  Roman  general — per- 
haps looking,  in  consternation,  for  his  wife  and 
children,  amid  this  scene  of  horror.  The  sight 
of  the  husband  and  father  in  a  position  of  safe- 
ty made  the  wife  and  mother  perfectly  furious 
with  resentment  and  anger.  "  Wretch  !"  she 
screamed,  in  a  voice  which  raised  itself  above 
the  universal  din,  "  is  it  thus  you  seek  to  save 
your  own  life  while  you  sacrifice  ours  ?  I  can 
not  reach  you  in  your  own  person,  but  T  kill 


B.C.  145. J  Carthage  Destroyed.        29ld 

Carthage  destroyed.  Its  present  condition. 

you  hereby  in  the  persons  of  your  children.". 
So  saying,  she  stabbed  her  affrighted  sons  with 
a  dagger,  and  hurled  them  down,  struggling  all 
the  time  against  their  insane  mother's  phren- 
sy,  into  the  nearest  opening  from  which  flames 
were  ascending,  and  then  leaped  in  after  them 
herself  to  share  their  awful  doom. 

The  Romans,  when  they  had  gained  posses- 
sion of  the  city,  took  most  effectual  measures 
for  its  complete  destruction.  The  inhabitants 
were  scattered  into  the  surrounding  country, 
and  the  whole  territory  was  converted  into  a 
Roman  province.  Some  attempts  were  after- 
ward made  to  rebuild  the  city,  and  it  was  for  a 
long  time  a  place  of  some  resort,  as  men  lin- 
gered mournfully  there  in  huts  that  they  built 
among  the  ruins.  It,  however,  was  gradually 
forsaken,  the  stones  crumbled  and  decayed,  veg- 
etation regained  possession  of  the  soil,  and  now 
there  is  nothing  whatever  to  mark  the  spot 
where  the  city  lay. 

*  War  and  commerce  are  the  two  great  antag- 
onistic principles  which  struggle  for  the  mas- 
tery of  the  human  race,  the  function  of  the  one 
being  to  preserve,  and  that  of  the  other  to  de- 
stroy.    Commerce  causes  cities  to  be  built  and 


294  Hannibal.  [B.C.  145. 

War  and  commerce.  Antagonistic  principles. 

fields  to  be  cultivated,  and  diffuses  comfort  and 
plenty,  and  all  the  blessings  of  industry  and 
peace.  It  carries  organization  and  order  every 
where  ;  it  protects  property  and  life ;  it  disarms 
pestilence,  and  it  prohibits  famine.  War,  on 
the  other  hand,  destroys.  It  disorganizes  the 
social  state.  It  ruins  cities,  depopulates  fields, 
condemns  men  to  idleness  and  want>  and  the 
only  remedy  it  knows  for  the  evils  which  it 
brings  upon  man  is  to  shorten  the  miseries  of 
its  victims  by  giving  pestilence  and  famine  the 
most  ample  commission  to  destroy  their  lives. 
Thus  war  is  the  great  enemy,  while  commerce 
is  the  great  friend  of  humanity.  They  are  an- 
tagonistic principles,  contending  continually  for 
the  mastery  among  all  the  organizations  of  men. 
When  Hannibal  appeared  upon  the  stage,  he 
found  his  country  engaged  peacefully  and  pros- 
perously in  exchanging  the  productions  of  the 
various  countries  of  the  then  known  world,  and 
promoting  every  where  the  comfort  and  happi- 
ness of  mankind .  He  contrived  to  turn  all  these 
energies  into  the  new  current  of  military  ag- 
gression, conquest,  and  war.  He  perfectly  suc- 
ceeded. We  certainly  have  in  his  person  and 
history  all  the  marks  and  characteristics  of  a 
great  military  hero.     He  gained  the  most  spien- 


B.C.  145.]  Carthage   Destroyed.        295 

Hannibal's  greatness  as  a  military  hero. 

did  victories,  devastated  many  lands,  embarrass, 
ed  and  stopped  the  commercial  intercourse  which 
was  carrying  the  comforts  of  life  to  so  many 
thousand  homes,  and  spread,  instead  of  them, 
every  where,  privation,  want,  and  terror,  with 
pestilence  and  famine  in  their  train.  He  kept 
the  country  of  his  enemies  in  a  state  of  inces- 
sant anxiety,  suffering,  and  alarm  for  many 
years,  and  overwhelmed  his  own  native  land, 
in  the  end,  in  absolute  and  irresistible  ruin.  In 
a  word,  he  was  one  of  the  greatest  military  he- 
roes  that  the  world  has  ever  known. 


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isa, Louis  Philippe,  Ferdinand  of  Austria,  Nicholas,  Isa- 
bella II.,  Leopold,  Victoria,  and  Louis  Napoleon.  By 
John  S.  C.  Abbott.  With  numerous  Illustrations.  12mo, 
Cloth,  $1  75. 


A  SUMMER  IN  SCOTLAND. 

A  SUMMER  IN  SCOTLAND  r  a  Narrative  of  Ob- 
servations and  Adventures  made  by  the  Author  during  a 
Summer  spent  among  the  Glens  and  Highlands  in  Scot- 
land. By  John  S.  C.  Abbott.  Illustrated  with  En- 
gravings.    12mo,  Cloth,  $1  75. 


THE  ROMANCE  OF  SPANISH  HISTORY. 

THE  ROMANCE  OF  SPANISH  HISTORY.    By 

John  S.  C.  Abbott,  Author  of  "  The  French  Revolution," 
"The  History  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,"  &c.  With  Illus- 
trations.    12mo,  Cloth,  $2  00. 


SCIENCE 
FOR  THE  YOUNG. 

By  JACOB   ABBOTT. 

WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


HEAT.     12mo,  Cloth,  $1  50. 

LIGHT.     12mo,  Cloth,  $1  50; 

■WATER  AND  LAND.     12mo,  Cloth,  $1  50. 


Few  men  enjoy  a  wider  or  better  earned  popularity  as  a  writer 
for  the  young  than  Jacob  Abbott.  His  series  of  histories,  and  sto- 
ries illustrative  of  moral  truths,  have  furnished  amusement  and  in- 
struction to  thousands.  He  has  the  knack  of  piquing  and  gratifying 
curiosity.  In  the  book  before  us  he  shows  his  happy  faculty  of  im- 
parting useful  information  through  the  medium  of  a  pleasant  nar- 
rative, keeping  alive  the  interest  of  the  young  reader,  and  fixing  in 
his  memory  valuable  truths.— Mercury,  New  Bedford,  Mass. 

Jacob  Abbott  is  almost  the  only  writer  in  the  English  language 
who  knows  how  to  combine  real  amusement  with  real  instruction 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  eager  young  readers  are  quite  as  much 
interested  in  the  useful  knowledge  he  imparts  as  in  the  story  which 
he  makes  so  pleasant  a  medium  of  instruction.—  Buffalo  Commercial 
Advertiser. 

*  *  *  Mr.  Abbott  has  avoided  the  errors  so  common  with  writers 
for  popular  effect,  that  of  slurring  over  the' difficulties  of  the  subject 
through  the  desire  of  making  it  intelligible  and  attractive  to  uu- 
learned  readers.  He  never  tampers  with  the  truth  of  science,  nor 
attempts  to  dodge  the  solution  of  a  knotty  problem  behind  a  cloud 
of  plausible  illustrations.— N.  Y.  Tribune. 


'■)K\U 


7{7j>  35 


